President Donald Trump now says U.S. troops will "slowly" be withdrawn from Syria after his controversial announcement in December, saying that troops would be pulled out within 30 days, led to the resignation of Defense Secretary James Mattis and the accelerated resignation of Special Envoy to Syria, Brett McGurk.
The President has been the subject of scathing criticism over his communication style, but according to The New York Times, he has agreed to a timetable of closer to four months for the withdrawal of some 2,000 U.S. troops.
Cipher Brief Expert Doug Wise, who served as a member of the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service before serving as Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has experience both in Syria and another place where the President is discussing troop withdrawals: Afghanistan.
Last month's resignations of Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Special Envoy Brett McGurk, who both resigned their positions last month in protest over President Donald Trump’s impromptu announcement that he was pulling U.S troops out of Syria, added fuel to a fire that in my opinion, has more to do with how the President makes and communicates significant policy decisions, than it does with Syria itself. Still, the decision to pull troops out of both areas is not necessarily a bad one. Here is what I learned during my years at the CIA and during my time as Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
There is more to the making of foreign policy than being decisive; successful policy requires team effort because of the complexities of blending all of the elements of national power as well as the extraordinary costs of making bad and uninformed decisions. A foreign policy team must work closely with allies and aggressively against adversaries, to set the conditions ahead of an announced decision, as well as to develop implementation details which come after the policy is made public. Recent developments in Washington, D.C. clearly show that the President’s statements on Afghanistan and Syria were unanticipated and uncoordinated with the President’s foreign policy team.
I can’t tell you whether the President’s decision to pull U.S. Forces out of Afghanistan and Syria is a mistake, despite the fact that the way he announced the decision certainly was. What I can tell you is that if the President’s foreign policy team can realign to his decisions, there could actually be significant benefits.
I served in Afghanistan right after 9/11 and I was tasked with coordinating CIA’s efforts on Syria much later in my career. The U.S. is now in the 17th year of a war in Afghanistan that is stuck in a “stalemate” (as recently described by the incoming commander of U.S. Central Command) with no satisfying, Jeffersonian democracy end state in sight, despite the courageous sacrifices by U.S. and coalition military women and men, their families, and the Afghan people. Victory has been illusive in Afghanistan because of the non-state structure of our adversary, the availability of a safe-haven in Pakistan, the uncertain and fluid loyalty of the Afghan people, and the inability of Kabul’s western-installed government to govern a geographically and culturally diverse people who have no real experience with an effective central government. Maintaining a significant military presence won’t change these things.
The President made a campaign promise in 2016 to end the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and his decision to begin to withdraw troops, no matter how controversial, is an effort to live up to that promise. One could make the argument that we “won” in 2002 when the Coalition rid Afghanistan of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and then again when Afghanistan held its elections in 2004. But we remained beyond our welcome, seeking more from Afghanistan than it is capable of delivering. Today, the situation in Afghanistan is hardly stable, the Afghan people may have a greater affinity with the Taliban than with the central government, the safe-haven in Pakistan thrives, and the western military investment is not sufficient to secure the country alone.
The parallels between our situation today in Syria and Afghanistan are obvious. Syria, like many of the countries of the Middle East, was an outcome of World War I, when national boundaries were drawn for the convenience of the victors and without regard to local history, tribal affiliations, culture or religion. The Assad family emerged from the aftermath of both world wars to rule as minority rulers; despotically and brutally. At the time of our engagement, Syria did not pose an existential threat to U.S. national security. But it was Assad’s use of weapons of mass destruction to control the Syrian people which were abhorrent and contrary to U.S. and western core values. President Barack Obama decided on a punitive and non-lethal policy to remove Bashar al-Assad by supporting the Syrian opposition. However, he failed to decisively implement his policy, and Russia, along with its proxy Iran, adroitly exploited that indecisiveness and preserved to Assad regime. The “moderate opposition” was not the only anti-Assad element on the Syrian battlefield. A direct consequence of our invasion of Iraq, (where I also served) triggered the rise of the terrorist group, Al-Qaida in Iraq. Iraq quickly plunged into bloody civil war (a term we were directed not to use under the Bush Administration). And in the latter years of that conflict, Al-Qaida in Iraq morphed into ISIS.
As ISIS was confronted by coalition and Iraqi military power, the organization became less effective and sought the safer environment of a turbulent Syria. The record of coalition military action against ISIS is extraordinary. However, what we have today is not victory, nor is ISIS defeated. Going against ISIS is like treating cancer; there is no cure, but we pushed it into remission.
Preserving a U.S. and coalition military presence in Syria will not have a significant effect on the outcome there, and keeping forces there is all risk with precious little to be gained. Remaining in Syria provides no benefit to U.S. national security and only increases the likelihood of inadvertent armed combat with the Russians, Iranians or the Syrians, any of which could lead to an escalation. It is time for Turkey, other Middle East governments, the Russians and the Iranians to do their part in a post-conflict Syria. We’ve eliminated the current ISIS threat and we can now bring our forces home. It would be tragedy indeed to remain in Syria and allow future U.S. casualties to serve Russia and Iran’s interests in improving the ability of Assad to continue to brutally rule the Syrian people.
For more Cipher Brief Expert Analysis on the Implications of pulling U.S. troops out of Syria:
Read The High Cost of President Trump's Decision-Making Style from Cipher Brief Expert Adm. Sandy Winnefeld (Ret.)...
Read ‘Iran’s Uncontested Influence in Syria’ from Cipher Brief Expert Norm Roule…
Read ‘The Greater Cost of U.S. Absence in Syria’ from Cipher Brief Expert Emile Nakhleh…
Read ‘Prepare for a Return of ISIS’ from ISW’s Dr. Kimberly Kagan…
Read ‘How Will Russia Play a U.S. Syria Withdrawal, from Cipher Brief Expert Steve Hall…
Read ‘President Trump’s Syria Surprise’ from Cipher Brief Expert Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt…
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