The 19 December announcement by President Trump to withdraw ground troops from Syria was surprising to everyone but should have come as a shock to no one.
Here's why: First, ISIS may not be destroyed, but one is hard pressed to suggest that it remains an existential threat to the United States. The U.S. military has done a brilliant job working by, with and through their Iraqi and YPG counterparts and because of their successes, the ISIS caliphate no longer exists. While there are remaining pockets of ISIS fighters, there are plenty of alternatives to combat them. As Joshua Landis, the respected Syria analyst points out, the Turkish, local and/or Syrian forces should be the ones to finish the job, and there is nothing in the withdrawal plan which prevents the U.S. from providing intelligence, air strikes and other support from outside of Syria.
Second, the President campaigned on a platform of “getting the U.S. out of dumb and expensive wars in the Middle East”, and his base - many with service in the military or a close connection to the military - certainly sympathized with that point. With the backdrop of a seventeen-year war in Afghanistan, a return to Iraq, no direct threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from ISIS and a confusing mélange of actors fighting the government (when not fighting each other), Syria is likely not a fight for which the President felt he had public support.
Third, there are unmistakable signs of mission creep. As President Trump tweeted, “The mission in Syria was to defeat ISIS, and ISIS is defeated.” Yet, the U.S. military was committing itself to a longer term mission outside of that mandate to include training a 40,000 man local security force which would have entailed many years to fully train and equip. Additionally, any settlement of the Syria conflict would most likely require a peace enforcement or peacekeeping mission similar to that in the Balkans, and it would be unlikely that the United States would back away from a commitment to that mission.
Fourth, relations with Turkey- once among our closest allies in the region- were fraying and in danger of failure. Many would argue that Turkey needs the U.S. far more than the U.S. needs Turkey, but Turkey has the largest land force in Europe, hosts U.S. air assets, hosted U.S. nuclear capabilities during the cold war and served alongside the U.S. in Korea, the Balkans and Afghanistan. Its strategic location and regional influence are an advantage to any of its allies and its recent dalliance with both Russia and Iran offer strong reason consider mending the relationship- especially as Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulan remains in the United States and Turkey remains important to the strategic political and military goals of NATO. It is likely that with Turkey as an ally, the U.S. may be absent from influencing the final resolution of the Syrian crisis, but Turkey could well be our proxy against the Iranians and the Russians.
Fifth, many will decry the “abandonment” of the YPG. While they have been superb fighters on the battlefield and key to the successes against ISIS in Syria, it is important to remember that the relationship was always “temporary, tactical and transactional”. It was clear from the beginning that this would not be a long-term relationship, particularly as this is a force closely aligned to a U.S. Declared Terrorist Organization. Additionally, the departure of 2000 U.S. ground forces does not necessarily mean that the U.S. is completely abandoning the anti-ISIS forces. As mentioned previously, there is wide scope to continue air support, provision of intelligence and equipping of the forces outside of Syria.
Last, an impending Turkish offensive into Northwestern Syria would be fraught with danger to “friendly” forces. The mission of the Turkish forces would be to “neutralize” terrorist organizations in the area east of the Euphrates, and those terrorists include the YPG. The proximity of U.S. forces to the YPG, in some cases embedded into YPG units, puts an accidental confrontation between two NATO allies in the realm of the possible.
Despite the reasons behind the President’s decision, there remain legitimate concerns over the consequences of pulling ground troops out of Syria. Regardless of commitments to keep intel and air force support to the local forces, they will not have the expertise or precision that experienced U.S. Special Forces provide when working side-by-side with commanders. It also remains a question whether Syrian, Turkish and/or local forces can (or will) keep the pressure on ISIS. Expect setbacks in the counter-ISIS fight, and expect ISIS to make a measurable reversal in its fortunes. One hopes it will be temporary.
In the post-conflict Syria negotiations, the United States just left the table. The decisions for what Syria look like in the future are no longer influenced by the U.S. While our best diplomats were able to attend some of the non-UN conferences at Astana, being an observer rather than a participant is not helpful for affecting the final outcome.
Our battlefield allies, despite a clear understanding of the temporary nature of the relationship, will still feel abandoned. No matter how many air missions or intelligence dumps are provided in the future, leaving the foxhole and departing the battlefield is a combat betrayal. This will come to affect any future operations where we must serve with local forces dependent upon our support. Fool me once….
Last, any mission to “push back on the Iranians”, especially the Revolutionary Guards Corps, has just been dealt a serious blow. Syria was one of those conflicts where the U.S. had a significant ability to affect the movements and the influence of the Iranians. Absent Syria, the number of places and methods to apply “maximum pressure” on Iran has narrowed considerably.
The decision to withdraw ground forces from Syria has created a clamor inside the region and from Syria watchers in the United States. There are many reasons for the United States to stay, yet there are an equal number of reasons to leave, and the readers can weigh those reasons according to their own calculus. Whatever the argument, whatever the rationale, whatever the strategic imperative one finds most important, a decision was made to withdraw those forces in the near term, and planners on the National Security Council, at the Department of Defense and at the Department of State will have to accommodate to the new reality on the ground. And, while the planners are at it, they should expect an equally spontaneous decision on Afghanistan and Iraq somewhere on the horizon.
Read ‘Iran’s Uncontested Influence in Syria’ from Cipher Brief Expert Norm Roule…
Read ‘The Greater Cost of U.S. Absence in Syria’ from Cipher Brief Expert Emile Nakhleh…
Read ‘Prepare for a Return of ISIS’ from ISW’s Dr. Kimberly Kagan…
Read ‘How Will Russia Play a U.S. Syria Withdrawal, from Cipher Brief Expert Steve Hall…
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Read more from Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt here...
