A considerable amount of quiet, intense diplomacy is underway regarding conflict between Greece and Turkey over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited the region last week in a bid to keep escalating tensions between Athens and Ankara from boiling over.
Pompeo said the US will base a US Navy ship at a military base that it shares with Greece in what some view as a sign of symbolic support for Athens. The ship will deploy in Souda Bay, the joint US – Greek base closest to where Ankara deployed its own drilling ships in search of gas deposits earlier this year.
The Cipher Brief tapped expert Norm Roule, former senior advisor with ODNI and career CIA officer, who advises regularly on energy issues, to put this into perspective for us. Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency and has held multiple assignments overseas.
The Cipher Brief: Tensions between Ankara and Athens haven’t settled since we first asked you whether gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean were worth going to war over. The US is taking a more public role in the dispute with the decision to base a US Navy ship in Souda Bay. Help put the regional impact of these rising tensions into perspective for us.
Roule: The Aegean dispute highlights serious fractures in the European Union when European cohesion and relevance are being called into question. Greece, Cyprus, Austria, and France most strongly reject Turkish actions. Paris’ stance is the most significant. It reflects French unhappiness with Turkey over Kurdish issues, Syria, Libya, and even allegations that Turkey has been attempting to influence France’s Muslim community. However, in mid-September, Portugal, Spain, Malta, and Italy joined these countries in condemning Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is significant in that Italy and Spain are among Ankara’s most important trading partners.
On the other side, the European Union (EU) has been less enthusiastic about Greek claims and has urged Athens and Ankara to resume direct talks. Germany currently chairs the EU council and has rebuffed Cypriot calls for sanctions against Turkey. German Chancellor Angela Merkel appears to be the only European leader who regularly engages President Erdogan. Berlin has used this relationship over the past months in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate this issue.
The issue took on a new wrinkle when Cyprus – outraged at the EU rejection of sanctions against Turkey – blocked EU sanctions against Belarus. It took a just-concluded meeting by the EU leadership to convince Cyprus that the body was sufficiently supportive of its interests, and thus allow the divided capital Nicosia to drop its objections against Belarus sanctions.
The Cipher Brief: How important is this issue of potential conflict between NATO allies to Washington?
Roule: The U.S. seems increasingly frustrated with President Erdogan. Washington remains engaged, generally in behind-the-scenes diplomacy, similar to the US role in Libya.
The Secretary of State’s recent travel to the region omitted Turkey but included a visit to the Greek Island of Crete to announce that Souda Bay will be the berthing site for USS Hershel Williams. This will be the first major ship to be deployed in Greece in many years. Secretary Pompeo also made several statements during the trip to underscore strong U.S. relations with Athens. The trip was likely meant, at least in part, as a signal of discontent with Turkey.
The Cipher Brief: There have been other regional developments involving Turkey in recent weeks.
Roule: Certainly, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is at the top of the list, but before I speak on that, Libya and Mali deserve mentions.
A long-burning power struggle within the United Nations-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) erupted in mid-September. GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj announced that he would resign in October, although whether this happens may depend on whether the GNA can form a new government. In any case, Sarraj has been a useful ally of the Turks, and his departure introduces unwelcome turbulence into Ankara’s Libya policy. I expect that his successors will be pro-Turkish, but Ankara will want to ensure that nothing threatens the maritime boundary agreement it signed with Sarraj.
The Cipher Brief: Do we have a sense as to who might be on the list of likely successors?
Roule: I can think of three. Foremost would be the current Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha, who wields considerable political and military influence in Misrata. It was his suspension by Sarraj – announced while Bashagha was in Ankara on official business – that provoked this most recent political crisis. Bashagha is considered close to President Erdogan and indeed can claim Turkish roots. He is a member of the Koroglu community, i.e., Libyans with ancestors who include Ottoman janissaries who settled in Libya and other North African countries after the 16th century.
Other candidates would include Ahmed Maiteeq, Vice President of the GNA High Council of State. Also, from Misrata and a member of the Koroglu community, he enjoys strong relations with Ankara and Moscow. Last, I would add Khalid al-Mishri to the list. Head of the GNA High Council of State, he is considered to have good relations with Erdogan, the Muslim Brotherhood, Russia, and Qatar.
The Cipher Brief: What about Mali? What is Turkey’s interest there?
Roule: As your readers are likely aware, in mid-August, Mali experienced a military coup that overthrew its civilian government. Turkey was among the first to recognize the new government, and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu traveled to Mali in mid-September. Mali is traditionally seen as being within France’s sphere of influence, and Erdogan’s government has publicly criticized French involvement in Africa. Erdogan himself has used angry rhetoric on the issue, reportedly accusing France of genocide in Algeria. Turkey has worked to expand its political, military, and commercial reach into the continent. Erdogan has visited about 28 African countries and Ankara has repeatedly spoken of its export ambitions for the continent. Turkey’s military has eyed Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Niger for military bases. Until the pandemic, Turkish Air flew to around 50 destinations in 37 African countries.
The Cipher Brief: What is the role of Turkey in the current Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict? How does this fit into Ankara’s regional ambitions?
Roule: Overall, I believe Turkey sees the conflict as an opportunity to demonstrate its capacity as a regional hegemon and determination to stand with long-time regional partners. Turkey has trained Azeri officers for decades, conducted military exercises, and remains one of Baku’s top sources of military equipment (after Russia and Israel). Azerbaijan and Turkey also share important energy interests.
A significant Azerbaijani victory would reflect well on Ankara. At the same time, Ankara will likely seek to keep its involvement below a level that would unsettle Moscow. Turkey may also be seeking to employ tactics it employed in Syria and Libya. For this reason, a modest conventional presence along with the provision of equipment, Predator-style drones, and Syrian proxy fighters will likely remain the limit of its involvement if the fight continues to go in Baku’s favor.
Turkey joined Azerbaijan in rejecting a call for a ceasefire by the United States, Russia, and France.
The Cipher Brief: Turkey’s international role feels increasingly militarized. What could this mean?
Roule: In general, it may be safe to say that Turkey’s military has never been so widely and differently engaged in the Turkish Republic’s history. But this comment needs perspective.
We need to say upfront that Ankara remains a partner of the U.S. in Afghanistan; and NATO operations in the Balkans. We should be grateful for this partnership. The injection of Turkish naval craft in the recent Aegean issue is dangerous, but not dissimilar to the actions of the government led by pro-U.S. Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in the 1990s.
Since 2006, there have been growing calls within Turkey from many sides of the political spectrum to restore Turkish regional naval dominance. Known as the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) strategy, this policy originated with secular officers, although it appears to have been adopted by Erdogan’s government. It is hard for me to see how this improves regional security, let alone that of Turkey. Indeed, key states in the Arab world will see this campaign as a threat.
The Turkish military presence in Qatar and Africa is unusual and, at best, complicates already messy regional dynamics. Turkey's role in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and now Azerbaijan involves hybrid war elements that no other NATO member employs so aggressively. Ankara commentators point out, however, that Turkey’s operations are often aimed at checking Russian influence.
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