The discovery of large gas deposits has refueled decades-old territorial disputes in the Mediterranean. In late July, Turkey announced it was dispatching a survey ship near a contested area around the Greek island of Kastellorizo, known as Meis in Turkey. The announcement caused an international stir when both NATO allies put their militaries on alert.
As tensions have risen, improvements in exploration and extraction technology, coupled with growing international energy demands have driven riskier confrontations among Mediterranean neighbors.
The Cipher Brief spoke with expert Norman T. Roule about the latest entanglement. Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.
The Cipher Brief: What is the significance of this one particular island where Turkey announced it was sending a survey ship, when it comes to re-igniting decades-old disputes between Greece and Turkey?
Roule: The smallest of the Greek Dodecanese islands, Kastellorizo is just under 12 square kilometers in size and holds a population of 500. This small island is located only 1.5 kilometers from Turkey’s Antalya coast. However, this area is claimed by Athens, which seeks to exploit the same gas deposits. Greece immediately protested. Turkey announced that it would ignore the protests. Tensions escalated, and both countries put their military forces on alert.
The Cipher Brief: The U.S. aircraft carrier the Dwight D. Eisenhower was also sent to the region. How significant is that, and what about Europe’s reaction to the rising tensions?
Roule: The European Union and the United States have been increasingly critical of Turkish exploration and drilling operations in recent years throughout the eastern Mediterranean and have urged Turkey to halt the survey.
Several European countries played an active role in this crisis. German Chancellor Angela Merkel directly engaged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, to de-escalate tensions. Berlin also stated that Ankara’s actions would directly impact efforts to bring Turkey into the European Union. European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell conveyed a similar message to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu.
France supported Greece’s call for significant economic sanctions against Turkey if it pursued its gas and oil exploration plans. Paris’ response was not unexpected. Relations between France and Turkey are at their lowest point in decades. On June 10, Turkish ships attempted to block a French frigate from inspecting a Tanzanian-flagged vessel suspected of smuggling arms to Libya.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
The U.S. response blended blunt statements calling on Turkey to halt its operations, likely behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and an apparent show of force. U.S. Under Secretary of State Matthew Palmer urged “Turkish authorities to halt all drilling operations off Cyprus.” The U.S. Ambassador to Greece recently called on Turkey to halt plans to survey natural resources in areas where Greece and Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean and instead work with regional actors to develop an approach that shares the region’s potential.
But it may be that most significant U.S. action was the arrival on the scene of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier battle group. On July 22, the Eisenhower transited the Suez Canal for the Mediterranean to conduct exercises with the Hellenic Air Force south of Crete. Such training is not unusual, and the same aircraft carrier conducted similar exercises with Greece in March. This exercise was scheduled to begin on August 2-3, but there are reports the Eisenhower’s arrival was accelerated. My sense is the carrier group was sent, in part, as a U.S. gesture to encourage both sides to de-escalate. Keep in mind that the Eisenhower task force includes about a dozen warships, 90 aircraft, and more than 5,000 personnel.
The Cipher Brief: How has Turkey responded?
Roule: Shortly after the announcement of the Eisenhower’s arrival into the Mediterranean, there were reports that Turkish warships had returned to their bases. The Oruc Reis reportedly remains anchored off the shore of Antalya. Turkey has since announced that it will refrain from surveying seabed areas claimed by Greece and is willing to enter into negotiations “without preconditions” on the issues of air space, continental shelf jurisdiction, and associated gas and oil exploration. Greece has cautiously accepted the offer and talks are tentatively scheduled to take place in Ankara or possibly Berlin.
The Cipher Brief: What is at stake here?
Roule: A lot. I have focused on Middle East issues for more than 35 years, and I have never known an issue that rivals this problem in its complexity, historical entanglements, deeply felt national positions, and strategic impact.
Ankara’s moves are the latest chapter in Turkey’s efforts to redefine regional Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) and gain a greater say in the exploitation of massive gas resources under the Mediterranean Sea. For Ankara, success in this arena would bring tremendous influence in the eastern Mediterranean economies and significant long-term revenue for its flagging economy. Such an achievement would undoubtedly strengthen the political base of President Erdoğan. But perhaps more importantly, Turkey may be seeking to renegotiate one of the most important international treaties of the last century. This issue certainly rivals Iran’s regional adventurism in impact.
Turkey’s actions inject a dangerous element of jurisdictional risk at the same time that major oil firms are reluctant to authorize significant capital investments in higher-risk environments. Significant American assets will be at risk in this area. In late July, Chevron announced that it would acquire Noble Energy, a firm with major holdings in the Eastern Mediterranean, to include Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar gas fields.
More broadly, this is the latest attack on an eroding international order. The incident weakens NATO solidarity, denies regional countries billions in development funds, and maintains Russia’s dominance in the European energy market.
The Cipher Brief: What does this mean when it comes to regional gas and oil development?
Roule: Over the last decade, improvements in exploration and extraction technology, and growing international energy demands have encouraged a focus on the energy potential of the Mediterranean seabed. Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt have all discovered large gas deposits. The exploitation of these gas deposits would be a significant boon to regional economies and ease their reliance on foreign energy sources. Mediterranean gas shipped via a direct pipeline would reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas. For Greece, regional finds have additional value. There have been reports that by 2021, 80% of the gas consumed by Greece will transit Turkey, an unacceptably high percentage given their historically tense relationship.
There has been some positive regional cooperation. In January 2019, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Italy organized the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. The Cairo-based organization aims to reduce infrastructure costs, develop pipeline routes, and promote intra-regional collaboration in the promotion of gas exports. Since its formation, the U.S. joined with observer status, and France has sought membership.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Turkey has actively frustrated the group’s efforts. However, its inclusion brings significant problems. Ankara’s support for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has meant that it refuses to allow Cyprus to exploit its gas reserves without Northern Cyprus’ involvement in project decisions and profit-sharing. Turkey has gone so far as to use naval forces to block development by foreign companies around Cyprus. The presence of military forces unsurprisingly discouraged the involvement of international firms. The head of the Italian oil firm ENI famously commented in 2019 that he didn’t “want to start wars for wells.” At the same time, Turkey deployed its exploration ships into the area.
In July 2019 and, again, in November of the same year, European Union frustration with Turkey reached such a level that the organization ended funding meant to assist Ankara’s entry into the union. Turkey ignored the move. Ankara’s strategy appears aimed at blocking billions of dollars in regional development until regional actors make concessions on Turkey and Northern Cyprus.
In November 2018, Turkey signed a maritime agreement with Libya’s UN-backed government to demarcate the maritime boundary between the two countries. This pact also introduced new complications to its regional gas competition with Greece. The agreement gives Turkey authority over portions of the seabed claimed by Athens. As if this is not complicated enough, Libya and Greece maintain disputing claims to waters south of Crete.
The Cipher Brief: The eastern Mediterranean has a complicated history. How does that impact current events?
Roule: A brief review of some history is crucial to understanding the complexity of the problem and suggests how Turkey will act in the future. The islands of the Mediterranean have been fought over by various powers for hundreds of years. However, this story begins in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. This pact ended Turkey’s occupation by the Allied victors of World War I and laid the foundation of Turkey’s modern secular state. But this agreement also defined Turkey’s new borders, ceding former Ottoman territory to Allied victors and Ankara’s new neighbors. Generally forgotten in the U.S., Turkey celebrates the anniversary of this treaty as a holiday.
The islands and seabed under dispute today were under Turkish control before World War I. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne gave them to Italy. Following World War II, the Paris Peace Treaty assigned Greece sovereignty over the islands. There were other twists and turns during this period but suffice to say that studying this region is a delight for diplomatic and legal historians.
To this day, many Turks question why Turkey ceded so much of its territory, especially in Syria, northern Iraq, and the Mediterranean Sea. In a likely effort to appeal to Turkish populism, Erdoğan called for revisions to the treaty several times. He has also criticized the Turkish diplomats involved in its negotiation. Some Turkish commentators even go so far as to claim the treaty will expire in February 2023, at which point Turkey could reassert claims to lost territories.
The idea that Turkey can reclaim lost territory is unlikely in the extreme at this point.
Advocates of this outlandish claim point to changes to the treaty in 1936 that returned control of the Bosphorus straits to Turkey and the 1938 referendum that shifted the then Syrian-controlled district of Iskenderun to Turkey (now the province of Hatay). If it could be done in the 1930s, they argue, why not now? In 2006, then Turkish Rear Adm. Cem Gürdeniz announced the concept of speak of mavi vatan (blue homeland) in which Turkey would expand naval influence in the eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. This strategy would provide Turkey with economic benefits, improved regional defense and political influence. Such ambitions may have been behind the June 2020 statement of Erdoğan’s deputy, Fuat Oktay, “We are tearing up and throwing away the maps of the Eastern Mediterranean that imprison us on the mainland.”
The reconversion of Hagia Sophia from a museum to a mosque occurred on July 24, 2020, the 97th anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne. It is hard to think of a better way to underscore Erdoğan’s intent to redefine Turkey’s stature.
The Cipher Brief: What is the legal basis behind the competing Greek and Turkish claims over the territory?
Roule: Greece bases its arguments on authorities derived from the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention assigns a country exclusive fishing, mining, and drilling rights in an EEZ as far as 200 nautical miles from its coast. The treaty further allows a country to define this zone based on its inhabited islands capable of independent economic activity. This authority enables Greece to control the area regardless of the island’s proximity to Turkey’s coastline.
Turkey is not a member of the treaty, although that doesn’t mean it hasn’t respected aspects of the treaty in the past. Ankara argues instead that a country’s continental shelf should be restricted to twelve miles from its mainland territory. Under this theory, the area of Kastellorizo would fall within Turkey’s exclusive economic zone. Ankara contends that acceptance of the UNCLOS position for island-rich Greece would effectively give Athens an EEZ 580 kilometers from the Greek mainland consisting of 39,885 square kilometers. In fairness to Turkey, the Mediterranean basin has multiple competing EEZ claims.
UNCLOS does provide that in case of disputes, say when economic zones overlap, the relevant countries are supposed to work out an agreement. However, this has proven impossible between Greece and Turkey and, as I said, Turkey is not a signatory to the treaty.
The Cipher Brief: Could these disputes lead to war between these two NATO allies?
Roule: Greece and Turkey have argued passionately for decades over maritime boundaries. Although neither Athens nor Ankara seek conflict, an accidental clash between their military forces could lead to conflict. Both sides put their respective militaries on alert during this crisis.
Confrontations between the Greek and Turkish militaries are not uncommon, although this topic is rarely discussed in the U.S. press. Mock aerial dogfights between these two NATO allies occur with surprising frequency. Greek pilots have been killed in accidents while engaging Turkish jets. Such incidents usually occur in response to air space violations. In May 2017, Turkish jets and helicopters reportedly entered Greek airspace over 140 times in a single day. In December 2019, Greek and Turkish aircraft engaged in 16 mock dogfights in a single day. Similar faux engagements occurred in early July of this year as Turkish jets reportedly violated Greek airspace more than 50 times. A few weeks later, Greek and Turkish warplanes jousted over the skies of the island of Kastellorizo for more than two and a half hours, the booms caused by planes breaking the sound barrier caused tourists to flee the island.
We should recall that in 1996, a similar dispute involving an uninhabited 10-acre island - called Imia by the Greeks and Kardak by the Turks - almost led to what could have been a war between the two countries. Such a conflict would have had strategic consequences for NATO and the United States. At that time, the U.S. enjoyed relatively good relations with Ankara, and the international scene seemed (at least from today’s perspective) far less complicated.
Beyond Greece and Cyprus, frictions between Turkey and Israel are also growing. Only last week, the Israeli parliament approved a $6 billion pipeline project that aims to ship Israeli gas via Cyprus and Greece to Europe. Ankara will certainly seek to block this deal. It is likely this issue that compelled Israeli military planners to describe Turkey as a “challenge” in its December 2019 annual assessment.
The Cipher Brief: What could the U.S. do to help resolve this dispute?
Roule: We should be careful about claiming that this problem is the result of the current or, indeed any specific U.S. administration’s diplomacy. The fact that this dispute has developed over multiple U.S. administrations for decades underscores its complexity and the difficulty of action. But the extent of this problem highlights the consequences of non-action.
Although the international community should strongly endorse diplomatic talks, it is difficult to imagine a more complex challenge. Ankara may have agreed to negotiations, but it continues to seek a dramatic change to the regional political and economic fabric that would be perhaps unprecedented since 1945.
Any resolution will take an extraordinary amount of U.S.-E.U. cooperation and political capital. Identifying a broad solution to these long-standing disputes would require tremendous international diplomatic effort when multiple high-priority issues compete for policymakers’ time in the U.S. and Europe, and among the other concerned Mediterranean parties. Until this is possible, our focus should be on building a coalition aimed at preventing the outbreak of a conflict, ensuring that Ankara understands there will be severe consequences to any aggressive expansion, and pushing the various sides to political discussions.
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