THE CONTEXT
- On July 26, military officers in Niger overthrew the government of President Mohamed Bazoum. Bazoum’s 2021 election was Niger’s first power transfer from one democratically elected leader to another.
- On August 30, military officers in Gabon conducted a coup against newly elected president Ali Bongo, ending the Bongo family rule that began in 1967.
- The list of African countries whose governments have been overthrown since 2020 includes Niger and Gabon (2023), Burkina Faso (2022), Guinea, Chad, Sudan (2021), and Mali (2020).
- This period has also witnessed a handful of failed coup attempts in other countries: Sierra Leone (2023), Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau (2022), and the Central African Republic (2020).
- The combined population of these countries is around 150 million, exceeding that of Russia or about that of Germany and the United Kingdom combined.
- French President Macron has referred to this period as an “epidemic of putsches.”
The Cipher Brief tapped Energy Expert and former National Intelligence Manager Norm Roule for his take on what's happening in Africa's Coup Belt and what it could mean for the U.S.
Norman T. Roule, Energy Expert and Former National Intelligence Manager, ODNI
Norman T. Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the ODNI from 2008 until 2017. As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policymakers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.
THE INTERVIEW
The Cipher Brief: Are there any common characteristics or drivers behind these coups?
Roule: We are watching one of the more significant political shifts in international governance in memory. Military officers seem increasingly willing to overthrow civilian leaders with a frequency that carries echoes of the turbulent 1970s. The geography of these nine countries stretches across Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.
By any measure, this is an extraordinary shift in power. It would be unwise to think that we have either seen an end to such coups or that the impact will be limited to only the countries involved.
These countries are blessed with significant resources and large populations. However, they share a raft of debilitating characteristics: income inequality, poverty, economic malaise, poor governance involving leaders who refuse to relinquish power, a perception that coup leaders are the only alternative to deal with multi-decade leaders, corruption, and high youth unemployment rates.
Many of these countries are former French colonies, and anti-French sentiment – encouraged by Wagner group information operations – has been growing in the region. Islamic militant groups have been a chronic problem for some, and Western assistance against these groups has not been as effective as hoped. But if their former governments failed to deliver good governance and security, there is little reason to believe their current leadership will do better.
The Cipher Brief: Talk to us about the strategic implications of this trend. Why does this concern Western policymakers?
Roule: Above all, this is a tragedy for the citizens of their countries, who will find it harder to escape the food and energy insecurity that has plagued these countries for decades. This provides a fertile environment for militant groups and encourages migrant flows to Europe.
The U.S. provided Africa with $6 billion in aid last year, and this instability risks human catastrophes that will likely overwhelm Western aid budgets. Europe has also spent billions, but there are concerns about Europe’s funding to Africa that have been reduced to address refugee issues and even Ukraine.
Policymakers have started to wonder what it would mean if these countries formed an anti-Western bloc that favored China or Russia in return for economic, military, and political support. There are probably three areas that would benefit Moscow and Beijing.
First, they would have greater control over minerals essential to Western economies. A short list of minerals available in these countries includes copper, gold, iron, lithium, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin, vanadium, uranium, zinc, and diamonds. Many of these minerals are critical to green energy. The value of these minerals has already brought Great Power commercial and strategic competition to the region.
Second, they would gain new diplomatic allies in international institutions where they seek to upend the existing international order. This would complicate and likely stall, U.S. support for Africa to play a more prominent role in the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, and other international institutions.
Last, Russia and China would have a broad platform and partners to propagate anti-West information operations that would impact Western influence throughout the region. Beijing and Moscow provide similar messaging on Ukraine. It’s not hard to imagine that they would cooperate in Africa. One need only look at the recent BRICS summit in Johannesburg to see how this propaganda played out.
We have begun to see the first indications of security cooperation between these countries. In response to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) warning that it may send forces to restore the civilian government in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced they would respond militarily against ECOWAS, should this occur.
A single look at a map will show that these countries border a number of important Western partners or fragile states. We need to be considering to what extent the establishment of a new anti-West bloc increases regional poverty, the outflow of economic migrants to Europe and the existing counter-extremist efforts. The threat of jurisdictional risk concerning expensive mining operations is often present in Africa. It isn’t unrealistic to consider if these new governments would nationalize Western assets.
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The Cipher Brief: Have the U.S. and Western countries engaged enough in Africa in recent years?
Roule: It would be wrong to say that the West has ignored Africa, but it is fair to say that our response and existing efforts failed to prevent seven governments from sliding into military rule. In its latest annual report, the respected Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) noted that eight of the top ten displacement crises in the world are in Africa. Several of these countries are included in the list of those that have seen coups since 2020.
U.S. administrations have repeatedly tried to jump-start programs in Africa. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama each visited Africa and encouraged greater political engagement, economic efforts, and commercial ties. The Trump and Biden administrations have each launched programs aimed at political and commercial engagement and support against COVID and Russia’s damage to world food supplies with its war against Ukraine. President Biden also held a widely publicized summit with African leaders focused on trade, clean energy, and digital transformation. Our diplomatic cadre in Africa is also quite good and includes many deep experts. Since 2007, AFRICOM and our special forces have worked with regional and European partners to confront militants. At the same time, recent years have seen France “reorganize” its presence in Africa, which some have perceived as a push to reduce the number of French forces devoted to Africa’s security.
Still, it would be unfair to say the West has failed to work with African partners to help them overcome decades of poor governance, corruption, dictators, and instability. A tangible example of U.S. engagement can be found in our recent efforts involving Niger. Niger was the largest recipient of a broad package of U.S. economic and security assistance in West Africa. To underscore our support for the partners, Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Niamey in March – the first such visit by a Secretary of State – where he announced a large U.S. aid package to the Sahel region. Since the August coup, Blinken has declared that U.S. aid to Niger is now at risk. In Niamey, Blinken called Niger "a model of resilience, a model of democracy, a model of cooperation.” This comment does suggest that we and our allies should ask whether we overestimated Niger’s stability and why the coup came as a surprise.
The Cipher Brief: What are your thoughts on Russia’s intentions for Africa?
Roule: In part, it comes down to one’s definition of success. For the West, we focus on encouraging good governance, promoting democracy that supports the existing international order, local action against regional militants, fair commercial competition for resources, and efforts to stem migration to Europe. In nearly every case, Moscow sees these goals as an obstacle to its regional and international influence.
The apparent assassination of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was likely delayed until Putin could be assured that Moscow would be able to absorb Wagner operations and personnel in Africa. These elements probably represent the extent of Russia’s capabilities in the region, at least for as long as it is waging war against Ukraine.
Moscow will undoubtedly exploit the Coup Belt’s friction with the West. Africa represents a potentially low-cost, high-impact, strategically located target for Russia in a world where Russians find themselves isolated. At the same time, we shouldn’t overstate its capabilities or its popularity. There isn’t much evidence that African migrants seek a new life in Russia. Africans recognize Russia as the cause of the region’s food insecurity and raised the issue during the July summit in Moscow. Putin offered free grain to African partners, but it is not yet clear Russia will make good on this promise.
Moscow’s engagement with Africa will likely include high-level diplomacy, such as Putin’s summit in Moscow, offers of political backing in the United Nations, economic and security support, and anti-West information operations. Given their revenue potential, Russia will emphasize commercial deals in the mining and timber sectors. However, Moscow has a poor record of delivering on its promises, even in better days. Most of the deals concluded in the 2019 Africa summit failed to materialize, and Wagner support against militants involved such violence that it turned local citizens against the group. Moscow will also have difficulty offering weapons. By 2022, Moscow had become Africa’s leading arms supplier but now appears to be turning to Africa for such weapons to sustain its forces attacking Ukraine.
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The Cipher Brief: How will Gabon’s coup impact energy and commodity markets?
Roule: At this point, there shouldn’t be any impact, at least in the near term. The coup leaders have announced no changes in Gabon’s oil or manganese production, and they will be reluctant to risk its revenue.
Gabon produces about 200,000 barrels of oil daily, among OPEC’s smallest producers. Its production has been declining and is now just over half what it was a couple of decades ago. In global terms, an interruption to Gabon’s output wouldn’t impact energy markets. More relevant is the destination of Gabon’s oil. Israel increased its purchases of Gabon’s oil due to supply problems earlier this year.
Gabon is also the world’s second-largest producer of manganese, critical for steel making and an essential element in batteries for electric vehicles. The French firm Eramet manages the manganese mining operations in Gabon and only briefly halted operations due to the recent coup. In case of any cut in Gabon’s production, the world would have to turn to other suppliers in China, Australia, Brazil, and South Africa. Manganese is currently not in short supply, but this would change if China’s economy improved or as electric vehicle production places greater demand on battery production.
The Cipher Brief: What about Niger? Isn’t France heavily dependent on Niger’s uranium output to sustain its nuclear power program?
Roule: Niger is Africa’s second-largest producer of uranium, producing about 5% of the world’s total output. Most of this production is exported to France, which produces 75% of its electricity using nuclear power. Although Niger was France’s second largest source of uranium, it seems unlikely that Niger will halt exports. The revenue produced by uranium exports pales compared to the 1970s, but it is still important. Niamey also knows Paris can turn to other producers, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, and Australia, to make up any shortfall. Niamey could seek to increase China’s existing role in its uranium industry. If Niger does cut exports, however, it will make it more difficult for Europe to increase sanctions on Russia’s uranium exports.
The Cipher Brief: What are Western policy options in the coming months?
Roule: The question is whether the Biden administration and its European partners have the capacity to execute a more transformational strategy. I think this is unlikely, at least in the near term. This will also take more than another strategy paper or large aid package. For these reasons, the only options would seem more tactical, an effort to prevent any further erosion of regional stability or Western influence. If so, this strategy will rely on four elements:
Engage partners. A multilateral approach, led by Washington, is likely to have the most impact and will help spur international institutions to action. Our most influential partners will represent a broad swath of the international community. The African Union and ECOWAS need to play a prominent role. Given their regional political and commercial interests, the United Kingdom, Europe, Canada, Japan, and South Korea would also make valuable contributions. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait have deep economic, cultural, and historic interests in Africa.
Avoid actions that will weaken our influence. Anti-western sentiment in these countries is high. China and Russia are already working to undermine our efforts. Protesters in Niamey attacked the French Embassy and ongoing protests may still get out of hand. Local influence over these demonstrators is likely more than they will admit. Still, it isn’t hard to imagine that the security situation in these countries could suddenly deteriorate with terrible consequences for U.S. and partner personnel on the ground and our political and economic interests. Russia or China would be thrilled if they could assume control of our $110 million drone base at Agadez. Multilateral engagement with and limiting economic pressure on coup leaders in Gabon and Niger will allow time to develop a long-term strategy.
Consult and strengthen African partners bordering the Coup Belt. The U.S. should increase engagement with regional partners at risk of instability, refugee flows, or other problems from their coup neighbors. In addition to ECOWAS and the African Union, U.S. engagement must increase with African countries to the north and south of coup states. The U.S. and our main partners should provide tailored aid and security support. Investment projects should be encouraged, likely with the help of wealthy Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates.
Expand U.S. and partner public diplomacy. An expanded and coordinated public diplomacy approach by the U.S. and its partners would be necessary to undermine Russian and Chinese anti-Western information operations. We also need to help regional countries identify and publish the sources of disinformation. U.S. embassies should coordinate such a program in their respective countries.
Work with partners to offer attractive alternatives to Russian and Chinese investment. Investment programs should build on past efforts to diversify economies. But we should also support low-carbon and green energy development to allow Africa to overcome its energy poverty and prioritize internet access. Development efforts must also focus on establishing industries that enable countries to move higher in the value-added chain regarding their natural resources. This campaign should be a significant part of our regional embassy operations.
The Cipher Brief: You left out a military option. Could the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervene in Niger or Gabon?
Roule: I have left out a military solution because I am not sure one exists. Neither the U.S. nor Europe are enthusiastic about sending our personnel to reinstall former leaders, but I expect we would provide support if ECOWAS chose to intervene.
The ECOWAS military option looks unlikely. Since 1990, ECOWAS has had a history of sending forces to intervene in a handful of regional civil wars or to restore democratic leaders overthrown by coups. Its missions often turned into United Nations security operations. I think its last military intervention was in 2017 when it sent forces to Gambia after then-President Yahya Jammeh refused to accept his election defeat. The group imposed sanctions on Niger but has yet to show that it will follow through on reported plans to intervene militarily in Niger to restore its elected government. Given that the Gabon coup occurred after ECOWAS threatened to interview, it would appear that the prospect of its intervention is not viewed as credible.
The Cipher Brief: Last question. Any wildcards we should consider?
Roule: Iran has shown periodic interest in Africa. Most of its commercial operations fizzled. The world protests Tehran’s export of drones to Russia but said little when it sent such weapons to Ethiopia. Expanding Revolutionary Guard engagement with the Coup Belt would introduce a new element of instability and threat in an already turbulent region.
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