Air Power

By Thomas Keaney

Dr. Thomas Keaney is the Associate Director of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Executive Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies.  He is a retired Air Force colonel and was a researcher/author with the Gulf War Air Power Survey from 1991-1992.

Three dramatic developments have occurred in the employment of U.S. air power in the past 25 years: the vulnerability of air defenses faced, leading to far less attrition of U.S. aircraft than was suffered previously; the ability to strike ground targets with great precision, day or night; and the ability to observe, track and target ground forces nearly continuously.  Each is complementary to the others, and together, they allow American air power to dominate the battlefield to a degree not approached before.  The enhanced capabilities reflect technological advances, limited capabilities of the adversaries faced, as well as adaptations by U.S. air forces that took advantage of the opportunities presented by these conditions.   It is important to emphasize that these were conditions, since trends can change and new conditions can well present new dangers.  

Attacks on the Iraqi air defense system at the opening of the 1991 Gulf War exposed the vulnerability of air defenses to the integrated employment of several technologies: laser-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and stealth aircraft, only the last of which was really new.  The United States had used laser-guided bombs and anti-radiation missiles extensively in the war in Vietnam 20 years prior, but their employment put the attacking aircraft in great danger, making their use problematic in highly contested airspace.  Laser–guided bombs on stealth aircraft presented an entirely new and effective attack mode. The stealth F-177s destroyed the Iraqi air defense system, making the radar missile sites vulnerable to the anti-radiation missiles.  As a result, these sites restricted their use of radar except for short periods, and when the severely outmatched Iraqi Air Force elected not to fly in opposition to the Coalition air attacks, the skies virtually belonged to the Coalition air forces. 

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