THE IRAN BRIEFING
YOUR BRIEFER: Norman T. Roule
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Norman T. Roule spent 34 years working for the Central Intelligence Agency managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017. In that role, Norm was the principal intelligence community official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, including U.S. Intelligence Community engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers, the National Security Council, and the Department of State. Norm's service in the CIA's Operations Directorate included roles as division chief, deputy division chief, and chief of station.
THE BRIEFING
A lot happened in 2018 regarding Iran, including the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA, and Europe trying to position itself to remain in the agreement.
How Does Iran See itself After 2018?
Iran, for the near term, would say its economic, political dynamic, and regional posture are relatively stable. Although, all are being challenged as a result of events in 2018. The domestic protests that occurred last year are held in check by security forces and the absence of austerity measures in the budget. Nonetheless, the situation in Iran is going to get a little darker.
Washington's renewed sanctions have certainly hit Iran's economy hard, and European efforts to blunt those sanctions have generally fizzled. The special purpose vehicle, I think, will have great difficulty in luring in multi-national companies to Iran. At the same time, it's always worth remembering that sanctions are a policy and not an end unto themselves. They are an accelerant on existing social and economic tensions. I think it's going to be several years before the situation in Tehran is such that the sanctions have the real impact everyone may seek in Washington.
Nonetheless, this year I think you're going to see as a result of the sanctions restoration, a growing amount of sharpening rhetoric by Iran that it will pull out of the deal, but will, in the end, decide whether the economic and diplomatic benefits from the deal are sufficient, or insufficient to therefore cause it to pull from the deal.
Regionally there's a complicated story going on here. Certainly, Iran is able to maintain significant influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even Yemen, but I think an untold story is that Israeli and Saudi strikes on Iran surrogates, and positions in Syria and Yemen, have actually thwarted the Quds force's ability to establish the significant infrastructure it hoped for in 2018. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, I sense, are also quietly eroding Iran's influence in Iraq, which is also a very complicated dynamic. I would say that despite the animosity of the international community towards the sanctions, or the Sunni states or the United States toward Iran, it's also important to see that in the last year Iran was not able to acquire a tremendous amount of support to protect its equities. Europe has proven, along with Russia, weak in many ways. Europe is unable to stop U.S. sanctions. Europe is unable to stop Iran in aggressive activity. Russia is unable to prevent the United States or Israel from attacking Syria or Iran in Syria. At the same time, Russia is able to block actions in the United Nations Security Council.
I think Iran's greatest strength of 2018 remains in the United Nations Security Council, because Russia is able to block all actions there. There's also the Qatar and Turkish factor. There is a modest amount of trade that goes between Qatar and Iran. It's symbolically useful for Iran to talk about that relationship, but it doesn't have a strategic impact on Iran's balance sheet, politically or economically.
There was much speculation when the U.S. pulled out of JCPOA, that there would be a retaliatory cyber response by Iran.
Do You Believe an Iranian Cyber Response is Likely to Occur?
That's certainly a pressing question. There has been a cyber response from Iran since JCPOA. I think what is sometimes missed, is people are looking for a dramatic cyber-attack, they're looking for a dramatic terrorist attack, or military strike. That's not how the world works. Iran has conducted some rather well-publicized cyber efforts against American businesses and government organizations, highlighted in recent months by such organizations as FireEye and others. That is in response in part, to sanctions, but also in part, because this is what Iran does as part of its maligned behavior.
In terms of its response to JCPOA, my view has always been that Iran will stay in the deal until the diplomatic and economic benefits are no longer sufficient. Those benefits still exist, especially diplomatic, with respect to Europe, Russia and China. I don't see Iran undertaking terrorist actions, or attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq simply because the U.S. pulls out of JCPOA. Nor do I see the likelihood of a war occurring in the near term between the United States and Iran simply over this issue.
The likelihood of confrontation between the United States and Iran is certainly growing, but there's not yet a strategic driver that would cause Iran to believe it needs to engage in what would be a regime-threatening conventional conflict with the United States.
How Then, is A Confrontation Between the U.S. and Iran Likely to Occur?
Primarily regionally. I think you're going to see Iran continuing to attempt to pound the wedge that exists, for a variety of reasons, in part because of JCPOA, between Europe and the United States. You will have the cyber actions continue. Mainly on theft, and probably, I would suspect positioning themselves to undertake more damaging actions in the future. Financial institutions are always a great target, simply because they touch the U.S. economy, just as our sanctions touch the Iranian economy, but we shouldn't rule out the energy sector or manufacturing sector in that regard in terms of a threat.
When it comes to other areas for conflict, there's a growing Iranian missile threat, but I'm not sure the Iranians are going to be firing their missiles against U.S. forces directly. Where there is a likelihood is with Iran's surrogates. We have often talked about the need to avoid a conventional war in the Middle East, and I think all of your readers would say that's what we want to do. At the same time, I think you could make a case that war has broken out, and it's ongoing right now. Israel has admitted to having conducted hundreds of air strikes against Iranian facilities in Syria. That's an air war. The Iranians have enabled hundreds of missile strikes on Saudi Arabia, to include as far North as its capital. That's a missile war. There has been naval activity in the Red Sea, in which U.S., Saudi, Emirati and I believe, Turkish ships, have been struck using a variety of Iranian-supplied weapons. That’s a naval war.
Finally, you have Iranian ground troops in the region training surrogates. Where I think conflict is most likely in the region is actually going to be with either a lucky or unlucky, depends on how you look at it, strike by one of those surrogates. What happens if a Houthi missile hits a significant Saudi facility, and the Saudis decide they simply must respond to protect their national interests? Or, if an armed drone gets into Israel, or Jordan for that matter, from Iran? It's that sort of surrogate activity that could provoke a different threat dynamic in the region.
How Will Iran’s Strategic Arc Take Shape in 2019?
When you look at the Israeli air strikes into Syria, a fact that is often not highlighted sufficiently is that the Israelis have conducted 200 air strikes, or more than 200, whatever number they've put out. That tells you that the Iranians were not dissuaded by the first, second, third, tenth or fiftieth and suggests that there will be more air strikes required by the Israelis. Whatever is being done by Israel in Syria has certainly caused Iran to endure some setbacks. They're not able to establish a presence in the Golan. That's a success for the Israelis. They've been defeated in their ability to put together an architecture to enable Hezbollah, that's also a success for the Israelis. However, the Iranians have yet to be dissuaded from continuing their attempt to build that effort. Among these events and other setbacks in the region, they've failed to impact Bahrain's elections, the activity in Hodeida has reduced their ability to impact the Southern Red Sea. I understand, based upon regional contacts, that Oman has taken steps to tighten its efforts to identify smuggling from Iran, and that has reduced some of the weapons going to Yemen.
The Iraqis refused to consider the late Mahmoud Shahroudi to replace Ayatollah Sistani, something the Iranians desperately want because it would provide them with significant increase in their influence over the Shia world. The U.S. departure from Northern Syria remains a significant issue, and I have a belief that we should stay there for a number of reasons. But I would caution people to not overstress the importance of that presence in the north regarding Iran. Iran has conducted all of its activities which led to Israel's military response, while our troops were there. Certainly, the ground line of communications that Iran would like to build for social, commercial, and military reasons with the Eastern Mediterranean is an important thing to dissuade, but we need to be careful in making sure we don't confuse what we have in the north of Syria with stopping what Iran is doing there.
Finally, I would say that Iran is also increasingly unwelcome in the region, and that's a shift from just four or five years ago in the Sunni states. It hasn't built up its popularity in the way it had hoped. Overall, the Quds force, has won successes of influence, or built pools of influence in seas of rubble which they can't afford to rebuild. And they now have militias that aren't very good at rebuilding or reconstruction. They're only good at fighting and political maneuvering.
What Iran Needs in 2019
What Iran needs in the coming months is stability. It needs stability for a number of reasons, in part because there are inexorable events playing out in the country which it will need to control. It's facing an unprecedented series of simultaneous environmental, demographic, economic, social, and political, mini-crises. The last thing it needs is more confrontation and more of a disruption in its economic and political status, because that would only exacerbate those issues. Increasingly, Iran is facing the fact that its population has lost confidence in the entire spectrum of Iran's leadership. Most of the population doesn't recall the revolution, they were born after it. They barely recall the Iran-Iraq war. You have a different demographic and political environment for Iran's leadership. Iran is also approaching the inflection point of succession. You have the 2020 municipal elections, the 2021 presidential election, Rouhani can't run, and what is really on everyone's mind is the succession process for a new supreme leader. And although Mahmoud Shahroudi was probably a dim hope for replacing Ayatollah Sistani, you do have a coterie of individuals including Ebrahim Raisi, Sadeq Larijani, Rouhani himself certainly would want to replace the supreme leader, and in the coming years, the supreme leader's mortality will just become more heightened, more of an issue, and they'll have to ensure that the architecture for selection is something that allows Iranian leadership to continue the revolution in stirring times. Sadeq Larijani and Ebrahim Raisi are respectively, I think 57 and 58, or let's say they're each about 58. Either one of them ascending to replace the supreme leader would provide 20, 30 years of sustained revolutionary hard-line leadership, which I'm sure is something the supreme leader seeks.
What Does Khamenei want his legacy to be and who does he think can best protect that legacy?
I've given you some names of individuals he believes can protect that legacy. I think Rouhani is very low on that list. The problem is that they're facing a shift in how not just Iran's population, but Iran's new leadership looks at the world. Iran's next leadership will be comprised of individuals who came to age in the Iran-Iraq war. That's a period where they saw a lot of sacrifice, a lot of risk, but also developed their own paradigm as to what the west can be counted on doing for or against them. I think in many ways, this new generation, many of whom are responsible for Iran's external activities, such as Qasem Soleimani, will be just as aggressive. I think he's looking for people to protect the revolutionary dynamic. He's looking for someone to replace him who will be as much of an Islamic jurist. There's a legal aspect to this that people don't often appreciate, and therefore, understanding what the Islamic revolution is really all about. At the same time, I think they're going to have to grapple with the issue of, how do they engage the west for economic benefits? That's where they're having the most difficulty. You can't really have all three. You can't be assertive and aggressive, you can't be revolutionary and then still engage the west. Fundamentally, their economy is, well, as I say, Mohammed bin Salman may have planned 2030, but the supreme leader has planned 1979. That's an old joke in the Iran community, but I think it's still an accurate assessment.
Do You See an Emerging China-Iran relationship?
China is a relatively stable partner for Iran. It doesn't criticize Iran in the United Nations security council where it tends to follow Russia's lead in that environment. It tends to be interested in growing its commercial relationship with Iran and particularly to pulling Iran into the belt road. But China is, like Russia, not an entirely reliable partner for Iran for the long term. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are far more lucrative and more important markets for the Chinese. The Chinese are certainly moving into the region. They have two bases in the world, one in Gwadar and one in Djibouti, that looks as if, on a map, they're positioning themselves to protect the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
As the U.S. changes its relationship with the region, we're not pulling out of the region. I always feel when people say that, they've forgotten about our bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar and somehow look at 2000-ish personnel in Syria as the entire U.S. presence in the Middle East, I've never understood that. But as the U.S. relationship changes because of evolving energy issues, that region will look more closely to China. And China's got to consider where its long-term interests lay, and that actually is not going to be in Iran. One more footnote, Iran is traditionally not excited about Chinese technology. They will take it when they can get it, on subway cars or certain not terrifically advanced equipment. But Chinese equipment is seen as being somewhat low-quality, and for this reason, Iran's long-term goal for technology is actually with Europe.
I want to do a segue on one issue on technology. One of the places where Iran is really in trouble is that its political and social dynamic, exacerbated by sanctions, pushes back on the concept of modernization in terms of technology. If you look at the Emirates or Saudi Arabia, you see these gravity sinks of acquiring technology and new and best methods in the world. You don't see that in Iran. And I think Iran is going to have their self-imposed wound of greater difficulty competing in the modern world, simply because it's turning away from sources of technology out of fear, reasonable, that this would undermine the regime. China can't supply that technological need.
We often hear that as the large population of young people in Iran reaches maturity, that Iran will liberalize. Is that still the thinking?
It's a great question. That tends to fall into something that is in crystal ball territory. One could look at the young population of China and Russia and ask, "How are they doing on political liberalization?" One could look at populations in Iran - there's another old joke in the Iran community, and that is that in 1979, the Iranians wanted a revolution without democracy, but now they want democracy without a revolution. You can't find many Iranians who want to risk bloodshed and the chaos of the Arab Spring in their own territory. Now, this said, the Middle East as a whole is changing. It's hard to find a country that doesn't have approximately 70% of its population under the age of 30, or 35, or 25, and likewise, a population which is connected less by a single nation's ideology and more by social media awareness. Iran's youth and population tend to have a commodity that doesn't exist throughout the Middle East, which has younger states, and that is, it mixes nationalism and a sense of deep patriotism. Many Iranians want to get rid of the Islamic Republic, but I just don't see that they would risk violence to do so.
So, what could this mean? Let's say the Islamic Republic collapses tomorrow. The most likely entity to stabilize the rubble would be the IRGC, that would be a military dictatorship of sort, probably with a Fatwa Council, a religious council, as their mask. Security is a big deal in Iran, so I just don't see that liberalization occurring. I believe it will occur in the long run, but I am an optimist and frankly, I'm sure there were those sorts of optimists who said the same thing about China in 1979 or Russia in 1989, and they were proven wrong. So I would just be careful in assuming that 'youth equals liberalization.'
What one factor, if changed, would facilitate Iran's engagement with the international community on a more equal, rather than a rogue footing?
Iran's external adventurism. I often wonder that when you look at the Trump administration views on JCPOA, what would've happened had Iran just withdrew the primary aggressive forces from the region? Not its political, social, economic interests from the region, those are valid, but why is there a Quds force in the region? And if you took the Quds force away, would you have the intensity from the regional states to endorse the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA? I don't think so. In fact, I think history may at one point judge Qasem Soleimani along with the supreme leader, but will see Soleimani as the face of the one effort which did the most to destroy Iran or to damage Iran, because of his activities in the region and freedom to do so, which just makes Iran a rogue state.
Will Iran Push the Boundaries of JCPOA?
As the benefits from JCPOA decline or are perceived to decline, I think you're going to see a growing rise in Iran's rhetoric. It often just downright lies about its technological achievements. The military commanders and its nuclear leaders have a long and rich history of fabricating successes and progress. I think you will see some of that fabrication come out in their rhetoric. Iran is likely to begin a few research programs, re-install some advanced centrifuges, and make as much rhetoric about this as possible to push the Europeans and the Russians and supporters in the United States to take steps to reduce pressure on Iran. I think the science behind that is something people should study. So, whenever Iran opens a program, it's important to look at organizations such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to which I'm an advisor truth in lending, and just ask them, "What does this new program that Iran has announced really mean?" My suspicion is a lot of it won't mean much, but that will cause, nonetheless, some concern in the West.
Qasem Soleimani
I think it's important to put Soleimani's history and successes in perspective. He's been managing the Quds force, I believe, since 1998. He has a long history of working external activities. I believe he may have begun his external activities in the initial phases of the revolution. Both with Iraq and maybe some involvement with Kurds. But he has limitations. The Quds force has changed since 2003 to become something more akin to a combatant command, in U.S. terms. He is a special forces officer, a special forces leader. He basically grows militias. He runs small terrorist operations. Assassination operations. This isn't the same thing as something, I would say Stan McChrystal did in his career, or Joe Votel at CENTCOM. These are much smaller, far less complicated, very demanding, and important, but also far less consequential in terms of from a military standpoint. They have more political value than not.
He gets away with what he's gotten away with, because there hasn't been a lot of pushback. When you think of what the Quds force has done, either its attempt to kill the then-Saudi ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir in Washington. If you look at their actions to grow militias, there has not been an awful lot of international support and pressure but sometimes, not even much notice of these activities. In fact, I challenge your readers to come up with any international reaction to the attempt to kill Adel Jubeir in Washington. Soleimani’s trade craft in weapons are not exceptional. Why is he successful? He's known to speak for the Supreme Leader. Well, what happens when there's a new Supreme Leader? He's been on the job for a long time, and he has a press machine. The Facebook pictures that he puts out, showing him striding among his adoring people, that has an impact. His logistics channels have never been impeded. What Soleimani's doing in Damascus could pretty much be turned off if the international community simply said, "No more plane flights over Iraq to Damascus. No more plane flights." That would have a significant impact on his ability to work in that environment. And I would say he has never attempted to take on the U.S. military directly. Now, before your listeners all jump in virtually to say, "What about Iraq?," that is again through surrogates. It did result in the death, I believe, of about 590 American heroes, and wounded several thousand, which is critical. But he has been careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States while he builds political influence among his supporters. But if you were to cut off his logistics, have a real international response to the Quds force, and a cohesive international program of confronting the Quds force, I think he would be seriously challenged.
Two final points: His failures are likely higher than his successes. As I say, they're not in the Golan Heights. They have had routinely personnel killed in Damascus, in Israeli air strikes, or in press reports. But they attempt to build a program against Israel that does what for the Iranian people? You have Iranians who protest, again social media, for what the Quds force is doing. So it's actually hurting his country. He's hurting Iran's international reputation. He's establishing a strain of aggressive militant DNA in the region, which I think has changed the DNA of the region as a whole. He's a much smaller figure who's been left alone by the international community. And for that reason, he appears to be larger. I will close on one point. I've seen some people try to compare him to Karla in the John le Carré world and so forth. That's not true at all. I think sometimes these people are interested in coming up with a character. He is a modest special forces general who has a lot of leash and grows militias in the Middle East because no one has really tried to stop him.
What Role Will the Changing International Oil Market Play in Iranian Power or Stability?
When you look at the changing international oil market, you have to ask, "Where is it changing?" It's not changing in China in the near term. Some would say we're watching the Americans pull out of the region. But again, we're not leaving Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.
And the importance of the global trade routes, particularly in the Bab-el-Mandeb will not change because of oil. About 4.6 million barrels a day transits to Bab-el-Mandeb. But also, more than 14, 15% of the globe's trade, entire trade, 12% of rice, I believe, goes through the Bab-el-Mandeb. So, we want to be careful about U.S. interests in the region being only about oil. That's usually a superficial look. For the locals in the region are also interested in moderating Islam, working with the local partners, and particularly Saudi Arabia. That's not really an oil issue. And finally, the economic transformation of Saudi Arabia, which we should all hope succeeds, because if it does succeed, it will sustain a new regional economic dynamic, which the region badly needs. But oil is still going to be important to China.
One more point on this. Russia and Saudi Arabia are, for all intents and purposes, the movers and shakers of OPEC. I believe after those two countries, only the Emirates and Kuwait have any spare capacity, and then it's only about 250,000 barrels a day. The Russia-Saudi relationship is so important; I think that also shapes oil. It also shapes what Russia will be willing to do for Iran in the long term. So, it's a complicated picture. Oil is going to be important to Iran's economy because China, oil will be a bit of a problem because of Russia. And for the region as a whole there, we hope that they are changing into a non oil-based series of economies. For all of our benefits.
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This briefing transcript has been edited for length, style and clarity.
