The security of the Sahel is crucial for the European Union. The Sahel region of Africa is plagued by poor governance, extreme poverty, frequent famine and drought, and a burgeoning youthful demography. All these factors, among others, have contributed to a spiraling irregular migration, Islamist extremism, and transnational organized crime. All of these pose serious challenges not just to the Sahel, but also have spillover effects outside the region – in particular in the EU, given the Sahel’s close proximity to the EU. These challenges call for concerted efforts to tackle development and security in the region. Based on this, the EU, over the last few decades, has invested heavily in the Sahel; one of the vehicles to promote development is the EU Sahel Strategy.
The strategic objective of the EU Sahel Strategy is focused on the development-security nexus and hinges on four pillars for its implementation: prevention and countering radicalization; creation of appropriate conditions for youth; migration and mobility and border management; and the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime. The EU Sahel strategy is implemented via the Regional Action Plan, with an emphasis on closer collaboration and cooperation with Sahelian and neighboring countries. The plan is complemented by other initiatives, such as the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative, launched in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in December 2012; the G5 created in 2014 by the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to address the main challenges in the Sahel, particularly in security and development; the Bamako ministerial platform of the UN, African Union, World Bank, and EU to coordinate the Sahel strategies; the Nouakchott Process launched in 2013 to promote collective security in the region under African Union auspices; and the revitalization of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to tackle common border issues, in light of the increased threat to the Sahel region from Boko Haram activities.
However, the EU strategy and those of its member countries in the Sahel have focused most on stemming insecurity and illegal migration.
On the migration front, the EU’s goal is to close the door against migrants, who are mostly economic and some refugees. According to the New Partnership Framework Agreement unveiled in June, the EU has expressed its determination to utilize all instruments and policies at its disposal to reduce migration into Europe. This was followed up with the setting up of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (a €2 billion aid program aimed at securing African countries’ cooperation in tackling irregular migration), leading to the initial signing of bilateral agreements with Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal and Ethiopia – four of these countries being in West Africa and the Sahel.
Niger seems to be the one of the main foci in the partnership, receiving a total of €610 million in aid ($646 million) to curb migration to Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged €17 million in development aid for Niger’s Agadez region, an important route for West African migrants trying to reach Europe either via Libya or Algeria. This intervention not only breached human rights principles as touted by human rights advocates but more importantly crippled the local economy of the Agadez region. The political problem was that the citizens became highly disenchanted with their government with accusations of the government receiving monies to crackdown on migration, which crippled the local economy. This kind of resentment helps fuel violent extremism and anti-Western feelings in the global south. The effectiveness of the agreement itself remains doubtful, even though the EU celebrated the success of the partnership framework due to a drop in migrants from 70,000 in May to 1,525 in November. This success proved short-lived when the International Organization for Migration revealed the drop was a result of a technical error in the data collection system, which only measured movements through two transit points, thereby not reflecting the plethora of illegal entries and exits into and out of Niger.
Another strong criticism of the partnership itself, like most development agenda in the Sahel, is the focus on a military approach. The bulk of the EU assistance for stemming migration was directed at training and equipping local security forces, while the pact with Niger has been fully exploited to reduce the migrant flow to Libya and the attendant outflow to the EU. This in itself breaches core international law principles forbidding the forced return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to security crises.
On the security front, the EU and other partners’ strategy in the Sahel emphasizes the military approach that includes training security personnel, border control, and, in particular, the deployment of security forces. Virtually all the major countries of the world – including the United States, France, Germany, and China – have a security presence in the Sahel. In addition to the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, which is the permanent military formation in Mali, there seems to be a proliferation of drone and military bases in the Sahel, especially Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Mali.
Besides tackling illegal migration, Niger seems to be the biggest EU ally in security cooperation, with countries such as Germany, France, and other European Union member states such as the Netherlands and Sweden having military bases and drone centers in the country. France, for example, has military bases in Niamey and Madama, and contingents in Diffa.
No doubt the renewed focus on security and illegal migration is based on the terrorists’ activities plaguing the Sahel, namely the ongoing insurgency in northern Mali and northeast Nigeria spanning the Lake Chad Basin, the Grand Bassam attacks in Cote d Ivoire, and the Splendid Hotel attack in Ouagadougou. These have all contributed to the heightened focus on security in the Sahel.
However, the question to raise is, does the EU Sahel Strategy indeed react to the concerns and internal dynamics of the region in enough ways to stem insecurity? The answer for me is “no,” as military operations and increased spending alone won’t root out terrorism or curb illegal migration. The EU and other entities involved in development will have to focus more on addressing the root causes, building bridges and continuous dialogues and engagements. All of these goals are already espoused in the EU strategy on the Sahel, but more political will and prioritization will have to be applied for long-term stability.
