President Joe Biden’s administration is aiming its Middle East agenda on adhering to campaign promises, examining current policies and undoing some that were enacted under the Trump administration. The U.S. has announced that it will no longer support Saudi offensive operations in Yemen and has appointed special representatives to help end the Yemen conflict and guide the U.S. back to the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA. President Biden also recently acknowledged the release of two Saudi activists, underscoring its promised attention to human rights. The new administration has restored contacts with Palestinians, but President Biden didn’t prioritize a call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other Middle East leaders, during his first few weeks in office, signaling a different approach to Israel, though the White House says it remains committed to Israeli security.
Some of the existing Middle East policies though, appear to continue. The administration has condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and has publicly committed to helping the Saudis defend their territory.
The prospect for diplomacy with Iran has hit a roadblock, with Tehran asserting that it will not abide by its nuclear commitments until sanctions are lifted. Conversely, President Biden has stated that the U.S. will not return to the nuclear deal until Iran complies with the restrictions set forth by the 2015 accord. So, what does all of this mean when it comes to the new U.S. policy toward the Middle East?
The Cipher Brief tapped expert Norm Roule to answer these questions.
The Briefer
Norman T. Roule, Cipher Brief Expert, former National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I), ODNI
Norman Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017. As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.
The Briefing
The Cipher Brief: The Biden administration is about to complete its first month in office. What can we say so far about its Middle East policy?
Roule: These are early days, but the administration appears committed to the execution of campaign promises to reverse positions taken by the Trump administration on the tone and nature of U.S. engagement in the region. The senior most foreign policy officials of the Biden administration have well-known positions on regional issues. Events will shape the execution of policies, but their solutions to regional topics are likely to reflect these views.
The channels of diplomacy with the region have also changed. With the departure of Jared Kushner, engagement will be handled via more traditional channels with an emphasis on the State Department. This will inject stability into the relationships but will likely also bring a more cautious approach that may be less likely to produce such tectonic shifts as the Abraham Accords or serious efforts to confront Iran’s regional aggression.
The Cipher Brief: What’s your sense of how the regional players are responding to the new administration’s approach?
Roule: My sense is that the Gulf states and Israel believe the administration will be less hostile than campaign rhetoric may have suggested. Washington will continue to provide defensive assistance, but the White House does not seek deep relations with regional leaders. The Gulf Arabs are anxious that they are being pressed to engage Iran when Tehran and its proxies are at their most aggressive. Jordan and the Palestinians are hopeful for a larger voice; Amman will worry about what it means to leave Iran in Syria. Iraqis likely expect the U.S. will be less likely to confront Iran within its territory. Some Iraqis will fear this leaves Iran a free hand, others will see this as a chance to avoid the instability that comes with such confrontation.
Like every administration since 1979, the Biden administration will prefer to deal with more strategic issues than Iran, but Tehran remains interwoven into most of the region’s most difficult issues and continues to press for regional hegemony. The Qods Force will likely continue to press via proxies for an end to Washington’s presence in Iraq but will modulate this to facilitate nuclear and regional talks. It will be difficult to deal with the demands of Syria, Gaza, Iraq, or Yemen without dealing with the impact of Qods Force operations.
On the nuclear issue, Iran has ratcheted up nuclear pressure on almost a weekly basis, making no effort to mask what is audacious nuclear blackmail. Tehran probably believes it can create a list of issues against which it can use to negotiate for financial and political inducements, or at least to limit demands to extend existing nuclear restrictions. Iran’s leadership also likely believes that Washington (and the Europeans) will be susceptible to its pressure campaign. We should expect Iran to continue to project a mix of defiance with occasional hints of compromise. The former will be louder in public, the latter stressed in private. Both tactics allow Iran to discourage multilateral pressure.
The Cipher Brief: What is your greatest concern about the region overall?
Roule: The international community has somehow accepted broken states and hybrid war conflicts as a new and tolerable normal. Future historians will likely cite this as a dark inflection point for our generation. I believe the system of collective security has not seen such an assault since the mid-1930s. Israel fights alone against Iran’s efforts to build an architecture in Syria. Gulf-states such as Bahrain get little support when they discover Iranian-supported attacks. The Yemen conflict has morphed into a constant (and often partisan) stream of criticism of Riyadh.
The Cipher Brief: Do you see any start to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians?
Roule: This will be difficult. Each side is defined by a complicated political dynamic which does not reward concessions. The Palestinian Authority needs fresh leadership. I think we need to let the politics play out in Israel and among the Palestinians. The Abraham Accords offer some of the new dynamic we need, but I am not sure this will be enough. For example, a U.S. return to the Iran nuclear deal will end significant sanctions which will provide the Qods Force with additional resources for such actors as Hamas.
The Cipher Brief: How will success be measured in Syria?
Roule: I am not sure the administration has decided on the shape of this policy. U.S. troops are likely to remain and relations with the Syrian Kurds will improve. Washington will need to find a way to work with Russia and Turkey. Some in the administration will likely argue that we should even engage Iran on this conflict. Inevitably, Iran and Russia will claim that all they seek is national elections, but in reality, they will aim for elections that will sustain the war criminal Bashar al-Assad. Turkey will be reluctant to withdraw from what it perceives as a buffer zone against Kurdish-terrorism, and a foothold in territory that was once controlled by the Turks.
