SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE EXPERT INTERVIEW — Iran’s incoming president Masoud Pezeshkian is promising to be a leader for “all Iranians” after a weekend election victory that followed the death of former Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May.
The former lawmaker and reformist may find it difficult to deliver on his promises, however, given internal pressures between hardliners and a population often willing to take to the streets demanding change.
Pezeshkian acknowledged apathy among voters – turnout was estimated at some 50% of those eligible to vote - but he promised that his administration would signal a “new chapter” for Iran. As a candidate, Pezeshkian pledged a warmer relationship with the West that would lead to an easing of international sanctions. In the runoff vote, he defeated the ultraconservative anti-Western candidate Saeed Jalili.
The Cipher Brief tapped former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norman Roule to explain what Pezeshkian’s victory means for Iran and the world, and how he is likely to lead while addressing the blistering sanctions at home and growing pressure over Iran’s use of military proxies throughout the Middle East.
The Cipher Brief: What’s your overall assessment of the election of Masoud Pezeshkian? Is this a positive or negative development? Does it matter?
Roule: The short answer is that Masoud Pezeshkian’s election will have no impact in the near term on any of Iran’s aggressive policies that have created the sanctions regime and even periodic consideration of military action. Pezeshkian will function within a political topography in which the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard, public and private sector networks loyal to this hardline elite, and that portion of the Iranian electoral supporting hardline ideology, define the framework of political and economic decisions. He may seek to reform aspects of the system, but he doesn’t have the authority to do so without the concurrence of the Supreme Leader.
Further, Pezeshkian’s political career provides valuable insights into his likely behavior as a regime insider, albeit one interested in some domestic reforms and diplomacy to achieve sanctions relief. He has repeatedly endorsed the Islamic Republic's hardline ideology and expressed his loyalty to the Supreme Leader.
Based on his statements and personal history, it is likely that he will support regime hardliners in their efforts to preserve the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic at a time when its popular support has never seemed more fragile. The passing of the revolutionary generation, plummeting voter turnout, and frequent bouts of widespread unrest make it clear that the regime must do something to build popular support. This is an extraordinary situation given that the succession to the next Supreme Leader is a growing likelihood.
The Cipher Brief: Masoud Pezeshkian isn’t well known in the West. What do we need to know about him?
Roule: That’s true. It’s interesting to note that he is sixty-nine years old, making him the oldest person elected president of Iran. His predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, was sixty-three when he died. Pezeshkian was born and raised in northwest Iran. He is not ethnically Persian. His father was Azeri, and his mother was Kurdish. He grew up speaking both languages and has a record of being proud of his ethnic background. He served as a medic in the Iran-Iraq war, later became a heart surgeon, and then head of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. His wife died in a 1994 car crash, and he never remarried, raising several children on his own. He is considered pious and an authority on the sayings of the first Shi’ite Imam Ali.
Politically, Pezeshkian entered parliament in 2008 and served sixteen years as the representative for Iran’s East Azerbaijan province. Under the (Mohammad) Khatami administration, he served as Vice Minister and Minister of Health. His tenure wasn’t without turbulence, but he developed a reputation for integrity. This election marked his third attempt at the presidency.
The Cipher Brief: The State Department commented that the election was neither free nor fair. How do you anticipate that Washington will respond to Pezeshkian’s election?
Roule: The State Department statement didn’t veer far from themes voiced during the Raisi administration. Namely, Washington does not expect that the election will lead to a fundamental change in Iran’s regional aggression or domestic oppression. But the U.S. remains committed to diplomacy.
If the Biden administration returns to office, it is likely that at least indirect negotiations will follow. We still have hostages in Iran. Europe, China, and Russia will not support sanctions if Tehran is interested in talks. This said, negotiations are unlikely to change Iran’s malign intent, absent significant changes in the regime.
The Cipher Brief: If the election was neither free or fair as the State Department says, why do you think a relatively unknown candidate was be allowed to run in the election and win? Wouldn’t the regime have preferred a hardliner to ensure no surprises in a succession scenario?
Roule: This is a question that political analysts will ponder for a long time. The core leadership of the Islamic Republic may have interpreted the persistent collapse of voter participation in the wake of the Guardian Council’s mass disqualification of reform-minded candidates as a threat to regime stability. The regime has long boasted that voter turnout was evidence of the legitimacy of the revolution. Khamenei probably would have preferred to see Saeed Jalili or Mohammed Ghalibaf win the election. However, recent polls have conclusively shown that a robust turnout of voters requires pro-reform candidates.
Regarding Pezeshkian specifically, his selection may have been based on the idea that his election would not restore the fortunes of Presidents (Hassan) Rouhani or (Mahmoud) Ahmedinejad. Last, a more conciliatory face would also play well internationally with those who seek engagement and oppose sanctions. As Pezeshkian’s popularity rose in the election, Khamenei likely understood that overt manipulation of the election would have sparked unrest similar to 2009.
The Cipher Brief: What are Pezeshkian’s political views? Is he a hardliner or, as some claim, a moderate?
Roule: The term moderate has no place in Iran’s political hierarchy. At best, you have hardline conservatives and more pragmatic conservatives willing to soften their demands for political power.
As to Pezeshkian, he is known to be a staunch supporter of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic, but also as someone who is willing to push for reforms that would strengthen the Islamic Republic. He has spoken out in favor of better treatment for Iran’s Sunnis, non-Persian minorities, and women. During the protests that followed the cruel murder of Mahsa Amini while in police custody, he criticized both her detention and the actions of protestors. At the same time, he has a record of strongly supporting the veiling of women.
On foreign policy, he has been a proponent of negotiations with the West but also a supporter of Iran’s nuclear expansion and ending cooperation with nuclear inspectors. The challenge will be to ensure that those who hear his conciliatory statements don’t overlook his record or forget the limitations of his power within Iran.
The Cipher Brief: Break down the role and limitations of Iran’s president compared to the Supreme Leader. If the Supreme Leader holds all the power, does it matter who is president?
Roule: Supreme Leader (Ali) Khamenei remains Iran's paramount political and religious authority. He serves as head of state and ultimate commander of the armed forces, judiciary, state radio and television system. He appoints the head of the Revolutionary Guards and confirms the latter’s senior appointments.
Whereas he doesn’t dictate every detail of national policy, he does create the framework of what is possible and leaves it to the President to execute this vision. The 2014 Iranian nuclear negotiations offer an excellent example of this dynamic. The Supreme Leader made no secret of his distrust of the talks at the time and engagement with the U.S. in general. But he nonetheless authorized then-President Rouhani and Foreign Minister (Mohammad Javad) Zarif to undertake the negotiations, albeit on the condition that doing so protected Iran’s right to domestic industrial enrichment, Iran’s right to nuclear research and development, and Iran’s ability to retain key nuclear facilities. He also rejected any idea that Iran would negotiate on its role in the region or missile program. Khamenei voiced his disapproval of the process throughout the talks but authorized the eventual deal. At the same time, Iran’s negotiators refused to discuss missile restrictions, Iran’s support for terrorism, or Iran’s regional aggression.
It might be best to think of Iran’s president as akin to the function of a Chief Operating Officer in a Western firm. He lacks the authority to oppose the Supreme Leader’s views. Still, he can influence policy and create a political environment favorable to specific policies through his ministerial appointments and the domestic political atmosphere they foster. The president is also responsible for national economic and financial policy, including such politically sensitive issues as subsidies, health care, and significant infrastructure investments.
But we should be clear. The president has minimal influence over Revolutionary Guard operations abroad, including terrorism, support for militias, and arms transfers. Pezeshkian will lead Iran’s traditional diplomatic engagement with foreign leaders and international institutions, but he will also be charged with protecting the violent actions of the Revolutionary Guard. Again, we have a historical example to show how this plays out. Following the Iran nuclear deal, Western diplomats invited Iran to join efforts to resolve the Syria crisis. Then Foreign Minister Zarif’s role was decidedly unhelpful during this process as he focused on protecting the interests of the Quds Force head, Qassem Soleimani.
The Cipher Brief: What are you expecting from the Pezeshkian administration?
Roule: Based on Pezeshkian’s past political performance and the realities of Iran’s political system, the regime may adopt a softer tone, but we are unlikely to see any significant shifts in Iran’s foreign, domestic, or nuclear policies. Ultimately, he is a regime loyalist with limited powers facing entrenched interests and daunting structural challenges. The hardline conservatives may have lost the election, but they remain a potent political force and won’t tolerate any efforts that undercut their power or financial interests. Even Iranian voters don’t expect much of a change. It may be that Pezeshkian will seek incremental wins to show Iran’s disillusioned electorate that he delivered on his economic and social promises.
Moving forward, Pezeshkian’s priority will be addressing Iran’s failing economy. This will be a tough challenge. He inherits an economy battered by systematic mismanagement, corruption, decades of inflation, sanctions, and a collapse in the value of Iran’s currency. The Revolutionary Guard dominates many private sector institutions and has exploited the current state of affairs for financial and political gain.
In the best of cases, it would take years for a government to improve the situation. Serious structural reforms – such as subsidy cuts – are likely out of the question for now, if only because doing so would likely spark widespread protests. The Supreme Leader will expect him to continue existing policies to build a resistance economy while seeking ways to overcome Western sanctions. I would expect Pezeshkian to highlight efforts to increase economic efficiency and reduce domestic corruption while trying to accelerate economic agreements with foreign partners that erode the impact of sanctions.
Regarding Iran’s foreign policy, his influence will be modest, but he will have a high profile regarding state visits and the United Nations. He will undoubtedly pursue a policy of engagement with Gulf states, China, Russia, India, Africa, and Europe. Pezeshkian may seek indirect negotiations with the U.S. at some point, but for now, he will await the results of U.S. elections before presenting a strategy for direct talks to the Supreme Leader. Election turbulence in the U.S., UK, and EU will likely preclude any outreach by these governments at this time.
Regarding social policy, Pezeshkian will likely seek to moderate the enforcement of hijab rules and perhaps ease Internet restrictions. During the campaign, he argued in favor of reduced hijab restrictions, but his history doesn’t suggest he opposed the policy. Indeed, he officially supported veiling in the past and boasted that he helped enforce mandatory veiling in hospitals and universities following the 1979 revolution. He may also seek to push resources toward regions dominated by Iran’s disgruntled Sunni and non-Persian ethnic population.
The Cipher Brief: What does Pezeshkian’s election mean for Iran’s nuclear program?
Roule: Pezeshkian will likely argue for nuclear negotiations that could temporarily constrain Iran’s program, similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but no more. In 2020, he supported the Majlis' (Iranian parliament's) Strategic Action Plan that authorized increased uranium enrichment and the restriction of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors' access to Iranian nuclear facilities. We should expect him to continue periodic statements favoring nuclear negotiations to gain sanctions relief. He might authorize increased IAEA access and slow or even pause the installation of advanced centrifuges and accretion of highly enriched uranium. These steps would all be easily reversible but would cause some – especially in Europe, Russia, and China – to oppose further sanctions pressure while the process continues.
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