OPINION — In March 2025, an elderly cleric with a long history in Pakistan’s jihadist circles stood before a gathering at Markaz-e-Taiba and called for “jihad against the kuffaar,” explicitly naming India and Israel. The speaker was Amir Hamza, co-founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and his sermon came just weeks before the Pahalgam attack, in which 26 civilians were killed in India’s Union Territory of Kashmir. One year since the Pahalgam attack, Makraz-e-Taiba—LeT's headquarter in Pakistan—remains destroyed because of an Indian airstrike during Operation Sindoor, and Amir Hamza survived two assassination attempts. However, Pakistan-based terrorist organizations have adopted to changing operational circumstances and expanded their geographical reach under the auspice of Pakistan’s civil-military leadership.
The questions remain whether anything has meaningfully changed at all since the four-day conflict between India and Pakistan unfolded in May last year. The answer, based on evolving patterns of activity, appears to be no. Rather than dismantling these networks, Pakistan-based terrorist organizations have adapted, restructured, and in many ways expanded their reach under the protection of the country’s civil-military establishment. Such accommodations not only reveal the acceptance of terrorist organization but exposes the links that continue to flourish under the leadership of Pakistan’s de-facto leader, Field Marshal Asim Munir. As Pakistan continues to position itself as a peacemaker in the Middle East, Islamabad’s ongoing support for Salafi-Jihadi groups reveals a fresh chapter of Pakistan’s long-troubled history with terrorism.
New Logo, Same Motto
Pakistan has formally banned organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), but these actions have not translated into meaningful dismantlement. Indian kinetic operations imposed operational setbacks for terrorist outfits and caused significant damage to the state’s military infrastructure, yet Islamabad has not eliminated these groups but helped mainstream them. These groups have now reoriented themselves through layered organizational structures that preserve their operational capabilities while providing a veneer of legitimacy. This transformation is most visible in the emergence of the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML), widely understood to function as a political front for LeT.
This dual-track strategy—pairing militancy with political participation—is not new, but it has intensified in recent years, particularly under the consolidation of power by Field Marshal Asim Munir. LeT operatives have increasingly appeared in public political spaces, participating in rallies, community outreach programs, and youth mobilization campaigns. These activities blur the boundary between extremist networks and mainstream political life, making it more difficult to distinguish between state-sanctioned political engagement and covert militant operations.
The presence of figures such as Saifullah Khalid Kasuri, a veteran LeT commander now operating within the PMML framework, highlights the extent of this integration. Kasuri, who resurfaced on US radar in 2024 after meeting Hamas terrorist Khaled Mashal in Doha, has openly acknowledged his ties to the Pakistani military and has been photographed alongside senior officers. Similarly, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, a US-designated terrorist, has been seen leading funeral prayers for Pakistani soldiers in the presence of uniformed officials. These instances reflect a pattern of proximity between militant actors and state institutions that raises serious questions about Pakistan’s commitment to counterterrorism.
Despite failing to secure electoral success, PMML has remained active as an ideological platform, targeting youth through training camps, religious competitions, and public gatherings. On several occasions, LeT leader and son of Hafiz Saed, Talha Saeed, has hosted rallies which have been attended by senior Pakistani politicians. In a picture recently leaked online, PMML-Islamabad chief can be seen sitting with Pakistani Defense Minister Khwaja Asif. Such evidence of close relationship between LeT-led political outfit and high-profile Pakistani politicians reveals the degree of access LeT operatives enjoy under the cover of political activities.
Adaptation and Expansion: New Networks, Old Objectives
The transformation of militant groups is not limited to political rebranding. These organizations have also adapted their operational and financial strategies to evade scrutiny and sustain activity. LeT-linked charity networks such as Falah-i Insaniat Foundation (FIF) continue to raise funds across Pakistan, despite being subject to US sanctions. Meanwhile, groups like JeM have shifted toward digital financing mechanisms, including mobile wallets and decentralized payment systems, allowing them to operate with greater anonymity and reduced reliance on formal banking channels. This shift into digital ecosystems represents a significant evolution in militant financing. It reduces the effectiveness of traditional counterterrorism tools, such as financial monitoring and sanctions, while enabling groups to tap into new sources of funding. The result is a more resilient and adaptive network capable of sustaining operations even under increased international scrutiny.
At the same time, these groups are expanding geographically within Pakistan. On April 14, LeT leaders Saifullah Kasuri and Faisal Nadeem visited Quetta in Balochistan Province held a large gathering of LeT cadres. Hundreds attended the gathering in Quetta, which likely reflects LeT’s attempt to strengthen the organization in Balochistan. Historically concentrated in Punjab, organizations like LeT and JeM are now establishing a presence in regions where they previously had limited influence, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Recent reporting of recruitment drives by JeM in remote areas of KPK also indicate a deliberate effort to broaden their operational footprint in western Pakistan. This expansion serves multiple purposes. First, it allows these groups to diversify recruitment and funding sources, reducing their dependence on traditional strongholds. Second, it enables them to rebuild organizational capacity following losses inflicted by Indian military operations. Third, and perhaps most significantly, it aligns with Pakistan’s broader security challenges.
Pakistan is currently facing a surge in internal insurgencies, particularly from groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) in Balochistan. According to the 13th edition of Global Terrorism Index, TTP and BLA were responsible for more than 1,000 attacks in 2025, making Pakistan one of the most terrorism-affected countries globally. In this context, the expansion of LeT and JeM into western Pakistan takes on a new dimension. Rather than being solely oriented toward external targets such as India, these groups may also be serving as instruments of internal counterinsurgency. By recruiting fighters in regions affected by anti-state violence, Pakistan’s military establishment could be attempting to leverage jihadist networks to counter other militant threats. This strategy, while tactically expedient, carries significant risks. It reinforces the ecosystem of militancy rather than dismantling it, creating a cycle in which one form of extremism is used to combat another. Over time, this approach is likely to deepen instability, as different militant groups compete for influence, resources, and legitimacy.
Conclusion: A Persistent Threat to Regional Stability
The persistence and adaptation of these networks raise a fundamental question: has anything truly changed since the Pahalgam attack and the subsequent India-Pakistan crisis? On the surface, there have been visible actions through Indian military operations. However, this has not addressed the underlying structures that sustain militancy in Pakistan. Instead, Pakistan’s approach appears to have shifted toward managing, rather than eliminating, extremist networks. By allowing these groups to operate through political fronts, charitable organizations, and decentralized financial systems, the state has effectively created a parallel ecosystem in which militancy can evolve without direct confrontation. This approach may provide short-term flexibility, but it undermines long-term stability. It perpetuates a cycle of violence that extends beyond Pakistan’s borders, posing a continuing threat to regional security, particularly in South Asia.
One year after Pahalgam, Pakistan’s militant ecosystem has not weakened but evolved, exposing the reality of its military’s "death by a thousand cuts” doctrine against India. This reality should raise serious concerns in Washington, especially as the United States increasingly relies on Pakistan as a mediator in its engagement with Iran. US policymakers must therefore approach this partnership with caution, recognizing that a state struggling to manage its own militant ecosystem may not be a dependable broker in high-stakes regional diplomacy.
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