Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, US Army (Ret) was the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2008-2009. Prior to that, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs from 2006-2008. These positions followed a 30-year career in the military with service as Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans at US Central Command and Deputy Director of Operations for Coalition Forces in Iraq.
For most Americans, Libya has fallen off a crowded screen dominated by COVID, the tragic death of George Floyd, China, Russian election interference and a host of domestic issues. The odd coalitions among the adversaries, too, make it confusing. On one side is the UN-endorsed Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by the UN and most international organizations, Turkey and Qatar; on the other side is the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a former colonel in the Libyan army and a US citizen. The LNA is supported by Russia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, France and Jordan. The US position was made clear in 2017 when President Trump said, “I do not see a [U.S.] role in Libya. I think the United States has right now enough roles”, a comment which has come to characterize the administration’s view regarding foreign interventions in general.
On 26 May, General Steve Townsend of U.S. Africa Command released an assessment asserting that Moscow “recently deployed military fighter aircraft to Libya…to support Russian state-sponsored private military contractors (PMCs) operating on the ground.” Making comparisons to the Russian deployments into Syria in 2015, Townsend not only worried about the potential use of these aircraft against the civilian population but also expressed concern as to the strategic consequences of Russia’s return to its pre-2011 presence in Libya. Townsend’s Air Force commander was equally blunt in his concerns, noting potential Russian bases on the Libyan coast would likely position “anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities” which would “create real security concerns on Europe’s southern flank”. Unmentioned but equally alarming would be the potential to hamper or prevent U.S. anti-ISIS operations in the ungoverned spaces of southern and eastern Libya.
The recent escalation of Russia’s role in Libya is cause for concern. Over the past decade, Russia’s role in the MENA region has steadily grown, with some billing it as “crucial player” and “able to determine the outcome of many crises”. Others have dismissed Russia’s MENA strategy as “mere opportunism”. Earlier this year, some praised Russia and Turkey for their mediation attempts in Libya, despite their respective roles in fueling the conflict by arming opposite sides. Others have warned of an imminent “threat of Turco-Russian suzerainty” over the MENA region.
Yet, In the midst of these concerns lies an opportunity for the US. President Trump’s reluctance to become more deeply involved in the Libyan war now puts the US in a unique position as an “honest broker” to intervene diplomatically to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table as well as thwart another Russian attempt to reestablish its presence in the region.
The diplomatic framework is already in place. The Berlin Conference on Libya, concluded in January, set out a clear vision of aspirations and objectives. The headline goals were laudable: a military ceasefire, enforcement of the longstanding UN arms embargo, a return to the political process, security sector reform and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights. However, the agreed “Follow Up” was tepid – “support for the operationalization of these conclusions”, “translation of the commitments ...into actionable objectives will be key” and the establishment of “an international follow-up committee” in order to maintain coordination with “four technical working groups to take place twice a month”. Anyone with background in international organizations ranging from the United Nations to NATO can read through the “Follow-Up” and understand it is a prescription for inertia and status quo.
What is required is firm commitment from a lead nation. A successful example is the 2009 implementation of UNSCR 1851 addressing piracy off the coast of Somalia. The United States intentionally took the lead, guiding an effort with a small group of nations initially – to include Russia and China – growing over time to 60 nations and international organizations. The results of the efforts virtually eliminated piracy as a threat to international shipping within years. This would not have happened without US leadership, and absent significant US interests at stake, permitted that leadership within an “honest broker” context.
In Libya, the US is similarly positioned to assume a commanding role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table. With no direct involvement in the civil war, the US might, as in Somalia, serve as the lead nation. It has allies on both sides of the conflict, each responsive to US influence. The direct and indirect military support given to the direct and indirect military support given to the GNA from Turkey and Qatar – as well as the authority of numerous UN resolutions – means that the US, if it chooses, can roll up its sleeves and do the hard diplomatic work to “urge” these allies to implement and enforce the UN resolutions and the recent Berlin headline goals. The same “sleeves-up” work can be done with the main LNA supporters - Eqypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and France - although little help can be expected from the Russians. Like the implementation of UNSCR 1851, the success of these efforts will be accomplished in the background via strong bilateral and multilateral efforts, not through “technical working groups [meeting] twice per month”.
The underlying rationale for these efforts should focus on the concerns cited by AFRICOM in its recent press release. While bringing all sides to the negotiating table is a noble purpose, it can also help to thwart a Russian effort to repeat a 2015 Syria scenario. It leaves little to the imagination to consider why Russia helped a struggling Assad in 2015 or why Russia seeks to help Haftar in 2020.
According to a UN report, the infamous Russian Wagner Group, a private military contractor has 1,200 fighters on the ground, and Moscow has reportedly sent fighter aircraft to provide air support for these mercenaries. It has also shipped containers of Libyan dinars, printed in Russia, to help fund Haftar’s operations. A stronger military intervention offers Russia an opportunity to regain not only its influence, but it commercial interests, port and $4B in Libyan arms contracts, lost when Gaddafi was toppled in 2011. Having cemented its hold on the port of Tartus in Syria last year, Moscow is now on course to do the same with the port of Tobruk in Libya. With 48 billion barrels of oil and gas reserves, Libya, under Haftar’s control, could also see lucrative export contracts for Russia. Strategically, the ongoing civil war also offers Russia an opportunity to expand its influence in the region and see US influence contract.
Given this administration’s aversion to new or expanded foreign policy initiatives, any serious US involvement on a diplomatic track would likely be a difficult “sell”, but not impossible. The recent Berlin Conference on Libya, attended by Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of the Congo, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as well as High Representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and the League of Arab States provides a foundation for heightened US efforts. It is likely that most of those participants would support strong US efforts to move the thus-far unsuccessful process forward. This is an opportunity to bring a growing set of adversaries to the negotiating table, safeguard continued anti-ISIS operations, potentially blunt further Russian expansionism into NATO’s southern flank in particular and the Middle East in general and demonstrate long neglected US diplomatic prowess. Carpe Diem.
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