The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran is on life support. Despite the pledges of allegiance to its implementation, Iran is now likely to undertake its fourth phase of reduction in commitments on or around November 5. A familiar circular firing squad of recriminations will then commence: the United States will protest and sanction; Europe will release a statement expressing its deep concern; and Iran will insist its violations are reversible only if it receives an economic bang for its nuclear buck.
But as we enter this latest episode of nuclear brinksmanship with Iran, we may be in for more of a breakdown rather than a breakthrough for three reasons: the next phases may be different from all other phases; the coming months will test the staying power of the JCPOA; and regional stakeholders are beginning to think that the Trump administration is all hat and no cattle, emboldening Iran even further.
On the nuclear file, a predictable cycle of hype, hyperventilating, and handwringing with each phase of Iran’s breakout from the JCPOA has ensued. First, the mullahcracy publicly warns it’s about to breach restrictions on its nuclear program if Europe doesn’t deliver the JCPOA’s promised economic benefits and hardliners then float publicly the possibility of 20% enrichment, withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or limiting the access of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Second, Iran announces its latest JCPOA violations, cushioning the blow by assuring they’re reversible and ensuring they don’t drastically reduce the breakout time under the accord. And then, finally, Europe reiterates its commitment to the JCPOA and calls on Iran to return to compliance, while the United States sanctions.
But the next phases of Iran’s JCPOA rollback may be different. The spokesman of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Behrouz Kamalvandi warned in October that “only two more steps will end all of Iran’s JCPOA undertakings and will return the country to the pre-JCPOA conditions.” This may have been the regime’s way of signaling that the next tranche of violations will be greater than those which have come before. Speculation has been swirling in Iran’s media, with some Iranian analysts predicting Tehran will unveil a chain of 30 IR-6 centrifuges and increase the level of uranium enrichment, coupled with developments on the IR-7, IR-8, and IR-9 advanced centrifuges and an announcement related to the Arak heavy water reactor.
Additionally, the political context in Tehran is important to take into account. Hassan Rouhani has been under withering criticism from conservative circles. A recent editorial in Kayhan, whose head is appointed by the supreme leader, accused Rouhani of destroying Iran’s nuclear industry under the JCPOA. Indeed, Iran’s incremental approach to date in stepping away from the JCPOA hasn’t moved the needle in attracting sanctions relief. This is why a more significant break from the JCPOA may inevitably be in the offing—for both economic and political reasons—with Iran still preserving a nuclear off-ramp for negotiations. In essence, a dual-hatted Iranian campaign of increasing pressure, while maintaining maximum flexibility.
Likewise, the coming months may prove to be a referendum on the durability of the JCPOA. Compliance with the action plan of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—which sets standards for anti-money laundering and countering terrorism financing—has proven to be a proxy debate in Tehran for a decision the Islamic Republic has yet to make: whether it’s a country or a cause. Iran’s elected state—namely the Rouhani administration and some members of parliament—has endorsed passage of the Palermo bills, which include ratification of the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Terrorist Financing Convention. But Iran’s deep state has dragged its feet.
The bills have been stalled in Iran’s Expediency Council, whose members are directly appointed by Iran’s supreme leader, in part because of fears of the scrutiny that would accompany ratification while Iran is under sanctions. The tug of war has become fierce. In October, Iran’s first vice president indicated the Palermo bills—as the ratifications are referred to in Iran—were approved by the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and endorsed by the supreme leader, and therefore the “Expediency Council should approve the bills as soon as possible.” That prompted a riposte from a member of the Expediency Council that the “supreme leader has not issued any orders on this matter.” It’s gotten so heated that President Rouhani lashed out at conservatives directly at his cabinet meeting late last month, charging “[t]he expediency of the nation and the Islamic community may not be understandable to the hardliners.”
Such wrangling is important because the Europeans appear to have conditioned the launch of their special purpose financial vehicle (INSTEX)—which is meant to induce Iran to remain in the JCPOA—on Tehran’s establishment of a mirror company meeting FATF standards. Because the battle over the FATF in Iran has become bogged down in this more fundamental struggle in the Islamic Republic over interaction with the outside world, with the FATF’s threat to fully re-impose countermeasures on Iran in February, the chances for INSTEX ever getting off the ground remain slim. This will in turn make it even more difficult for the remaining parties to put the JCPOA back together again.
Lastly, the lack of a more kinetic U.S. response to Iran’s downing of a U.S. drone in June; the attack on the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia; and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northeast Syria have all signaled to adversaries and allies alike that the United States lacks the will to lead in the region. This is evident in the Iranian analysis of recent events. For example, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani, one of Iran’s preeminent strategists, wrote in an op-ed earlier this month “[t]he U.S. government’s bitter but instructive admissions [that “U.S. presence in the Middle East has yielded no result”] have led many West Asian nations, even those who have been preparing the grounds for and hosting America's presence in the region for years, to acknowledge that ‘the Middle East without America is a safer place.’” Such a conclusion—that the United States lacks readiness and reliability—redounds to Iran’s benefit, where Tehran may feel even more emboldened to push the envelope, on the nuclear and non-nuclear files, because the Washington lacks the will to check its aggression.
In the end, with the U.S. Treasury Secretary already warning of even more sanctions, confrontation will likely continue to trump conciliation with Iran as November 5 approaches.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). He is on Twitter @JasonMBrodsky.
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