Cipher Brief Expert and former CIA Director, General David Petraeus said "It is impossible to overstate the significance of this action. Soleimani was, in U.S. terms, a combination of CIA Director, JSOC Commander, and Special Presidential Envoy for the Mideast. He was the second most important person in Iran and the architect and commander of Iranian initiatives to solidify control over the Shia Crescent. He had the blood of hundreds of American and coalition soldiers on his hands and that of countless of our Iraqi and partner elements in the region. There will inevitably be responses by Iranian and proxy forces; the question is whether they force the U.S. to respond with direct attacks on Iranian forces and infrastructure, at a time when the Iranian economy is already seriously damaged by sanctions and when the Iranian people have already been demonstrating against the regime in very considerable numbers.”
Cipher Brief Expert and former Deputy Director of the NSA Rick Ledgett told The Cipher Brief that “The strike on Soleimani, the head of the IRGC, is a message to Iran that the unfettered use of their paramilitary forces to attack Americans and their allies in the area is not going to be tolerated any longer. It is very likely that Iran will respond with attacks against Americans and specifically their leaders, most likely in the Middle East, and most likely at a time and place of their choosing. In the past, when it has responded to what it sees as U.S. provocations, Iran has tended to wait for what it views as the most opportune moment, and not necessarily immediately after the U.S. action. Another important note, Russia will seize on this as an opportunity to cast the U.S. as the aggressor and to enhance its relationship with Iran by siding with them in their public statements.”
Cipher Brief Expert and former Acting Director of the CIA John McLaughlin told us “It will require sophisticated diplomacy and fine touch strategy neither side has shown to keep this from escalating into broad scale violence in the Middle East, especially now that the U.S. has claimed responsibility. Soleimani is not just a military figure — he is probably the second most important and powerful official in Iran after the Supreme Leader. Iran will retaliate in some major way and probably turn loose its proxies such as the terrorist wing of Hezbollah and its militias in Iraq and Syria. About the only hope of slowing escalation is if the U.S. can demonstrate beyond doubt, perhaps with declassified intelligence, that it was seeking to preempt an attack on Americans and rally allies to support such a case. Given the shaky state of our alliance relationships and the emotions this will unleash in the region, that would be a very steep climb and unlikely to succeed.”
Cipher Brief expert and former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco expressed concerns over the cost of likely retaliation. "What are we doing do protect our people in the region from the game changing backlash that is about to come? And are we prepared for retaliation that will come in all forms - We should anticipate Iranian cyber capability as part of any response."
Nick Fishwick, Former Senior British Diplomat, and Cipher Brief Expert told us, “The U.S. killing of General Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis is an act of statecraft that will be judged by its consequences. Let us hope that the U.S. administration has carefully and correctly judged what they will be. This act will have more real impact than the killing of Bin Laden in 2011. Bin Laden was no longer pulling AQ’s strings: Gen Soleimani, right up to the moment of his death, was leading the IRGC-QF from the front. He had the knowledge, the extraordinary range of contacts, the mystique. I can’t see General Qaani, his successor, filling these gaps. This will cost Iran regional influence; it will work very hard to regain this as quickly as possible. I hope the U.S. has also carefully worked through the implications in the volatile Iraqi context of killing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the effective head of the Popular Mobilisation Units. His death will be another big blow for Iran, but that does not necessarily mean good news for stability in Iraq. I do not know how the Iranians will retaliate. They have an endless number of assymetric options. Their response - against U.S., Israeli, Saudi or other targets - will probably not be designed to result in all-out war. I suspect anyway that some in the Iranian regime will be happier to have Soleimani as a martyr than as a living force. The effect of the killings in Iraq however is unlikely to be stabilising.”
Cipher Brief Expert and former Senior CIA Officer Marc Polymeropoulos served in field and headquarters operational assignments for the CIA before his retirement from the Senior Intelligence Service last June. He told us that “The death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike is arguably the most seminal event in the region since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. President Trump will now go down in history as the commander in chief not who disengaged from the region, but one who finally struck back directly at Iran in a most personal, decisive, and deadly manner. Conventional wisdom argues that escalation with Iran is now inevitable, and that American lives globally are at grave risk from highly capable Iranian backed terrorist proxy forces. Soleimani, one of the world’s most notorious and capable intelligence officials, had the blood of hundreds of Americans on his hands. There is no question that this event was justified, and an evil man was taken off the battlefield. He was also per the Pentagon announcement, continuing to plot attacks against Americans and our interests, so the defensive notion of this strike appears accurate. That said, will this event have been worth it in the end? Does America have the stomach to endure Iranian terrorist attacks on our embassies, military bases, and perhaps other soft targets? I am most curious if the analytic assessments prior to the event warned of a regional conflagration, and if such assessments had any effect on President Trump’s decision making. It also is unclear why the administration chose to conduct this under Title 10 authorities, vice under Title 50 in which the strike would have been non-attributable. The latter—which would not cause the Iranians to lose face and could have been couched in the ambiguity of a violent Baghdad, would almost certainly have lessened the chance of a major retaliation. The Israelis have perfected the art of this “zone of deniability,” and we may have erred significantly in choosing the path of formally acknowledging the strike.”
BACKGROUND:
- Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Commander of Iran’s Quds Force, was killed in a U.S.-directed drone strike January 3 in Baghdad.
- U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the strike was launched in order to deter “imminent threats to American lives” and said Soleimani “was actively plotting in the region to take actions…that would have put dozens if not hundreds of American lives at risk.”
- Within hours of Soleimani’s death, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded to the killing saying, “With his departure, and with God’s power, his work and path will not cease, and severe revenge awaits those criminals who have tainted their filthy hands with his blood and the blood of the other martyrs of last night’s incident.” Khamenei quickly announced that General Esmail Qaani would be replacing Soleimani as the head of the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp’s Quds Force.
- The U.S. said on Friday that it was sending an additional 3,500 troops to the region in addition to 750 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne division that had already been deployed in response to protests outside the U.S. Embassy before Soleimani’s killing. Thousands of additional U.S. troops have been put on standby.
- The military Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Hossein Dehgan told CNN that “The response for sure will be military and against military sites…The only thing that can end this period of war is for the Americans to receive a blow that is equal to the blow they have inflicted.”
- In a series of Tweets, President Donald Trump said “Let this serve as a WARNING that if Iran strikes any Americans, or American assets, we have targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD. The USA wants no more threats!”
- Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said that Soleimani's killing marks a new phase in the history of the Middle East.
- The Iraqi Parliament has passed a non-binding resolution to expel U.S. troops from the country in response to the strike against Soleimani.
BRIEFING:
The Cipher Brief tapped our expert Norman T. Roule, widely seen in the broader Intelligence Community as one of the leading experts on Iran who also served as the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI. We asked him to give us a much ‘deeper than the headlines’ look at who Soleimani was, and what his killing is likely to mean for the near and long term.
The Cipher Brief: How should we be thinking about the U.S.’ decision to launch the strike against Qassem Soleimani, understanding that an escalation would follow? What led to this and should we have seen it coming?
Roule: We should first think about the timeline of this event. It didn’t start last week or even in the last couple of months. Over the past year, we have seen repeated statements from the administration describing their concern over the Iranian threat to Americans in the region, in general, and in Iraq in particular. The nature of this threat was considered sufficiently serious to close our consulate in Basra.
Since that time, the President, Secretary of State, and Special Representative for Iran and Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State, Brian Hook have made repeated statements on this issue. The Secretary and Hook have made numerous trips to the region – to include Iraq – to deal with the issue. They have also repeatedly reached out to our U.S. partners in Europe, and likely the Russians.
Iraq’s fragility has likely played a role in the administration’s handling of Iranian threats, much as it has done when past administrations considered how to respond to this problem. I think we saw this play out in Washington’s handling of 11 recent attacks that took place against our forces in Iraq prior to the most recent attack that killed a U.S. contractor. Administrations respond differently to failed attacks than they do to successful ones. The former may be handled by a warning, the latter requires a kinetic response.
The problem was that Iran apparently wouldn’t take the administration’s warnings seriously. The timeline behind their assessment is important – the Supreme Leader and Soleimani have dealt with multiple U.S. administrations and their views of America’s response likely reflect this experience vice their assessment of the current administration. Indeed, if you consider the administration’s response to these threats over the past year, it followed a rather traditional escalatory ladder, not unlike that of past administrations.
But in the end, a few facts are clear. The Iranians ignored repeated warnings and their surrogates – apparently on the direct orders of Qassem Soleimani – killed an American contractor and wounded four servicemen. Further, the Iraqi government is unable to restrain either Iran or Iran’s proxies from attacking Americans on Iraqi soil. Most importantly, the administration claims that they learned that Soleimani was working on an operation to kill U.S. diplomats and war fighters. The strong British statement of support increases my confidence that this information must be serious and significant. My sense is that the administration is not exaggerating the threat.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Based on my read of the President’s comments, I believe the administration faced a terrible choice: risk allowing an Iranian operation which would almost certainly lead to the deaths of Americans and further embolden Iran or kill Soleimani and risk the consequences.
In the days before the strike, senior U.S. security officials travelled to Mar-a-Lago to speak with the president. Based on press reports of who was there, it's almost certain that they reviewed the information we had on the nature of the threat, what had been done to stop the threat, why these efforts weren’t sufficient, what other options were available, and how they believe Iran would respond to these options. The idea that our military leaders would not highlight the long-term risks associated with killing Soleimani is inconceivable.
The Cipher Brief: Is this the right kind of deterrent to use against this regime? Will the U.S.’ more aggressive stance against Iranian aggression serve the U.S. well in the long-run?
Roule: One of the complaints about the United States, across a number of administrations, and the international community in general has been that we actually have not engaged in sufficient deterrence against Iran. U.S. facilities have been attacked by Iran and its surrogates for years. U.S. and allied personnel were killed in the hundreds in Iraq, and thousands were wounded. U.S. banking facilities have been the target of Iranian cyber attacks, which is an attack against the broader U.S. economy. The attempt against former Saudi Arabian Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in the United States and the Iranian mining of tankers and the attack on Abqaiq are other examples. We should always remember that the Iranian missiles fired from Yemen were a threat to Americans and other foreigners living in Saudi Arabia. Iran regularly takes Westerners hostage. As you know, I have said in the past that in the absence of deterrence, Iran would execute increasingly bold and deadly attacks. Soleimani - likely believing that he was inviolate – walked in Iraq as if he owned the place.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
You ask the right question. The administration may have stopped the strike, but will this deter Iran? Or even stop the strike that Soleimani apparently planned to execute? That is likely a complicated answer and we shouldn’t rule out that further strikes may be required to stop the threat which prompted Soleimani’s death.
I do believe Iran will respond to this attack. Soleimani was an icon and Iran will need to project deterrence and has to save face. Iran will need to undertake an operation which punishes the U.S., but one that isn’t so powerful that it risks a U.S. response which could threaten the regime’s survival, and one that doesn’t impact Iran’s relationships with Europe, Russia, and China. That won’t be easy, but I don’t think Iran can easily back down.
The U.S. attacks against Soleimani and Iranian surrogates show that the U.S. has a rather good understanding of developments in Iraq. Iranians will first wonder about the security of other senior personnel who travel through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. A kinetic or terrorist response could take time, unless such an operation was already in the advanced stages at the time of the attack on Soleimani. I expect that Iran will announce a further expansion of their civilian nuclear program and perhaps some “defensive” steps in the Gulf to express defiance.
We also need to consider how Soleimani’s successor, Brig. Gen. Ismael Qaani, will respond. Qaani served in the Iran Iraq war and he later managed counter insurgency operations in north eastern Iran. He was a long-time confidante of Soleimani and deeply aware of his plans, intentions and thinking. He has participated in many meetings with Soleimani, and has traveled throughout the war zones of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. He is also familiar with architecture, budget, & logistics requirements, issues that are required to keep the organization going. He certainly lacks Qassem Soleimani’s iconic stature and strategic vision. He doesn't have the capacity to deal with the Supreme Leader or, say, the head of Lebanese Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, to the same extent that Qassem Soleimani did. In this regard, Soleimani was irreplaceable. But Qaani appears to have the confidence of the Qods Force and he will likely want to restore the group’s morale with an attack against the U.S. that won’t damage Qods Force strategic equities in the region.
If Iran does choose to attack Americans, I feel confident that the U.S. will respond kinetically. The administration has reached out to a number of countries to urge them to advise Iran to de-escalate. Iran’s rhetoric certainly won’t soften, but multilateral diplomatic pressure will have some impact on their decision-making.
The Cipher Brief: Let’s understand Qassem Soleimani a little better in hopes of understanding the regime. You describe Soleimani as having had iconic stature. How did that come about?
Roule: I look at his career in two phases, i.e., before and after 2003. When the revolution erupted, he was a water worker in the city of Kerman. His first assignment during the Iran-Iraq war was ensuring the delivery of water to the Iranian troops on the front line. He was later brought into the military, fought bravely, and developed a specialty on Kurdish issues.
After the war, he led forces in southeastern Iran focused on insurgents based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Around 1998 or 1999, he replaced General Ahmad Vahidi as the head of the Quds Force and developed experience with Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinians, and other foreigners training in Iran. One point: He was never a shadow commander; his assignment was relatively well known to people who care about such things.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
What changed things for Soleimani was the U.S. invasion of Iraq, because the ensuing chaos allowed him to spend years learning the art of failed state politics, building Arab militias, and testing U.S. red lines using hybrid warfare tactics. His officers also developed similar skills, many of whom went on to fight in Syria. His success – or rather the international community’s unwillingness to seriously challenge his actions – allowed him the opportunity to develop an outsized stature. As he realized that the U.S. would not strike him personally, he eagerly embraced a public role magnified by Iran’s regional propaganda machine. He's probably the most frequently photographed Iranian military official. I really think that a tougher posture toward Iran during the time of his rise if you will, might have changed regional history.
The next stage in his evolution came following the collapse of Syria. Here, he learned to work with an array of partners: Lebanese Hezbollah, the exhausted armies of the failed Syria state, Afghan and Pakistani proxies, and Russian military personnel. The West – to include the U.S. – left him alone and allowed him to travel regularly from Iran to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and even Turkey and Russia. Part of this freedom was the result of Russia deflecting any efforts to punish Iran at the United Nations. As Soleimani grew in stature, he became more dangerous.
One point: Soleimani had many enemies. According to the recently publish MOIS cables, he was despised by that organization. Some Iranian figures envied his ability to draw on the support of the Supreme Leader and certainly there were those in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq who hated him as well. Although all of these players will praise Soleimani now and promise revenge, I suspect more than a few are delighted with his passing and the prospect that this will improve their own influence.
The Cipher Brief: Let's talk about the response to the strike by America’s allies. How might this change the nature of relationships in subtle ways?
Roule: The U.K. has made a strong statement in support of the U.S. and this action underscores the importance of this historic partnership. Unfortunately, the European Union has once more responded weakly. Russia has naturally condemned the attack. Iran will take note of these responses and treat each party differently in the coming days and weeks.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Events in Iraq are likely to be the greatest challenge. Many Iraqi officials will privately celebrate Soleimani’s death but will keep such views to themselves to safeguard their political future and even lives. We may see Iraq’s parliament call for an end to America’s presence in the country. This would harm are efforts against ISIS and could lead to increased Iranian influence. I am certain there is intense diplomatic work being done in Baghdad where we are fortunate to have a very strong diplomatic and security team.
Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and other regional countries have also come out supporting U.S. actions. The U.S.’ willingness to send more forces to the region certainly pushes back on recent concerns in the Middle East that the U.S. would not stand up to Iran. This will be important given Gulf concerns that Iran’s retaliation may land in their living rooms. The Gulf States will obviously be very sensitive to the prospect of a future Iranian attack whether it’s delivered via cyber, drone, missile attack or an act of terrorism. However, their security forces have a good record of responding to Iranian security threats and protecting Americans in their countries.
The Cipher Brief: Strategically in the region, Iran has demonstrated enormous capability, whether it's in Iraq or Syria or the strike that we saw against the Saudi oil facility. How are they most likely to avenge Sulieman’s death in a way that would stop short of inviting war?
Roule: Iran does have a number of response options, but they also face serious challenges. Clearly, their OPSEC is obviously less robust than they thought, and their operations do misfire. Their handling of the recent demonstrations at the U.S. embassy underscore that Soleimani was no mastermind. The entire purpose of this demonstration was to shift the anti-Iran narrative to an anti-U.S. posture. Instead, the Iranians produced an obviously orchestrated demonstration which brought a sea of Iranian and proxy flags and slogans against the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Far from shifting the narrative, they underscored that Iran operates far too freely and powerfully in Iraq. Iran’s influence in Iraq is significant, but nationalism in Iraq is growing and Soleimani was far from popular. I suspect that funerals for Soleimani and Abu Mehdi Mohandis in Iraq will remain dwarfed by Iraq’s recent economic protests.
Iran’s options will require careful planning and any retaliation can’t threaten its own stability. The Supreme Leader is reportedly ill, Iran will have a presidential election in 2021, and a parliamentary election in coming weeks. Their economy is eroding monthly. Certainly, they will use the death of Soleimani to rally the population, but this will bring only a temporary spike in popular support. The government simply can’t rule well. Decades of corruption, mismanagement, and revolutionary state planning have inflicted deep damage on the society and economy. Iran’s currency remains fragile and diminishing foreign exchange severely limits Iran’s ability to prevent a likely collapse of its currency should the U.S. attack Iran itself. I suspect that Iran’s Qods Force is considering a number of options but there are no easy response options for Iran.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
I believe the threat in Iraq will be very high, but proxies face their own challenges. Iran's proxies need to demonstrate solidarity with Iran, and try to deter future attacks from the U.S., but they also need to ensure that their response doesn’t invite their own destruction. Lebanese Hezbollah is facing its own issues in the country with protests.
The Cipher Brief: What else should we be thinking about when it comes to understanding how the situation is likely to move forward?
Roule: First, I suspect even the Iranians and their proxies are sure what will happen next. Wild card actions are likely, especially in the region. We should watch how the world responds. I am sure many countries are trying to assist in the de-escalation of this situation. Iran’s rhetoric will remain violent, but a multilateral diplomatic approach may force Iran to rethink its most aggressive response options.
Finally, the hyper partisan environment in the U.S. is counterproductive – it may even encourage Iran to strike out of a belief that doing so could add to this cacophony. We have never needed a bipartisan approach to Iran as much as we do now.
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