EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the US and the Russian Federation concluded without resolution of Russia’s “security guarantee” demands. The same result as well for last week’s negotiations between NATO and the OSCE respectively and the Russian Federation. With this round of negotiations concluded and surprising and commendable unity and resolve shown by the West, the question arises what Vladimir Putin’s next move might be? What is the likelihood of further Russian military action against the Ukraine or elsewhere?
Press reports from Kiev state the Government of Ukraine suffered a massive cyberattack on 13 January, the day the OSCE discussions concluded. Cyberattacks are a favorite tool in Putin’s strategy of asymmetrical warfare. There was no immediate statement of attribution, but it seems an odd coincidence. Was this a foreshadowing of Russia’s next move?
In a further hint of coming escalation, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister and lead negotiator in the bilateral discussions with the US Sergey Ryabkov, said he “couldn’t exclude dispatching military infrastructure to Cuba and Venezuela if tensions with Washington continue to rise.” Another Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexander Grushko, warned that the continued deterioration [of relations] could lead to the “most unpredictable and most dire consequences for European security.” These remarks should be taken seriously.
What are some of the drivers that might persuade Putin that the time is right to take further action against Ukraine thus obtain strategic depth and a buffer for Russia from NATO?
First, Putin and his close advisors genuinely feel aggrieved by what they perceive as an aggressive and threatening expansion of NATO eastwards in violation of promises they believe were made by the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union (conveniently forgetting the historical responsibility the Soviet Union and now Russia have for the former Soviet republics, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joining NATO and the desire for former Soviet republics Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance in the first place). Feeling so aggrieved and believing the West responsible for various “color” revolutions on the periphery of the Russian Federation, Putin certainly sees the accession of two more former Soviet republics to NATO as directly threatening. The presence of two additional potentially free and prosperous states on the border of the autocratic kleptocracy Putin has created in the Russian Federation, is certainly threatening.
In his 20 plus years in power, Putin has surrounded himself with advisors and cronies who see the world exactly as he does and feel similarly aggrieved and threatened by NATO. If remarks that Putin purportedly made at a meeting of the Russian national security council that he chaired by video earlier this month are true, Putin feels the US was responsible for the ousting of former Ukrainian President Yanukovich at the time of the Maidan Square demonstrations and is similarly responsible for discontent in Belarus last summer and Kazakhstan over the past few weeks. He fears more “color” revolutions are coming. This has likely fueled his resolve to move against Ukraine sooner rather than later.
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Putin is almost certainly convinced of his strategic genius, having largely stabilized, then rebuilding Russia in line with his KGB vision of order and stability. He credibly rebuilt Russia’s military ensuring Russia a place of strength in the order of the world’s powers. He can also look back with some satisfaction at his ventures abroad: Georgia, Crimea, Donbass, Syria, Libya, Mali and, most recently Belarus and Kazakhstan (restoring order to both).
In the case of Crimea, Putin returned Sevastopol with all its historical and military significance to Russian control. Thanks to Russian military intervention, Bashar al Assad remains president of Syria and has won that war. Looking back at this string of successes, would anyone be surprised if Putin feels he is the supreme judge of his regional and strategic opponents and thinks it time to take another step to assure his legacy?
That Putin views reincorporation of Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence as a key part of his legacy is indicated in his July essay about the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. In this essay, Putin asserts that Ukraine is not, and has never been, an independent state; Ukraine is an inalienable part of Russia, lacking a distinct ethnic identity, culture, religion, and language. He further asserts Ukraine’s independence has always been inspired and sponsored by enemies of Russia who have used it as a weapon against Russia. More recently, Putin has repeatedly described NATO’s activities in Ukraine as a threat to Russia’s security. In Putin’s mind, a path for Ukraine to NATO or EU membership is a direct violation of Russia’s historic domain as well as a strategic threat. Thus, Putin’s legacy is not complete until this “problem” is solved.
Putin may also believe that the correlation of forces is in his favor and may never again be so favorable. He sees a weak and divided West led by the US, a superpower in decline and crippled by internal dissent, in his view. He likely believes there would be no Western military response to an incursion in Ukraine in 2022, as there was not in 2014. The most Putin thinks he will face is sanctions, the favorite tool of recent US administrations.
Putin scoffs at sanctions.
As one retired very senior KGB general laughingly said to me, “If you think you can intimidate our President by sanctions, you are seriously mistaken. His people come from St. Petersburg and endured three years of siege by the Germans in WWII”.
Putin also now has energy leverage over Europe as never before and with crude oil approaching $100bbl, he has plenty of money and knows prices will rise if there is a crisis. In addition to energy leverage over Europe, with 100,000 plus troops arrayed along the border with Ukraine, Putin has local military superiority. He has credible military options for several different levels of operation ranging from military support to protect the Donbass Republics, to limited incursions to protect ethnic Russian population areas in eastern Ukraine and perhaps take Mariupol and drive toward the Dneipr with the additional objective of securing a land bridge to Crimea. It might be a stretch for Putin to launch to an all-out assault towards Kiev and then pull back (an action that would be reminiscent of the August 2008 campaign against the Republic of Georgia).
Although the argument for a military intervention at the moment may be persuasive to Putin, were he to receive objective counsel, he might be reminded that war is risky and unpredictable. The element of surprise no longer exists. The Ukrainians might fight with more skill and resolve than in 2014, raising the cost of an incursion in both expense and body count. Putin may finally face crippling sanctions with real and long-term effect on important sectors of the Russian economy. He may also provoke a course of action he would likely find highly undesirable, which could include more determined movement by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, significantly increased NATO troop deployments to Poland and the Baltic states, and perhaps the resurrection of political resolve in Europe to spend more on defense and reduce their dependence on Russia as a source of energy.
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If Russia decides to make further moves on the geopolitical chessboard to deploy military infrastructure to Cuba and Venezuela, they may provoke a response from the West in a decision to give support to Moldova against the Russian enclave known as Transnistria and to the Republic of Georgia to address the Russian supported breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While unlikely to face all these actions by the West, Putin may have been surprised by the resolve he has seen thus far from the West in Geneva and Brussels and may need to readjust his strategic algorithm.
Russian officials from Foreign Minister Lavrov, to Ryabkov and Grushko have said they expect a written response from the West to their security request demands within a week. If that response echoes what they heard during negotiations last week, then we may soon know what Putin’s next steps will be.
There are reports of Russian paramilitaries deploying near the Ukrainian border. A favorite tactic of Putin and other authoritarians before him is to react to a “provocation” they created to justify aggressive action. One wonders if Putin is looking to create that casus belli right now. In my view, it is difficult for someone in Putin’s current state of mind to back down. No one should be surprised if hostilities in some form break out in the next couple of weeks. As a historical note and perhaps coincidence, the Russian invasion of Georgia took place during the Beijing Summer Olympics while Putin was in Beijing. He is scheduled to travel to Beijing for the opening of the Winter Games on 4 February.
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