As the U.S. President prepares to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore, sources tell The Cipher Brief that U.S. Special Operations Forces have been preparing for potential action against the North Korean regime for more than a year.
This, as the Pentagon recently completed a sweeping review of Special Operations Forces. According to The New York Times, the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff want options by mid-June that will strike more of a sustainable balance between rising security challenges and the current op-tempo for counter terrorism missions.
But with rising strategic challenges coming from Russia, Iran and North Korea as well as China’s expanding Military presence and a persistent threat from terrorism, can US Special Operations Forces afford to slow down?
The Cipher Brief’s Brad Christian recently spoke with David Maxwell, a well-respected retired Special Forces Colonel, about the new global challenges faced by SOF.
Christian: I recently talked with Dr. Michael Vickers about SOF’s requirement to prepare for the rising threat of nation states and near peer adversaries, while continuing to address the current CT requirements. He told me that balance is a significant challenge. What do you think?
Col. Maxwell: This is one of the most complex and challenging tasks for USSOCOM. In short, USSOCOM has to employ the right forces for the right missions in the designated areas of responsibilities.
While our counterterrorism forces are optimized for CT operations around the world other special operations forces are optimized to operate in specific theaters, regions, and countries.
As an example, if the regionally aligned forces for Africa within Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs have their operations and deployment tempo (OPTEMPO/DEPTEMPO) reduced, they are not going to be shifted to Korea and Iran as there are other forces that are already organized, trained, and optimized to conduct operations in those countries should the requirement arise.
That said, we have faced the problem of sustained operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility since 9-11 and those operations could not be sustained solely by regionally aligned SOF. While many would like to fight a war and deploy forces “for the duration plus six months” as we did in World War II we could not sustain the regionally aligned forces for nearly 18 years. Therefore, all US SOF, regardless of regional alignment, have had to deploy to CENTCOM on a rotational basis.
If there is a war in North Korea and/or Iran (God forbid) it will create an even more complex problem for USSOCOM than has existed for the entire war on terrorism.
USSOCOM will have to continue to prosecute the war on terrorism but will also have to commit SOF to conduct operations in North Korea and Iran that only SOF can conduct. Some of the forces that conduct counterterrorism operations will also have to be re-tasked for counter weapons of mass destruction operations (C-WMD) in those combat zones.
The challenge for USSOCOM, its component commands, and Theater Special Operations Commands is to properly balance the force to meet current requirements in the war on terrorism, build and sustain relationships with indigenous forces, develop deep understanding of the regional operating environments, and wielding influence to support strategic objectives, while training the force to be prepared to support existing war plans, such as in North Korea and Iran. This is a leadership challenge for all leaders at all levels.
Beyond terrorism and short of nation state war, we also see the gray zone where state and non-sate actors described as revisionist and rogue/revolutionary powers are conducting operations to coerce and disrupt the US, our friends, partners, and allies, and nations that believe in the international nation state system. Congress has recognized the need for the US to conduct counter-unconventional warfare (NDAA 2016 Section 1097), political warfare, and irregular warfare. In fact, congress provides a superior description of irregular warfare than the DOD definition in the 2018 NDAA Section 1202 :
“…activities in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
That said, national political leaders and senior military officers also need to task the right forces for the right missions. SOF has been relatively “easy” to turn to deploy for specific operations. In many cases there are other forces that may be more appropriate or effective. These may be conventional forces or other special operations forces. We should heed the wise words of the late Lt Gen Sam Wilson and his guidance for planning and conducting special operations:
Special Operations Forces have a limited number of DIRECT roles:
Special Operations Forces are trained for specific missions. They are the most highly trained and proficient forces that the US possesses but they are not the answer for every small contingency mission that comes along. Many conventional forces are more proficient at conventional type missions than SOF. Even more specialized units exist and they should not be used outside their primary mission. Just because a select force is in being, does not automatically mean that it is the BEST to use. Politics will play in this decision, the HIGH RISK/HIGH GAIN nature of the specific operation may cause the political leaders to make this choice, even if better alternatives are available, i.e., such as have SEAL TEAM SIX do a routine beach recon.
We need to ask for senior leaders to be disciplined and judiciously use special operations forces. The challenge for USSOCOM is to prepare its entire arsenal of SOF to sustain the terrorism fight, operate in the gray zone and conduct irregular warfare, and prepare forces for the high end contingencies in places such as North Korea and Iran that will demand a large number of SOF to conduct operations with indigenous forces and to wield influence at the operational and strategic level.
Christian: In your view, how can SOCOM be expected to maintain the CT advantage they’ve worked hard to achieve, prepare for significant new threats, including battlefields where they may not enjoy all of the tactical and technological advantages, including air superiority, while not worsening the health of a force that is already “spread too thin” by many people’s view?
Col. Maxwell: USSOCOM must absolutely maintain its exquisite capability to capture or kill high value targets at the time and place of our choosing and defeat networks that threaten the US, our interests, and our friends, partners, and allies. We must be able to provide the precision targeting and crisis response capabilities that have been raised to a high art form since 9-11. This is non-negotiable.
However, there is a large part of USSOCOM that is optimized for other operations particularly working "through, with, and by" indigenous forces and developing understanding and wielding influence. While these forces do support counterterrorism operations they also must address threats beyond terrorism. We cannot judge or assess all SOF by what is happening in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Yes SOF from all the combatant commands are employed there on a rotational basis. However, they have to maintain their regional focus and train for the potential contingencies that may occur in theaters other than CENTCOM.
We must also disabuse policy makers and political leaders of the notion that if military forces are being employed in combat that they are maintaining readiness. This is not the case. Readiness is maintained by good training of a healthy force. As soon as a force deploys its readiness is on a downward trajectory. It will perform its specific combat tasks well for a period of time but when it returns from combat it must rest, refit, and retrain. Too many people equate the many thousands of exceptionally well executed and successful tactical operations with readiness. The only way our forces are able to be successful is through good training and sufficient rest prior to deployment.
To avoid being spread too thin we need to return to ‘first principles.” USSOCOM used to teach the SOF Mission Planning criteria that provided a useful guide for decision-making on the employment of SOF. However, it appears to have fallen out of favor and is no longer in current doctrine, Joint Pub 3-05 Special Operations. These criteria can be useful in helping to ensure we use the right forces for the right missions.
SOF Mission Planning Criteria (Note: this is from the superseded 2011 edition of JP 3-05 Special Operations)
- Must be an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) mission or activity.
- Mission or tasks should support the joint force commander’s campaign or operation plan, or special activities.
- Missions or tasks must be operationally feasible, approved, and fully coordinated.
- Required resources must be available to execute and support the SOF mission.
- The expected outcome of the mission must justify the risks.
Whenever a policy maker or planner seeks to employ a force they should ask if it is an appropriate SOF mission or activity. SOF planners have a responsibility to advise decision makers on what is appropriate and cannot “chase missions” simply because they possess the mindset of “marching to the sound of the guns.”
Christian: Has the initial deployment of the first Security Force Assistance Brigade met expectations in Afghanistan?
Col. Maxwell: I think it is too early to tell. The first brigades have only been deployed this spring. I am optimistic that the force will be able to train, advise, and assist the right forces within their capabilities. But we should also realize that it takes time to determine the effect of the mission and a train and advise mission is not the same as a capture/kill mission as it takes time to achieve and assess effects.
Christian: What do you see as the most important opportunity for US SOF in the next 12-24 months?
Col. Maxwell: SOF has validated its strategic value over the past 17 years. It no longer has to fight for relevance or even its existence in the post Goldwater Nichols/Nunn-Cohen era. In terms of our counterterrorism and hostage rescue (direct action raiding) capabilities we demonstrated we have evolved from the missions at Son Tay (Ivory Coast) and Desert One (Eagle Claw) to an advanced state of being with the elimination of Bin Laden at Abbottabad (Neptune Spear). No other force in the world is capable of executing similarly complex mission.
We have also seen the importance of being able to work “through, by, and with” indigenous forces in the right circumstances. While some have wrongly turned working “through, by, and with” or small-footprint, building partner capacity operations into a strategy (e.g., the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance) when correctly employed as part of a broader campaign it can make a strategic contribution. However, “through, by, and with” operations are not a panacea and not a foundation for strategy and should be employed only in the right conditions.
One of the appropriate roles for special operations is in the future operating environment that we characterize as the gray zone where special operations can provide support to the conduct of national level political warfare strategies and campaigns to counter what the2017 National Security Strategy describes as revisionist and rogue powers. One of the ways to describe the gray zone where these powers operate is revolution, resistance, insurgency, terrorism, and civil war. Simply stated, revisionist and rogue powers seek to exploit the conditions that give rise to political resistance and political violence that can take various forms from terrorism to civil war. The US must be able to assist friends, partners, and allies to counter the conditions that give rise to political violence and counter the revisionist and rogue powers who are exploiting those conditions and conducting their own forms of unconventional, irregular, and political warfare. There is a need for a national level organization to develop and orchestrate strategies and campaigns and to educate and train our civilian and military organizations for operations against these threats.
We should keep in mind what Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote inMilitary Misfortunes: all military failures are a result of the failure to learn, the failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate. The US military is a learning organization. We have learned much and we have adapted the force in the past 17 years. The biggest challenge is anticipating the future threats. Now is the time to educate and prepare SOF, the broader military, and government agencies for these emerging threats whether they be the Little Green Men from Russia, China’s Three Warfares, the Iranian Action Network, the protracted warfare of AL Qaeda and the Islamic State and asymmetric warfare by North Korea. The common denominator among these threats is that they are conducting irregular, unconventional, and political warfare using their own cultural characteristics. SOF is uniquely suited to contribute to the defense against these threats.
In conclusion, irregular warfare in the Gray Zone consists of competition, not only among state between and among state and non-state actors but also in two competing ideas – one idea is the national interest to maintain a stable international nation-state system based on respect for and protection of sovereignty. This idea can be supported in part through the application of one of the majorspecial warfare activities: foreign internal defense in which SOF, conventional military forces, and other US government agencies seek to assist friends, partners, and allies in their own defense and development programs so that they can defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism that would threaten their sovereignty. The other idea is the fundamental American value of the right of a people to seek self determination of government and this can be supported by the special warfare activity of unconventional warfare which consists of activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power. These two competing ideas must be reconciled through the correct application of national statecraft and political warfare, supported by US government agencies, regular military forces, and SOF conducting special warfare.
David S. Maxwell retired as a US Army Special Forces Colonel after 30 years of service and currently is an independent national security consultant and lecturer. He is a Fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies (ICAS), on the Board of Advisors of Spirit of America, and on the Board of Directors of the International Council of Korean Studies (ICKS), the Council on US-Korean Security Studies (CUSKOSS), Small Wars Journal, the Committee For Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), and the OSS Society.
