The British people shocked the international community when they voted to quit the European Union (EU) this summer. Markets tumbled and fears mounted that the United Kingdom (UK) or the EU might fall into political or economic crisis, or begin to unravel completely. Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Theresa May attempted to deliver some clarity with “Brexit means Brexit,” and her vow to focus on the needs of working people across the UK during her tenure in Downing Street. These domestic priorities will define her legacy, but Brexit will undoubtedly have implications for British defense and security policies, too.
At present, one can only speculate about the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. Prime Minister May looks likely to stay the course on defense policy as she negotiates the UK’s separation from the EU. Michael Fallon will keep his post as Defense Minister, evidence of her preference for consistency in defense policy. Her voting record also shows a typical conservative approach to foreign and defense policy, and her tenure as Home Secretary prepares her for an early focus on terrorism, migration, and on the troubled regions to Europe’s south and east generating so much instability. May’s top defense and security challenges are to ensure that the UK remains central for European defense and that the special relationship thrives, that a global UK foreign policy remains credible, and that all of this remains affordable.
Centrality in European Defense
British influence in Europe has been waning for years, and it will continue to decline as the UK loses its ability to argue for EU interests with any credibility. This pattern began even before David Cameron blocked a treaty proposal in 2011, leaving his partners alone to tackle the eurozone crisis. A recent LSE study shows that the UK is the most “outvoted” member-state in the European Council since 2004. This has been particularly true on foreign policy and foreign aid topics, and not necessarily across all areas (as the UK supported the majority of EU laws). The study also reveals a kind of “self distancing” of British parties from the “mainstream political families” in the European Parliament. Theresa May must, therefore, overcome past rifts by redoubling her efforts on European defense and demonstrating the centrality of the UK for European security.
In the short-term, the UK will hold onto its traditional channels of influence in Brussels. This will be the case at least until Article 50 is triggered, and likely into a transition period as well. Britain can use these channels to set a tone for future collaboration with the EU. Sir Julian King’s appointment as Commissioner for the Security Union, for example, provides such an opportunity. If his role continues to be seen as relatively high profile (though this is by no means certain) he may be able to find common ground with EU partners, and set out a vision for cooperation on terrorism, cyber defense and organized crime. These are all areas that fall under his portfolio, and areas where the UK has significant experience and capabilities.
The UK has played a crucial role in the creation and evolution of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as well. Though not a major contributor to missions, British policymakers have ensured that CSDP remains entirely complementary to NATO, and that its architecture helps build European capabilities that in turn strengthen the Alliance. The UK balances the French, German, and other more “pro-EU” views (that CSDP ought to be used to build an EU capability that is independent of NATO). Some speculate that without the UK veto, others could move ahead with a controversial permanent EU military headquarters or even with a European army, which has been unthinkable for the UK. The truth is, though, that CSDP is likely to be weaker without British capabilities, and other member states have been unable to forge a cohesive strategic vision for CSDP.
The Special Relationship
If there is one principle in UK defense thinking that will endure, it is the centrality of the special relationship with the United States. Washington will remain London’s top defense partner, and NATO will remain its most important alliance. The UK is valuable to Washington for two main reasons. First, it offers Europe real defense capabilities and spending levels that show commitment and political will. Second, Washington trusts the UK to lead Europe with a familiar strategic culture that enables the US to comfortably attempt a re-balancing to Asia, or to focus on other global priorities.
As the Brexit negotiations begin, the May Government will have to protect its value for Washington. This means demonstrating leadership in NATO, meeting the NATO spending targets, and keeping a wide focus on shared priorities at the global level. Theresa May has not re-affirmed the British Warsaw Summit commitments, but she is unlikely to backtrack on those promises. The UK is set to lead one of the new battalions of the frontline members. It will continue efforts in the Baltic, and it will prepare to lead the spearhead force, the VJTF, in 2017. Given growing transatlantic attention to challenges in the south, the UK could help by providing more assets for NATO’s use in the Mediterranean. It could also show some creativity in easing the internal political obstacles to NATO’s efforts in the south, and facilitating NATO-EU cooperation.
When it comes to intelligence, the special relationship is still important to both the U.S. and the UK. Washington still sees the UK as its key partner on issues that matter: countering the Islamic State (ISIS), Russia, and tackling transnational challenges in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Theresa May has significant experience in overseeing intelligence efforts, and in thinking through plausible reforms. Her tenure as Home Secretary is not free of controversy – the Extremism Bill and the Investigatory Powers Bill are two such examples – but she is experienced in thinking through the balance between intelligence needs and safeguards, and in fighting extremism while protecting British values. She is one of Britain’s longest serving Home Secretaries, at the forefront of British debates on counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization, asylum and immigration.
Theresa May is not worried about Brexit’s impact on intelligence or on the special relationship. She argued in an April 2016 speech that even outside the EU, the UK “would still have our relationship with America. We would still be part of the Five Eyes, the closest international intelligence-sharing arrangement in the world. We would still have our first-rate security and intelligence agencies. We would still share intelligence about terrorism and crime with our European allies, and they would do the same with us.” Some suspect that the U.S. may look for other interlocutors in Europe, but on defense and intelligence there is no other power that can be as natural a fit as the UK.
Resourcing UK Priorities
The UK’s relevance for Europe and for the U.S. hinges on its ability to resource these priorities. Some economic analyses have been too pessimistic about Brexit, but it is clear that the separation will come at some cost to the UK and that it will have implications for defense. The defense budget was already tight before the referendum. It wasn’t clear, for example, that the UK could meet NATO’s spending targets after the 2014 NATO Summit. For better or for worse, those targets are now widely accepted as the Alliance’s measure of capability, political will, and commitment to collective defense. In other words, they are a measure of relevance. The Cameron Government committed to achieving the targets at least through 2020-21, but this effort will almost certainly be difficult as the Brexit negotiations begin.
The economy stabilized relatively quickly after the referendum, but there will likely be more fallout to come. Economic growth trends are still difficult to forecast, and the pound could fall further against the dollar. Both would have implications for the UK’s Defense Equipment Plan. Trevor Taylor has done some initial analysis, arguing that given British reliance on more than $10 billion per year in defense imports from the U.S., a continuing drop in sterling’s value against the dollar could raise the cost of imports by around 2 percent of the total defense budget per annum. He also points to ongoing support costs for in-service equipment, and a number of expensive promises, including commitments to buy 138 F-35s and 9 Poseidon P-8 aircraft.
The European angle on capabilities development also matters. The May Government must protect UK contributions to NATO Smart Defense, to European Defense Agency (EDA) initiatives as a third party, and to try to ensure synergies between the arrangements. The UK is already a participant in major multi-national programs, and they are unlikely to be affected by Brexit. The separation between the UK and the EU does raise longer-term questions for the UK. Industry experts argue that (in part because of British pressure) a European defense internal market is emerging. It is being propelled by “competition, innovation and increasing specialization.” If the UK removes itself from the core, it will sit on the sidelines as others closer to the core negotiates the rules-of-the-game. Down the line, this could make it harder for the UK to secure participation in key programs, shape future EU defense directives or access the EU’s research and development funds.
Global Defense Ambition
The final defense challenge for the May Government is to reject strategic shrinkage. The UK has influence, power projection capabilities, a fine network of diplomats, world-class intelligence services, nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the Security Council. The risk is that negotiations will be so complex and drawn out that Brexit will consume Ministers’ attention and resources at the expense of strategic thinking on global issues. There is an additional risk that other major powers around the world may see the UK as a less attractive partner if it is outside the EU, or if it appears to be bogged down by Brexit negotiations.
Nowhere is a reduced UK role more concerning than when it comes to the Middle East. A robust British policy towards the Middle East is important not only for British interests, but for the U.S. and for Europe as well. The UK carries unique influence in the region as a result of historical experience, family relationships, development aid and military engagement. UK policy towards the region has taken place in multiple frameworks: bilaterally with regional countries, in partnership with the U.S., at the EU level and through the UN Security Council. Working through the EU has had significant advantages for the UK, acting as a force multiplier for the British voice and offering it an expanded set of policy tools. It also balances its reputation as America’s junior partner and softens its negative image in some parts of the Middle East.
Even if the UK exits the EU, its military relationships and its alignment with the United States will continue to afford it significant influence in the region. For that reason, cooperation between the UK and the EU on Middle East Policy should be an attractive outcome for the UK and the EU27 in the Brexit negotiations. There is a risk, though, that the British will continue to lose confidence in their own capacity to bring positive change to the Middle East. Intervention fatigue is very real in the UK. There is a widespread sense that the British bear some responsibility for the Middle East’s most entrenched and most difficult challenges. With the Chilcot Report out and the Brexit negotiations on the horizon, there is a risk that the UK will pull inwards, focusing on the minutia of the UK-EU separation (as important as the details are) at the expense of strategic thinking on global challenges.
