In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, U.S. defense officials announced a rare military strike on a senior Islamic State group (ISG) leader in Libya. Wall-to-wall press coverage of events in Europe made the strike on the Iraqi commander Wissam al-Zubaydi (aka Abu Nabil al Anbari) seem relatively trivial, but underestimating Libya’s strategic importance to the fight against the Islamic State would be a mistake.
Libya is ISG’s most important base outside of the Levant, and it is attracting fighters from throughout North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Pressure on ISG in Syria and Iraq will make Libya even more important to global extremists. Only 100 miles from European shores, Libya is the third node of a triangle connecting ISG in the Levant with the Maghreb, Africa, and Europe.
From its base in Qaddafi’s former hometown of Sirte, ISG controls approximately 125 miles of non-contiguous coastal territory, where it has imposed its version of Islamic governance, carried out a series of mass executions, and launched attacks on neighboring states, most importantly Tunisia. ISG is increasingly drawing recruits from neighboring countries in North Africa and the Sahel, who have carried out suicide attacks and other operations against a range of targets.
Syria remains the primary destination for ISG recruits, but Libya is rising fast for at least three reasons. First, a more aggressive air campaign by the United States and France against the ISG in Syria and Iraq will prompt the group to divert some fighters and resources to Libya to bolster the Libyan branch’s capabilities, but also to save assets. Shortly after Russia launched airstrikes in Syria, Tunisia’s defense minister revealed that some 250 Tunisian ISG fighters in Syria were relocating to Libya. A further exodus from Syria would bolster ISG’s ranks in Libya.
Second, ISG in Libya is aggressively recruiting in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and is marketing Libya as an integral part of ISG’s caliphate project. Propaganda videos and appeals by Tunisians, Egyptians, and Sudanese fighters in Libya specifically target young people in those countries. Social media campaigns further highlight that conditions in Libya make it conducive for jihad, including an abundance of weapons, oil wealth, and a geographic location close to European shores, which make it ideal for launching attacks in neighboring countries. The appeals are working. More than half of the ISG’s fighting force in Libya is likely comprised of foreigners, mostly Tunisians and Moroccans, but Algerians, Sudanese, Egyptians, Malians, and Nigerians from Boko Haram are also active. The ISG is also working to recruit and unify jihadists from al Qaeda’s African affiliates, something which al Qaeda failed to accomplish.
Third, Libya is more accessible than Syria to recruits and fighters in neighboring states in the Maghreb and Sahel. Libya shares 2,700 miles of land borders with six neighboring countries. Vast stretches of those frontiers are controlled by smuggling networks, which facilitate travel across the border. At the same time, local security forces are making travel to Syria, via Turkey, which had been a direct route for many North African jihadists, more difficult. For many wishing to join ISG, reaching Libya is simply closer and more direct.
The massive flow of people to and from Libya makes it difficult to distinguish between those who seek legitimate work or transit and those who seek to join ISG. More than 40 thousand Tunisians currently live and work in Libya. Moreover, Libya is a primary route for illegal migration to Europe, especially from Sub-Saharan Africa. More than 100 thousand people a year have crossed the Mediterranean from Libyan shores over the last several years.
ISG in Libya is already undermining security in neighboring countries. Two ISG attacks against civilian targets in Tunisia in March and June, which killed over 50 people, were planned from Libya. Tunisian security forces have reportedly intercepted car bombs that infiltrated the country from Libya, and more recently, suspected ISG operatives decapitated a Tunisian teenager in the Side Boozed region.
The challenge for Libya and its neighbors, including Europe, is that a renewed military campaign against ISG in Syria and Iraq makes the group more lethal in Libya. Maintaining pressure against high-value militant targets like al-Zubaydi is important. But without a broader Libyan political accommodation and a more unified campaign against ISG, the group will continue drawing foreign recruits and threatening its neighbors. With ISG in Syria now in the crosshairs, Libya will become more central to the jihadist narrative, and more dangerous.
