On July 28, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei marked 29 years since a referendum made his election official. Today, at 79 years old, he is still relatively young in the Islamic Republic’s gerontocracy. The chairman of Iran’s Assembly of Experts and Guardian Council, Ahmad Jannati, is 91. But persistent rumors of cancer have plagued Khamenei for years and he has publicly acknowledged his mortality. For him, these must be difficult and disappointing days. Iran’s revolution is fraying, and the jockeying among his potential successors tends to spike whenever his health appears to decline. Khamenei’s worries regarding the future of the revolution are well-founded. The current unrest may not yet threaten the regime, but the persistent turbulence and years of political infighting reflect deep economic, environmental, and political failings which seem to defy solution.
Khamenei’s main concerns are the regime’s inability to meet basic social obligations and flagging popular support for the revolutionary ideals which have served as Iran’s stated moral and intellectual foundations for almost a half a century. Like most aged revolutionaries, he appears frustrated at endless elite frictions, a dynamic he himself fostered to weaken potential rivals. He openly criticizes government failings to respond to societal concerns, but bristles at what he perceives as the failure of Iran’s youth to appreciate the sacrifices of his generation and the dangers of Western culture. Finally, recent political leaders have been disappointing. Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has become a corrosive figure; while current President Hassan Rouhani and former President Mohammad Khatami seem too willing to engage the West. For all of these reasons, he must recognize that the selection of his successor will be a crucial inflection point in Iran’s history.
When the inevitable moment arrives for the Assembly of Experts to select the next supreme leader, candidates will be examined through a series of religious, political, and ideological lenses designed to insulate the regime from moderate forces.
Constitutional underpinnings
Iran’s constitution provides broad guidance on the characteristics sought in candidates for the supreme leader. Article 5 lays out the ideal individual: “just, pious, knowledgeable about his era, courageous, a capable and efficient administrator…” Article 109 elaborates that the individual should have “scholarly qualification for issuing religious ruling (fatwa) concerning various discussions in jurisprudence; required justice and piety in leading the Islamic community; and sound political and social perspective, prudence, courage, sufficient administrative capability, and power for leadership.” It’s this marriage between the religious and the political that will prove pivotal in finding the right figure for the job.
The religious litmus test
In 1989, when the last succession process took place, the Islamic Republic found itself at a disadvantage. Khomeini had spent much of his decade in power with a designated successor—Hussein-Ali Montazeri. It was Montazeri who had the requisite clerical standing—grand ayatollah—to be considered the rightful heir to the Khomeini legacy. Montazeri, one of Khomeini’s prized pupils, quickly went from “the light of [his] life” to the bane of his existence after a series of disagreements over politics and policy. For example, he lent his support to the Islamic Republic’s first prime minister and staunch critic of the regime, Mehdi Bazargan, and questioned its image in the world, once remarking “[p]eople on the world got the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.” In a sign of the importance Khomeini attached to religious credentials, in correspondence to Montazeri in which the supreme leader asked for his resignation, Khomeini referred to him as a hojatolislam – essentially a mid-ranking cleric, rather than the more senior grand ayatollah status he held since 1984.
Yet, concern over religious credentials didn’t prove to be deal-breaker in the case of Ali Khamenei. When Khomeini died, Ali Khamenei was a hojatolislam and president of the Islamic Republic. The first choice among many in the Assembly of Experts was Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani, a grand ayatollah, who was then one of the most senior Shiite clerics in Iran. But Golpayegani fell short of the necessary support from the Experts. It’s at this moment that the high standard of religious credentials that Khomeini insisted upon in this contretemps with Montazeri quickly became diluted, and Khamenei became the leading candidate. Indeed, Khamenei himself during the deliberations all but admitted that “based on the constitution, I am not qualified for the job and from a religious point of view, many of you will not accept my words as those of a leader.”
Ali Khamenei’s elevation sets a precedent in the jockeying to come that a mid-ranking cleric can plausibly ascend to the supreme leadership. History has also shown that Khamenei’s status as a hojatolislam made him—at least initially—more dependent on the more coercive institutions of the Islamic Republic, like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Khamenei was considered a less powerful or more malleable supreme leader early in his tenure—for example, some, including Iran’s former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered Khamenei more malleable due to his lack of significant religious standing. The Islamic Republic had seen this movie before with Montazeri in what to expect of an ayatollah with such singular stature.
It’s in this context that today figures like Mojtaba Khamenei, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, Sadeq Larijani, Ebrahim Raisi, and Hasan Rouhani have been mentioned as potential successors to Khamenei. Many have inferior religious credentials—Raisi and Rouhani are both hojatolislam. And some analysts argue Mojtaba, Khamenei’s son, does not even hold the rank of hojatolislam. The presence of only one grand ayatollah—Shahroudi—in the mix means that the Khamenei precedent looms large in the halls of power in Tehran—clerics who can be shaped early on by the repressive institutions and individuals who surround them.
Political profile
Institutional experience is likely to be an important element in the selection, especially in terms of a potential candidate’s exposure to the inner workings and relationships which move Iran’s complicated bureaucracy. Service in the presidency, Assembly of Experts, Guardians Council, Council for Discernment of Expediency, and parliament are critical in this regard. Many observers saw Ebrahim Raisi’s campaign for the presidency in 2016 as an effort by Khamenei to provide him with national exposure and deepen his understanding of the problems of government to augment his experience managing the massive parastatal charity Astan Quds Razavi. The need for bureaucratic experience will likely rule out Ahmad Khatami, the firebrand Friday prayer leader, despite his service in the Assembly of Experts. Likewise, Mojtaba Khamenei and Hassan Khomeini, Khomeini’s grandson and custodian of his mausoleum, have no significant experience in this regard. This leaves Larijani, Raisi, Rouhani, and Shahroudi as top prospects.
Ideological indoctrination
Whether or not the current unrest continues, Tehran’s deep state—namely the IRGC—will seek to play a decisive role in any leadership transition but will feel especially compelled if they believe the selection will impact Iran’s political stability. Indeed, the IRGC has threatened to fill the vacuum at other points of turmoil in the history of the Islamic Republic. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the IRGC blasted Khatami in a public letter and threatened a military coup after what many considered were reforms that were too pro-Western.
It’s this sword of Damocles—the IRGC—which hangs over the heads of the ruling class in Iran. The IRGC has interests to protect—financial and security. It’s this latter category, particularly their capacity to manage Iran’s near-abroad issues and maintain the upper-hand over the foreign ministry that is a red line for the IRGC. All political hopefuls from across the spectrum must endorse or accept the IRGC’s role. For example, most recently, even reformist or more pragmatic leaders, like Khatami and Rouhani—who both had conflicts with the IRGC—have lately praised the organization and its special status within the Islamic Republic.
Given Iran’s myriad political and economic challenges, the identity of Iran’s next supreme leader probably remains a mystery to all involved. Potential contenders will seek to position themselves as Khamenei’s health fades. The Assembly of Experts will likely seek an individual they believe capable of strong leadership without disrupting the equities of the elites, like the IRGC. Such a choice would be consistent with Iranian history but would do little to produce someone capable of introducing the deep reforms Iran’s society, politics, and economy require to meet the challenges of today’s Iran.
Norman T. Roule was the National Intelligence Manager for Iran and served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to the Middle East. His service in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations included roles as division chief, deputy division chief and chief of station. Mr. Roule currently serves as senior advisor to United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of UANI.
