The battle for the strategic Iraqi city of Mosul has reached its final stage as Iraqi forces close in on the Islamic State’s last stronghold in Mosul’s Old City. The liberation of Mosul, the second-largest Iraqi city and the capital of oil-rich Nineveh province, would mark a watershed moment in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the broader region. It was in Mosul where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself the Caliph of the Islamic State caliphate in July 2014; and he used the city as headquarters to expand the group’s control over other Iraqi regions and into neighboring Syria.
If recent past is prologue, though, the military victory in Mosul will not easily translate into long-term peace and stability unless key security, political, social, and economic challenges in the region are addressed.
First, the Islamic State’s territorial loss would not end its acts of violence and terrorism anytime soon. With its regular army battered, the terrorist group will continue asymmetrical warfare tactics to avenge its defeat. By carrying out bombing campaigns and suicide attacks, its sleeper cells will attempt to destabilize Mosul and surrounding regions, impede reconstruction and development projects, undermine essential governance and political reforms, and scuttle reconciliation efforts with the aim of reigniting sectarian tension that aided the rise of the group three years ago.
Political bickering inside Iraq and a dangerous regional power play over the future of Mosul are also heating up. Since the start of anti-Islamic State operation in Mosul nearly eight months ago, the urgency of fighting the terrorist group has temporarily concealed deep-seated sectarian and political fissures in Mosul and across northern Iraq – some of which predate the emergence of the Islamic State. However, with the common enemy now on the brink of defeat, rival Iraqi political and armed factions as well as their regional patrons have already accelerated their race for control and dominance, which threatens the stability of the region in the long term.
One key challenge is a lack of consensus on the governance structure for the region after the Islamic State is ousted. Iraqi Kurds and other minority groups oppose the status quo of the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government running Nineveh as a unitary province. They prefer a more decentralized arrangement – or even dividing Nineveh into several smaller provinces – so that minority groups have more representation in administering their regions. Territorial disputes between Baghdad and the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government over parts of Nineveh present another challenge. After three years of brutal Islamic State rule over Mosul, inter- and intrasect divisions also run deep. Indeed, fostering reconciliation to ensure lasting peace in Mosul may prove more difficult than winning the war against the Islamic State.
Interference by outside powers further complicates the situation. Iranian-supported units of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have played a leading role in anti-Islamic State operations in western Mosul, and they control large swaths of territory in southern and western Nineveh – including key roads and strategic areas that connect Mosul to the Syrian border. The success of the PMF units has raised concern among Iraqi Sunnis and regional Sunni states that see the PMF as an extension of Iran’s power and influence in Iraq and Syria. Turkey, in particular, has warned that it may militarily intervene in Iraq if Iran-controlled Shiite paramilitaries commit acts of revenge and violence against Mosul’s predominantly Sunni population.
Tension between Tehran and Washington over the future of Mosul is also escalating. So far, the U.S. military and Iranian-supported PMF units have, in effect, been allies in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq. As the fall of Mosul becomes imminent, though, PMF groups close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards – such as Harakat al-Nujaba, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Badr Organization – have lately dialed up propaganda against American troops that are advising and assisting Iraqi security forces in Mosul and the broader region. Several PMF commanders have warned the Baghdad government against allowing American troops to stay in Iraq after the fight against the Islamic State is concluded. With the Trump Administration working with its allies to contain Iran’s regional ambitions and mulling keeping thousands of troops in post-Islamic State Iraq, Iran-sponsored armed groups may wage another violent campaign to speed up the U.S. withdrawal – reminiscent of what followed the 2003 Iraqi invasion.
This does not mean the departure of U.S. troops would minimize the risk of violence in post-Islamic State Iraq. Quite the contrary, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal, as happened after 2011, would weaken the Baghdad government, exacerbate political and sectarian tension, allow the Islamic State to reconstitute in parts of Iraq, and help Iran to expand its influence in Iraq at the expense of U.S. national security interests. Parallel to the military strategy, Washington and its allies must work with the Iraqi leaders to promote unity and reconciliation, avoid disenfranchisement of the Sunnis and other ethnic and religious minorities, rebuild war-ravaged Mosul and surrounding regions, and implement security and governance reforms.
