Cipher Brief Expert and former Senior CIA Analyst Steven R. Ward offers this exclusive analysis on Tehran's new year perspective as well as the strategies and tactics it will likely employ in 2019.
In 2019 the Islamic Republic will find itself the captain of its own destiny as it celebrates its 40th anniversary. There is no doubt that, as in 2018, the regime will face continued and very dire sanctions-related and self-inflicted economic problems, domestic unrest, political violence by dissident minority groups, and both cyber and terrorist attacks sponsored by its regional enemies.
The theocrats in Tehran will continue to be repressive at home, stressed by the pressure on the system and fearful of the country’s unhappy and beleaguered citizens. Over the coming twelve months, however, Tehran will have all the benefits—and the risks—that come from holding the initiative in its security relations, a gift from the United States, which has ceded this to Iran even as Washington pursues a “maximum pressure” campaign.
Steven R. Ward, Former Senior Analyst, CIA
Former Senior Analyst, CIA
"Iran’s initial advantage in its confrontation with a politically divided United States is that its domestic politics appear set to remain relatively stable. Barring the unexpected death of 79-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranians face no national elections and no significant leadership changes in 2019."
Hardline political opponents of President Hassan Rouhani have already shifted him and his administration in a more conservative and strident direction to deal with Washington’s economic warfare. The hardliners seem to have accepted a level of coexistence with the administration’s pragmatists—at least for the time being—after attempts at the end of 2018 to impeach prominent Rouhani allies failed because Khamenei and other conservative legislators withheld their support.
Far from President Trump’s suggestion last June that Iran had a much different group of leaders, a more unified and determined government, run by many of the same men who have guided Iran for the past 40 years, has emerged. In a time of multiple stresses, the Supreme Leader wants to keep the government focused on perceived U.S. plans against Iran. Last month Khamenei warned regime officials and the Iranian people to be alert to “America’s deceptions” in 2019, declaring that Washington will never stop scheming against Iran and confidently adding that America will never be able to “do a damn thing” about the Islamic Republic.
Steven R. Ward, Former Senior Research Analyst, CIA
Former Senior Analyst, CIA
"Indeed, while Iran needs to be contained, the U.S. approach is fighting rather than complementing, existing constraints of Iranian power."
Tehran holds the initiative because of Trump Administration policies and previously unimaginable bits of good fortune such as the U..S Congress’ turn against Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Riyadh-directed murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The U.S. administration ceded the upper hand in dealing with Iran because, having presented a long list of ultimatums in 2018, it gave itself few options but to wait for Tehran to yield or collapse, neither of which seems likely. Despite the economic pressure, a patient Iran bent on surviving will be doing its best, as the reality television program logo puts it, to outwit, outplay, and outlast the Trump Administration on a range of nuclear and regional security challenges.
First, with regard to nuclear issues, Tehran will remain uninterested in re-negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after the Trump Administration’s withdrawal last spring humiliated those Iranians who favored engagement with the United States and alienated other world powers who are essential to constraining Iran’s nuclear program. Another important Iranian advantage is that, with 40 years of sanctions-busting experience, it only has to make its energy supplies available to willing purchasers at mutually acceptable terms. The United States, meanwhile, must play defense against Iranian exports with only grudging cooperation from all but a few countries. Washington already has had to compromise on the November start of its maximum pressure campaign by giving 180-day sanctions waivers to China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, Greece, Taiwan and Turkey, the eight countries that purchase most of Iran’s oil exports. In December, Washington had to give Iraq a 90-day extension to its initial 45-day waiver to buy electricity from Iran. Given that chronic power outages were behind widespread and occasionally violent protests in southern Iraq last summer, if Baghdad is unable to find affordable substitutes for Iranian electricity and natural gas, more waiver extensions are likely to keep this reluctant U.S. ally safe from the consequences of Trump Administration sanctions.
On another front in the sanctions war, Tehran has an opportunity in 2019 to speed European establishment of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to provide the means for legal and secure trade with Iran that does not rely on the U.S. dollar and would not be reported to American regulators. Although Iran has a terrible reputation for its nonconstructive business dealings with foreign companies, the Iranians have an opportunity, if they choose, to be more accommodating to get the SPV finalized in the coming year as Tehran has demanded. Accepting near-term losses to advance this and similar efforts by Russia, China, and other countries to establish a new international monetary system could bring many long-term advantages to Iran by undermining U.S. sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy. Because accusations of Iranian-sponsored bomb plots and murder in France and Denmark in 2018 appear to have slowed progress on the SPV, Tehran will have to control its inclination to use violence against its political enemies in Europe if it wants to succeed.
Steven R. Ward, Former Senior Research Analyst, CIA
Former Senior Analyst, CIA
"In addition, look for Iran to do more diplomatically to fuel an international backlash against the U.S. withdrawal and sanctions. Tehran is and probably will continue abiding by its JCPOA commitments, making the United States the outlier in the international effort to contain Iran’s nuclear program."
Last October, Iran won a case against the United States before the International Court of Justice, which reprimanded Washington and ordered it to lift restrictive sanctions affecting humanitarian trade, food, medicine, and civil aviation. The U.S. response—officially terminating a defunct friendship treaty with Iran that was the basis for the ruling—gave Tehran another opening to heighten international perceptions that President Trump’s Washington has little regard for international law and treaty commitments and that its sanctions are illegitimate.
Regional issues pose a greater challenge for Tehran despite changes in the U.S. approach to Syria and Yemen that appear to strengthen Iran’s hand in shaping future outcomes. Iranian hardliners will happily echo American commentators’ overblown assessments that the announced U.S. military withdrawal from Syria and reduced U.S. support for allied operations in Yemen will grant Iran an opportunity to expand its influence in the region. Perceptions, after all, are critical to influence. But, developments in the region already are showing that Iran’s influence and presence face other constraints that are much more real than the roughly 2,000 U.S. forces being removed - over a now-undetermined amount of time - from eastern Syria.
First, Israel’s latest airstrike on an Iranian military site in Damascus at the end of December punctuated the reality that any Iranian efforts to establish permanent defense positions in Syria will not be unopposed. The remaining U.S. presence in Jordan and Iraq also will continue to serve as a potential curb on Iranian activities, including the much feared and greatly exaggerated Iranian creation of a land bridge to the Eastern Mediterranean, which, of course, first must pass through Iraq. Meanwhile, Iran’s forces and Iranian-supported militias in Syria are likely to remain committed to completing the consolidation of Syrian government control amid a chaotic situation involving Syrian troops, Russian forces, the Turkish military, and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. The remaining Islamic State fighters are potentially poised to create new problems that drain Iranian attention and resources.
Tehran also is likely to find that, as Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad becomes more secure, he probably will not welcome enhanced Iranian influence in his country. Unless it is accompanied by significant reconstruction funding (which seems far more likely to drain Iranian coffers rather than provide economic benefits to fund its “malign” regional activities). Damascus seems more likely to limit any future Iranian presence beyond its immediate security needs. Rather than gratitude, Assad may only show Iran and its militias the exit because he will want to avoid creating problems with Israel and to remove a potential obstacle to the normalization of relations with other Arab countries and the international community.
Steven R. Ward, Former Senior Research Analyst, CIA
Former Senior Analyst, CIA
"An early indicator of the extent of Iran’s influence in Syria probably will be the fate of the Iranian-directed Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters in Syria. IF allowed to stay as the regime regains control, these Iranian proxies will give Tehran multiple options for adventurism in and around the country"
But, if these non-Arabs are sent home as the need for their support dwindles, the remaining Iraqi militias and even some of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard forces may also be asked to return home.
As the situation in Syria develops in 2019, Tehran probably will continue playing its long-term and cautious regional game. Wary of providing a pretext for escalation, Iran already has foregone any significant retaliation against the repeated Israeli airstrikes and has never seriously threatened the U.S. forces in Syria. In Iraq, after unknown assailants rocketed the U.S. consulate in Basra following the burning of Iran’s consulate in the city in early September, Washington accused Iran of threatening U.S. diplomatic facilities and warned that it would be held accountable for any attacks. If Iran were behind the rocket attack, it took no further actions that might have worsened tensions.
Similarly, although Iran made public threats about retaliating for terrorist attacks in 2018 that it believed were sponsored by Saudi Arabia, Tehran has not responded beyond its continued support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the coming year, Iran is preparing to confront increased militancy among Sunni Baluch militants in eastern Iran, which Tehran charges Riyadh with supporting. Here again, the Iranians appear set on avoiding actions that harm relations with Pakistan, which has its own problems with the Baluch, and that might worsen the Sunni jihadi threat there and in Afghanistan.
In sum, Iran is likely to be seriously disappointed by the lack of gratitude shown by Damascus once Assad feels secure and seeks Syria’s place in the region by resorting to past behaviors that do not rely on the Iranians. Iran’s growing unpopularity in Iraq, even among Iraqi Shia, suggests Tehran and the militias it supports are far from politically dominant and face real limits regardless of the U.S. military posture. Yemen, assuming the chaos and its utility for diverting and bleeding Saudi Arabia ends, remains a place of marginal importance to Iran’s primary security needs and a locale little interested in following Tehran’s lead. Historically, the smaller Gulf States are happy to use Iran to counterbalance the Saudis but have no interest in falling into an Iranian orbit.
Looking Ahead: In 2019, we should expect Tehran to continue efforts to improve its international relations mixed with occasional threats to withdraw from its JCPOA commitments if European mitigation efforts lag. It also will confront jihadist groups, capitalize on the growing international interest in ending the war in Yemen, counter Saudi efforts to extend Riyadh’s sway over its smaller Gulf Arab neighbors, and continue to confront Kurdish, Baluch, and other separatist aspirations. In addition, Iran will continue, in its words, to resist Israel’s occupation of Palestine, but its ongoing support to Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas does not appear set to sponsor more provocative or aggressive actions. Iran’s cautious approach toward achieving these goals combined with recent U.S. actions and Saudi setbacks probably will result in a relative increase in Tehran’s regional influence. However, this increased influence postures Iran, at best, to be a spoiler of its adversaries’ aspirations rather than a major driver on its putative allies’ policies. Still, the Islamic Republic of Iran is likely to be satisfied as its 40th anniversary year ends, that it remains a survivor of U.S. enmity and sanctions and its enemies have weakened themselves with their own confrontational Iran-obsessed policies.
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