On March 7, 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS. Nearly a year later, has either of these terrorist groups gained from this partnership?
For ISIS, the answer is undoubtedly yes. Expanding its reach helps ISIS demonstrate in real terms that it is achieving its goal of creating a caliphate under Sharia law through its more than 40 affiliates. ISIS can claim responsibility for Boko Haram’s attacks, thereby bolstering its image as a growing, ruthless global threat. Similarly, Islamists do not need to travel to the Middle East to engage in jihad, but rather can stay in Western Africa to be part of the movement. It does not hurt that Boko Haram, which has renamed itself “the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,” was the world’s deadliest terrorist organization in 2014, killing 6,644 individuals, compared with ISIS’ 6,073. Together, the two groups were responsible for 51 percent of deaths from claimed terrorist attacks.
The gains are less clear for Boko Haram. According to Jacob Zenn, a Boko Haram expert with the Jamestown Foundation, the Nigerian-based group likely sought legitimacy to help with recruitment, funding, and logistics, in addition to guidance from ISIS in media warfare and propaganda. Without public recruitment or funding figures, it is impossible to assess if Boko Haram is satisfied with this partnership. Zenn, however, notes one advantage: “Previously Boko Haram was a sort of outcast in the global Jihadi community,” whereas now it is part of the Islamist group making headlines.
Boko Haram, however, has been hit hard by Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari’s counterinsurgency since the May 2015 election. Buhari moved military headquarters from the capital city of Abuja to the center of Boko Haram’s insurgency in Maiduguri, has arrested and killed many fighters, and claims to have recaptured all territories previously held by Boko Haram. These reforms have seriously hindered Boko Haram’s ability to achieve its primary aim—creating and governing a West African Islamic State—and as such, Buhari announced in December, “technically we have won the war.”
But technically winning has not stopped terrorist attacks, and Nigerians remain worried. Since Buhari has come to power, Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for 2,608 deaths, a conservative estimate according to the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker.
Boko Haram attacks are routinely executed in public places and against private citizens, from raids on villages to market bombings. Just last week, two girls detonated suicide bombs at the Dikwa camp, where Nigerians forced from their homes by Boko Haram rampages live, killing 58 people and wounding 78. A third girl, who decided not to detonate her device after recognizing her parents and siblings in the camp, warned that future attacks are being planned.
“Clearly, the snake has been injured and weakened, but not killed or defanged,” acknowledged Dr. Ona Ekhomu, President of the Nigerian Association of Industrial Security and Safety Operators, who recommends that the government focus on developing a brilliant strategy, not brute force.
What makes this challenge even more difficult is that Buhari is navigating the counterinsurgency through a system plagued with corruption and a struggling economy due to low global oil prices.
With a recent rise in Boko Haram attacks against Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, a more robust regional effort is perhaps the best move forward, despite Nigeria’s rocky history with some of these neighbors. Dr. C. Nna-Emeka Okereke of Nigeria’s National Defence College agrees Boko Haram is not solely a Nigeria problem and argues that, with ISIS affiliates across North Africa, efforts along West, Central, and North Africa should be consolidated to combat the larger ISIS movement. Given the difficulty of creating effective regional organizations in Africa, it remains to be seen whether the nations effected by Boko Haram terrorism will be able to work together to combat the threat.
Alana Garellek is an International Producer with The Cipher Brief.
