There was never any question that America’s relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would become one of its most important in the region and indeed in the world. It is the birthplace of one of the world’s largest monotheistic faiths and serves as the Muslim world’s “custodian of its two holiest places.” It sits atop the world’s richest oil reserves. A strong relationship with the kingdom is the sine qua non for the world’s superpower committed to maintaining stability in the region, the world’s energy markets and the global economy. The rise of extremism in the Middle East in the final decades of the 20th century made it more imperative that the U.S. forge closer ties with the nation that many consider the ideological birthplace of extremist religious ideology in the Muslim world.
For Saudi Arabia, too, a strong relationship with the U.S. was and remains, indispensable. It is without question, the kingdom’s most important relationship in the world. Its oil wealth, and all that came from it, made it an attractive target for nations as well as non-state actors with an eye on seizing the prize, whether the Soviet Union, Iran or Al Qaida. The only nation that could serve as its defensive backstop against any potential hostile nation or group has been, and remains, the United States. Saudi Arabia needs the U.S. Without it, its identity, the permanence of the ruling Al Saud dynasty, and its oil wealth are exposed.
The Odd Couple of Global Politics
From that shared interest in stability was born a unique relationship, a strategic marriage of sorts between the world’s oldest democracy steeped in respect for human rights, freedom and rule of law and a nation where faith and governance are indistinguishable and monarchical power remains absolute and concentrated. With practically no values in common, the unique relationship relies entirely on shared interests.
Since 1945, the odd couple of global politics managed to keep the relationship strong and healthy. But it wasn’t without its hiccups and disruptions. Oil embargos, passionate differences over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a shocking terrorist attack against the American homeland masterminded by a Saudi and carried out by 15 other Saudis, a wave of democratic revolution throughout the Middle East – blessed in many respects by the U.S. – and the restart of U.S. diplomacy and a nuclear accord with the kingdom’s most reviled enemy, Iran, failed to sever the relationship.
However, the divide between the two nations’ values was never far below the surface, most often on issues of human rights and liberty. Its treatment of women, intolerance of other faiths besides the ultra-conservative Wahhabist brand of Islam practiced and officially recognized in the kingdom, including a special antipathy for Shia Islam and Judaism, its strict controls over the press and other media, and rigid adherence to Sharia law, among many others, constantly plagued the relationship. Nevertheless, the two nations always seemed to find discreet ways to mitigate these, whether quietly arguing for the release of Christians imprisoned for proselytizing, women arrested for protesting the ban on female drivers. On terrorism, too, after the shock and consequential American fury over the 9/11 attacks, the two nations, through determined diplomacy, intelligence cooperation and political leadership, founds ways to become close partners on combatting extremist violence in the region and elsewhere.
Now a Conflict of Interests
Today, however, the relationship faces strains that it has never had to confront before. First, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, aka MBS, the Crown Prince and de facto ruler of the kingdom, has been strongly implicated in the grisly, execution-style murder of prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. Second, the kingdom strongly backed the American withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accord, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The U.S.’ decision to walk away from the accord potentially sets the two cross-Gulf rivals on a collision course that would inevitably drag in the U.S.
MBS’s unquestionable role in Khashoggi’s murder – as assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community and The U.S. State Department, and the JCPOA withdrawal, have placed the relationship into the territory of what might be the first time in which the two nations differ in both values and interests.
It is one thing for the USG or Congress or even the American public to wave off murder carried out by despots, e.g., Russia’s Putin, with which the U.S. has frosty relations, but it amounts to something else entirely when the leader of a close, strategic ally does it and then struggles futilely to cover it up.
While a formal pact between the two nations that requires the U.S. to come to the defense of the kingdom in the face of a major threat may not exist, there has been little question that the U.S. would step up if such a threat materialized, as was done during the first Gulf War. But are Americans willing to send their sons and daughters to defend a nation led by an all-controlling, 30-something unable to tolerate a little opposition coming from the pen of a single journalist, or critical blogs by young Saudis also disturbed by the crown prince’s autocratic behavior?
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. administration currently see eye-to-eye on Iran and the JCPOA. However, the fact remains evident to many, including the U.S.’s most critical allies, that the solution to the Iran-vs.-the West/Saudi Arabia confrontation is not armed conflict. If the U.S. and its allies are to resolve the long list of legitimate grievances, it will require determined, patient and deliberate diplomacy. 12-point demands, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo discussed last year, and ratcheted up sanctions, will only further entrench the Islamic Republic and drive the sides further apart. Similarly, Iran’s non-stop revolutionary, America-hating, anti-Israel rhetoric also will produce only harsher American responses. Both talk as though each is negotiating in front of a mirror as opposed to across the table from one another. If the U.S. administration can talk and negotiate with another equally despised, repressive regime like North Korea, why can’t it sit down with Iran?
So, what then should the U.S. do about what will surely become an increasingly problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia? Can it do business with a ruler accused of murder?
There are steps that can be taken if for no other reason than to mollify those justifiably reluctant to deal with MBS. First, if it hasn’t already, the USG should request a full report from the Saudi government about its role in the assassination of Khashoggi, including that of MBS. In truth, the Saudis may assert that this is an unjustified intrusion into its internal affairs or that it already has offered its one and only explanation. However, the U.S. should underscore that the relationship cannot continue as it has until a complete accounting of the journalist’s murder is provided.
Similarly, the U.S. should request all further information about the incident from Turkish authorities. With the Saudi response (assuming one is given), U.S. intelligence can make a final assessment based on all available information. It is unlikely, however, that even with this information, the crown prince will be exonerated, given what is already known. Then what?
Second, with or without the official Saudi and Turkish accounts, U.S. might consider supporting the movement in the UN to open an investigation. Such an investigation in this specific case, which would likely be supported by Turkey and other Western nations, would not obligate the U.S. or any other state to do so on any future case. However, the message of a U.S. endorsement of a UN investigation would also drive home the message to the kingdom that flagrant violations of international law won’t be tolerated by the U.S., whether in the Khashoggi case or potential cases in the future.
Third, the U.S. has a wide range of policy actions at its disposal, many of which the current administration will be unlikely to act on. One should be insisting that MBS shed some of his authorities, e.g., deputy prime minister, minister of defense, chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, chairman of the Council of Political and Security Affairs, and head of Aramco, the state-owned oil and natural gas company. It might also insist on the appointment of a new commander of the Saudi National Guard, now led by an MBS-appointee and ally.
It should be noted that the U.S. has extensive training programs and weapons contracts with both the armed forces, under the defense ministry, and the National Guard. The prince also controls the newly created Entertainment Commission. Turning these positions over to other senior family members would be in keeping with policies of previous Saudi kings, who shared powers and responsibilities within the family in order to maintain a consultative governing arrangement with the king.
Another action should be re-establishing the Allegiance Council, established by King Abdullah in 2007 to supervise and ensure an orderly and consensual transition from one king to another. It was effectively abandoned by MBS in 2017. U.S. outreach to its allies who believe similarly on the matter of MBS would add much useful clout to the U.S. request.
Whether any of these would be carried out by MBS is doubtful. Nonetheless, the overarching message would be clear: America does not like the new direction of Saudi Arabia’s leadership.
Applying U.S. Leverage
In the likely event that Saudi Arabia and MBS do not comply or make only cosmetic changes, then what? Again, the U.S. has options. The most important leverage it has is its position as the kingdom’s defensive backstop, without which the kingdom would have to completely overhaul its foreign and national security policies. For example, the administration – or more likely Congress – could impose restrictions on future arms sales and training programs in the kingdom. Those that serve specific American interests, e.g., combatting terrorism, could remain. Such an action would place a major burden on the kingdom’s armed forces and National Guard, now nearly totally dependent on American or British weapons systems.
The U.S. could also begin implementing plans to wean itself off Saudi oil. Thanks to alternative import sources and America’s fracking boom, U.S. imports of Saudi crude have already declined from its highs in the mid-nineties and mid-2000s of 2.5 MBD to just under 1.0 MBD, or about 12 percent of total U.S. oil imports, according to the Energy Information Agency. Any reduction in that amount would potentially unnerve the Saudis about America’s willingness to rely on Saudi oil and put further distance between American and Saudi interests. The Saudis would easily find alternative customers, but none with the special standing and capabilities of the U.S.
On the kingdom’s relationship with Iran, constructive action is unlikely during the current administration. However, Congress can begin to have productive hearings about the efficacy of the current approach of sanctions and demands, and on what genuine diplomacy might look like, including outreach to U.S. allies. This would not entail a retreat from America’s well-known concerns about the Islamic Republic, e.g., JCPOA shortcomings, ballistic missile development, Iranian support for terrorism, destabilizing activity in the region, threatening actions against Israel and even internal matters, including detention of Americans and human rights violations. Such an approach must include discussion about what would constitute an acceptable, re-worked JCPOA, including consultation with our allies in the accord, Britain, France, Germany and the EU.
Addressing the Matter of MBS
Lastly, what of the relationship with MBS himself? That is an especially challenging question given his already prodigious power in the kingdom but also the likelihood of him becoming king and remaining so for decades. Absent action on some, or all, of the aforementioned suggestions, the U.S. can decide to limit its top-level interaction with him. That might mean assigning all communication with him on intelligence matters to a designated CIA contact and all other issues would fall to the U.S. ambassador. The U.S. could also limit his travel to the U.S. except when specifically invited for UN events such as the General Assembly. Given the exceptionally close relationship that all previous presidents and kings have had since FDR, this might be the most powerful tool the U.S. has and a clear signal to the Al Saud family and the Saudi people of where the U.S. stands on government-ordered assassinations.
Additional potential actions on the part of the U.S. include severing all U.S. support for the kingdom’s disastrous involvement in Yemen’s civil war, calling for the release of political and human rights prisoners in the kingdom, and providing greater space for Saudis to voice their views without fear of punishment.
The U.S. will also need to make it clear that it will not tolerate interference in internal U.S. affairs by any means that are not public and transparent. This would specifically apply to cyberwarfare or other concealed attempts to distort or fabricate information in order to deceive or otherwise influence American citizens. It would not inhibit the kingdom’s ability to work with public relations firms in the U.S. to advocate its positions. To act contrary to this firm position, however, should mean automatic sanctions on the kingdom.
There is one final risk that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia face as long as the crown prince continues his autocratic approach to governance. Conservative imams, who were marginalized in the early days of MBS’s rule, are becoming increasingly prominent. Now, more progressive imams, like Salman Alodah, who speak on behalf of human rights, rule of law, and even diplomatic resolution of the standoff with Qatar, have been marginalized and, in Alodah’s case, imprisoned. As internal opposition mounts, MBS will turn to the power and influence of the Wahhabi conservatives for added enforcement power. The incontestable political power of the throne, which he effectively enjoys today, and the supporting religious power of the strict Wahhabists, will give MBS iron-fisted control over all aspects of the kingdom’s policies and the lives of its citizens. Such power is exceedingly dangerous and bound to lead to problems down the road, both for the kingdom and for its most important ally, the U.S.
The Trump administration’s current relationship with the kingdom and MBS is temporary. It conflates a relationship with Mohammed Bin Salman with the more important relationship the U.S. must have with the kingdom. A future U.S. administration will have to confront the reality of a MBS-led Saudi Arabia increasingly at odds with not only America’s values, but also its interests. At such a point, then, the entire basis of the relationship and what it means for the U.S. will require a wholesale reassessment and consequential policy changes for the kingdom and the region.
That is the inevitable outcome if this, and a future administration, continue along the current path. Meaningful course corrections, as suggested above, however, can change that direction so that the shared strategic interests of the two nations can be met working as partners, as has largely been the norm since 1945.
Read more from Ambassador Gary Grappo in The Cipher Brief...
