Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, US Army (Ret) was the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from 2008-2009. Prior to that, he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Affairs from 2006-2008. These positions followed a 30-year career in the military with service as Deputy Director for Strategy and Plans at US Central Command, Deputy Director of Operations for Coalition Forces in Iraq and significant command assignments worldwide.
Ship me somewheres east of Suez, where the best is like the worst,
Where there aren't no Ten Commandments an' a man can raise a thirst;
- Mandalay, Rudyard Kipling
In 1967, Great Britain was nearing the end of its imperial epoch. It was confronting trade deficits and declining productivity figures while running into the headwinds of declining export sales, lower worldwide growth and increasing budget deficits. The Defense Review, under study since Labor took office in 1965, reduced the Ministry of Defense budget to £2000 million, scrapped aircraft carriers, economized on NATO commitments and increasingly relied on a strategy of nuclear deterrence. Another casualty of the Review was the enormously expensive “East of Suez” policy.
Military commitments in Bahrain, Yemen, Malaysia and Hong Kong cost £330m per year; by comparison, maintaining its NATO commitments facing off against the Soviet Union were £247m. Given the financial imperatives, it became necessary for the British to make the difficult policy choices to withdraw British forces from Bahrain, Yemen and Malaysia – areas “East of Suez” – marking the end of permanent military commitments to both the “Near” and “Far” East aside from Hong Kong. The 1967 devaluation of the Pound sterling ended any substantive opposition to that policy.
It is said that history does not repeat itself but often rhymes. Some, such as Kori Schake at the American Enterprise Institute and Robert Kaplan at the Eurasia Group, suggest the US may be pushed into a similar “East of Suez” decision in the Middle East, with COVID-19 costs having the same pivotal effects as the 1967 Pound devaluation. They argue that downward pressure on budgets and a trend since 2006 to recede from Middle East operations will be amplified by the pandemic and, short of significant destabilizing events such as a “cataclysm in Iran”, this trend will accelerate.
Certainly, there are similarities between the current situation faced by the United States and that faced by the British in 1967. Like the British, the US decision to reduce its overseas presence would not be the consequence of a single event, but the convergence of a number of developments. Three in particular stand out; the waning public support for wars in the Middle East, diminished national interest in the region and the extraordinary costs incurred by the US government in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Diminishing public support for overseas operations is not new. Since the election of Barack Obama in 2008 and Donald Trump in 2016, there has been little support for ongoing operations as envisioned by the 1980 Carter Doctrine, whereby the United States would use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf. To Obama, the war in Iraq was a mistake from its outset and on his very first day in office, he directed the US military to "engage in additional planning necessary to execute a responsible military drawdown from Iraq."
Donald Trump has also been skeptical about the value of military operations in the region, redeploying most troops from Northern Syria, reducing troops in Iraq and pressing for a once-unthinkable peace deal with the Taliban. His views were summed up in a comment on 6 April: “We’re wasting all of our money in the Middle East... What we’ve done is so crazy. We’re in the Middle East for 8 trillion dollars and if you want to fix a pothole on a (US) highway you can’t,” said Trump. These views on Middle East operations are not unique or idiosyncratic.
The national interests of the US in the Middle East, too, are far less existential than in years past. The US is now self-sufficient in energy resources and a significant warming of relations with Israel within the region has led to increased stability among former adversaries. Relative to the threats from China, from a revanchist Russia, and from a host of non-state actors, instability in the Middle East ranks far lower than in years past. The threat of significant terror attacks have evolved dramatically as homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), domestic violent extremists, and foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) are considered more dangerous to the US. For example, the most recent foreign terrorist group designated by the State Department is not a regional offshoot of al Qaeda or ISIS, but the Russian Imperial Movement, a group with ties to US white supremacist groups.
Some say the cost of the COVID-19 virus will be the inflection point. Like the UK in 1967, the financial price of the pandemic will likely cause a reassessment of national priorities. The costs are staggering – some 9.95 million Americans filed for unemployment in the last two weeks, compared to the previous record of 695,000 in 1982. Tax revenues from individuals and corporations will be a fraction of years past. The government programs established to alleviate the mortal blow to the US economy are estimated to range from six to 10 trillion dollars – half of the annual GDP of the US – and increase the national debt by (at least) 50 percent. Even when COVID-19 is no longer a health crisis, a follow-on recession is inevitable. In light of this, government belt-tightening will be imperative as it is unlikely that the economy will be able to "grow" its way out of the pandemic for years, if ever. A responsible program to offset government expenditures will be obligatory, and military operations in the Middle East will almost certainly be a major target within the framework of a significantly reduced defense budget.
Yet, despite the obvious similarities to 1967, comparisons and claims of determinism are made at one’s peril. It would be rash to conclude that the coronavirus crisis is somehow akin to Britain’s financial collapse in the 1960s, or that the costs of COVID-19 marks an end to America’s significant involvement in the region, whether as a result of policies or pandemics.
While enthusiasm for foreign wars has plummeted, support for world engagement in general and in the region is strong. It has become conventional wisdom that the US is “Retrenching”, ‘Withdrawing” or “Abandoning the Order”, yet few polls are declarative on that point and often rely on the framing of the question. Even the recent calls for fewer immigrants or less dependence on foreign supply chains do not necessarily infer that Americans are less willing to engage with the world or are seeking autarky, but more likely suggest a preference for different terms to that engagement.
The penchant for engagement may reflect a common-sense realization that the Middle East still matters— and retreating from the region or redirecting focus elsewhere is dangerous. While vital national interests in the region may be less critical than in years past, the region is still important, still dangerous and still threatens the US. Terrorist groups, while not as capable as al Qaeda or ISIS, are taking advantage of weak state control, metastasizing into almost every country in the region and more dangerously exporting hardened fighters around the world. Oil is less important for the US but is still needed by the rest of the world, especially a voracious China. State collapse is increasing as countries are experiencing massive population explosions and urbanization without the means to adequately address the consequences. Civil wars, internal displacement and refugee flows are at a level both unimaginable and unmanageable, and continued malign Iranian expansionism throughout the region – particularly in Iraq and Syria – could explode into epochal conflict between Arabs and Persians.
All of this argues for continued American engagement. But, as many would argue, at what cost? What of the eight trillion dollars that President Trump says the US squandered in the Middle East might have been spend on infrastructure, education, or healthcare? Those sunk costs are significant, but analysis of those costs recognize that an overwhelming percentage of them were operational – fuel, ammunition, life support. Yet, those massive costs will abate significantly as extensive military operations recede.
What will remain are infrastructure and personnel – mostly rotational units – whose size will grow and shrink as needed and whose annual costs are a fraction of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, further cost efficiencies can be achieved by “geographical offsetting” though the use of drones controlled from Nevada, long range air platforms launched from Missouri and cyber operations launched from Maryland – all of which can be shared among other priority theaters.
Unlike Great Britain in 1968, whose withdrawal from Bahrain, Singapore and Yemen had little strategic impact, US withdrawal from the region would reverberate worldwide, creating a vacuum quickly filled by the Russians and Chinese. We would abandon longstanding allies to others and without the stabilizing impact of a comprehensive U.S. effort, might ignite another Arab-Israeli conflict. Our withdrawal would leave energy resources, shipping routes and alliances to those countries more willing to establish a presence in the region, thus far deterred by the US, and would certainly lead to decreased stability and increased threats to US national interests.
There will be many that see the COVID-19 pandemic as a catalyst or an opportunity to reduce a robust US presence in the Middle East. They might agree with President Trump’s aspiration to “Let someone else fight over this long blood-stained sand” or his view that the US needs to make difficult financial choices, and potholes take priority. Yet, few will dispute the numerous risks to US national security emanating from the region, including terrorism, encroachment by Russia and China, internecine conflict, control of economically critical waterways, threats to allies, potential state collapse, threats from Iran and a host of other seen and unseen challenges. It would be naïve – and dangerous – to adopt a policy which significantly reduces US military presence in the region as it would have the same impact on US worldwide influence as it did to the United Kingdom. Maintaining a presence will require continued popular support, a willingness to protect American interests and strong arguments in the face of other defense and social priorities and one can hope it unlikely that the COVID-19 pandemic results in a self-defeating “East of Suez” policy for the US.
Read more expert-driven insights, opinion and analysis in The Cipher Brief
Sign-up for twice weekly Expert Virtual Briefings by becoming a member today.
