Expert Q&A: A Kremlin ‘History’ of the Ukraine War

EXPERT Q&A — Last week Russia released a new textbook for high school students, a three-volume set called “The Military History of Russia” which includes a rewrite of the actual history of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The text says Russia was “forced” to invade Ukraine, and that the war was “a defensive necessity” given the “encroachment” of the NATO alliance. The Russian account also compares the urgency of the war and the way it has been waged with the Soviet Union’s fight against Nazi Germany.

The text, which will be required reading for Russian students 15 and older, is the latest effort by the Kremlin to seed and solidify its own narratives within the domestic population.

Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke about those efforts with Stanislav Kucher, the editor-in-chief of Samizdat Online, and a former Russian TV journalist who now lives and works in the United States. 

Their conversation has been edited lightly for length and clarity. You can also watch their full discussion on our YouTube channel.

Nagorski: To what extent do you think the Russian public, young or old, buys into this narrative that the war was necessary, that it’s just like World War II?

Kucher: I would say that around 60% of young Russians do buy into this narrative, to different extents. There are many young Russians who believe that America has always been an adversary, if not an enemy, of the Russian Empire, then later the Soviet Union, and currently [Vladimir] Putin’s Russia.

When I say 60%, I refer to the results of a recent public poll by Levada, which is a more or less independent polling agency. You can’t trust all public opinion polls in Russia today, especially when they ask questions about the policy of the government of the Kremlin. But when it comes to describing the general mood of the Russian people, their general attitude to America, or to Russian history, then yes, those results you can trust.

Nagorski: Given that Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin are succeeding to some extent in getting that message across, why do you think the Kremlin felt it necessary to put out these textbooks now, three years into this war?

Kucher: This did not start yesterday. I would say it’s a new chapter in an alternative history that the Kremlin has been writing for at least the past ten years, and especially actively since February 24th, 2022, the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine. 

For example, back in 2022, they introduced the so-called “lessons” about what is important in the war to Russian schools. Russian elementary schools would bring veterans of the so-called “special military operation” to schools to lecture about what’s going on in Ukraine, what’s important and what’s not. So this is already a part of the school program, and this new textbook just explains what has already been said in the course of the past three years. Let’s put it this way: Now it’s official, and now it’s everywhere. But teachers were obliged to lecture on pretty much the same things which are now described in this textbook throughout the past three years and even before that.

---

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that provides the best way to unwind while staying up to speed on national security. (And this Nightcap promises no hangover or weight gain.)  Sign up today.

---

Nagorski: The editor of this three-volume history is Vladimir Medinsky, described as an aide to Vladimir Putin. What can you tell us about him?

Kucher: Vladimir Medinsky is a typical governmental official, a typical career climber, a guy who always wanted to make it to the top. He was Russia’s Minister of Culture, and he was pretty much in charge of influencing the educational system. He also wrote a number of books; he wrote three books in a series called Myths About Russia. 

What’s interesting is that he has not always been like this. I remember him in the 1990s, when he was all for democracy, all for reforms. Even in the early 2000s, in the first decade of the new millennium, he was a pretty pro-Western politician. He was elected to the Russian State Duma [parliament] and he advocated for political reform, he advocated for western values, he spoke against political extremism, against nationalism, against xenophobia. And then he joined the lines of what [the Chechen leader] Ramzan Kadyrov calls Putin’s field soldiers. So he’s there now. 

I have known him since I was 17 and he was 19, because we went to college together. We attended a class called “Propaganda and Information Work,” where one of our professors used to tell us that “It’s you guys who will make the new information reality in Russia and in the world. It’s you who will be in charge of creating this new virtual reality.” I’m pretty positive that Vladimir Medinsky is now extremely proud, realizing that he is now filling the minds of young Russians with “information bull—.” He’s pretty aware of what he’s doing, but again, like Putin, and like many people in Putin’s entourage, he believes it himself now.

Nagorski: Even in a state that has control over the information flow, people – young people especially – who are curious have a way to access some other sources of information. Are young people in Russia not able to access other information, or are they really buying into this line no matter what?

Kucher: Both. They do have access to all modes of information. They have access to the internet, they use VPNs [virtual private networks], they access the internet without VPNs. Yet they are buying into almost all of this. They know that Putin invaded Ukraine. They know about the fight for power. They know everything about Putin and his coterie exploiting millions of Russians and stealing from them. They know about corruption. But this precise line, about the West wishing to economically or politically or militarily conquer Russia, they believe that somehow. And they do believe that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a preemptive attack designed to protect Russia and that if Russia had not attacked, probably Ukraine would have done so. So yes, unfortunately, a lot of Russians are buying that.

---

The intersection of technology, defense, space and intelligence is critical to future U.S. national security.Join The Cipher Brief on June 5^th and 6^th in Austin, Texas for the NatSecEDGE conference. Find out how to get an invitation to this invite-only event at natsecedge.com

---

Nagorski: Early on in the war, people here and in Europe, and I dare say in Russia too, assumed that if there were a huge number of [Russian] casualties, it would be damaging to the Kremlin. And here we are, almost at the three-year mark, there’ve been hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded Russians. And yet, to quote the same somewhat reliable polls, you have 60-70% of Russians who support the war. How do you account for that?

Kucher: The thing is, it’s not exactly that 70% support the war. It’s that 70% believe that the war was inevitable, a necessary step to prevent an existential threat to Russia from the so-called collective West, and with Ukraine at their service. That’s what Russians believe. 

But just a couple days ago, I spoke with a renowned Russian army general, a former aide to Vladimir Putin, Leonid Ivashov, who described to me the mood or the attitude of many Russians. He’s the head of a huge alliance of military veterans, and they have their own polling agency in Russia. They conduct their own research. They had done a lot of research before the war, and they had warned Putin against the war. They had called on him not to invade. They predicted casualties. They predicted Russia’s isolation. They predicted pretty much everything that has happened ever since, in the past three years. He told me that not a single of his acquaintances, not a single Russian military veteran, including those who fought in Ukraine now, are for the continuation of this war. They all understand that this war is evil. They all understand that Russia doesn’t need this war anymore. 

But — and this may seem paradoxical — at the same time, Russians just don’t know what to do next. They think that they’ve gone too far now, and having gone this far, the only way forward for them is to keep supporting Vladimir Putin, because if they don’t, then they think the West, together with Ukraine, will crush Russia, just like the world crushed Nazi Germany in World War II. Russians believe that. And they don’t want that. 

We are really in a very troublesome, dangerous situation. I wouldn’t say hopeless, but it’s a dangerous situation. Russians listen to Trump, and they do want this war to end. But they are also really afraid that the end of this war will mean the destruction of the Russian state, the elimination of Russian sovereignty, and the end of Russian independence, which is not true, of course. 

I’m pretty positive it will take years, if not decades — it will probably take a change in generations, just like it happened in Germany, to change minds. In the case of Nazi Germany, it took more than 20 years before the Germans realized that they actually were wrong. And so it’s a pretty similar situation with Russia at this point.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.  Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field?  Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief