The attempted military coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is perhaps the most important political event in Turkey of the past 16 years, and has fundamentally changed the country's internal politics and external priorities. Ambassador James Jeffrey's article, written for The Cipher Brief on July 19, explores some of those early changes and offers a prescient look at where the new Turkey might be headed.
Turks and the rest of the world avoided the worst when a military coup, organized by elements of Jandarma – the Turkish Gendarmerie – army armored units, and the air force against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AK Party government, failed. But even if this strike against Turkey's constitutional order was more successful, such a military move, unlike earlier Turkish military action against the civilian state, would not have mobilized the public. As seen in the immediate condemnation of the coup by the opposition political parties, and even anti-Erdogan elements of the media, the Turkish people overwhelmingly reject military rule. And Erdogan supporters, a large and well-organized element of the population, would have resisted to the end. Even had the rest of a military deeply antagonistic towards Erdogan thrown their lot in with the plotters, the result would have been not junta-imposed calm but civil war.
However, this mercifully brief attempt is the most important strategic event since the beginning of Erdogan’s rule 14 years ago. The military, long the most respected institution in Turkey, was revealed to be internally divided, its leadership oblivious to a plot involving thousands of troops country-wide, and initially defenseless against it. Moreover, some rebel elements opened fire on protesting civilians, crossing what was long seen as a red line – with the occasional exception of civilians sympathetic to the Kurdish PKK insurgency.
Thus, the first dramatic result of the coup is to strip the military of any stabilizing and unifying role in a country split into pro- and anti-Erdogan factions facing a resilient 30 year old PKK insurgency. While its coup-making days seemingly ended two decades ago, the military was still seen as a potential supporter of democracy, at least as a barrier to any movement including a government overthrowing the constitutional democratic order.
With the loss of this theoretical but potent force, Turkey's future is now totally in the hands of President Erdogan, who will be unchecked as long as he maintains the reins of power and can motivate his corps of supporters, especially among Turkey's devout Muslim majority. This, then, is the second dramatic result of last week's events. Erdogan now has the motivation to punish those – very broadly defined—willing to kill to overthrow him.
In the absence of military checks and bolstered by the adulation of a motivated "street," Erdogan now has the momentum he needs to take Turkey in almost any direction he wants. No wonder he called the coup a "gift from God" as he immediately ordered a purge of almost 3,000 judges, whose alleged links to the coup must have been "discovered" at warp speed. All while preparing a new constitution granting him extraordinary power as president.
Only he knows, and only he will determine, where Turkey will wind up. The country might now build on anti-coup unity and return to the double digit growth and stability, which Erdogan brought the country after 2002. But, given the divisions in the society – 60 percent voted against his party in June 2015 parliamentary elections, although he regained additional support (50%) in the November rerun – it is equally likely to become more polarized, less free, and perhaps less integrated in the 21st century technological economic world. Integration, which this middle income country with few natural resources desperately needs.
What should the U.S. do now? First, understand that no matter how important Turkey's fate is to America, there is nothing the U.S. can do to fundamentally impact domestic developments. Rather, the U.S. should focus on advancing mutual interests: stabilizing Syria, destroying ISIS, containing the Iranians and Russians, promoting a Cyprus settlement, building up the Turkish energy corridor, and cooperating against the PKK.
But one obstacle to this, seen already in post-coup comments by Erdogan and others, will be to blame the U.S. indirectly – for allegedly harboring accused coup mastermind and exiled Muslim cleric Fetullah Gulen – or even directly for the coup. While these accusations should be rejected (Secretary Kerry set the right tone in his stern denial), they should also roll off the Obama Administration's back like water. There is a seemingly inevitable history of America-bashing in Turkey, well beyond Erdogan, but relations often proceed unperturbed, even as America remains at the bottom in Turkish public opinion polls. Ultimately, this is a question of shared interests, not values or popularity. Yet, if Turkey were to damage relations, such as with a longer suspension of post-coup restrictions on U.S. military operations, Washington must push back hard.
The issue of Fetullah Gulen, a resident alien in Pennsylvania, is particularly difficult. Despite years of public accusations, the Erdogan Government has yet to use the available legal means to have him extradited. While Erdogan's charge that Gulen master-minded the military coup seems implausible, the organization Gulen heads has adherents everywhere who have, among other sins, infiltrated and politicized the Turkish judiciary. Thus, some of Erdogan's grief with former ally Gulen is understandable. If the Turks initiate legal action, the U.S. Government, probably over the objections of its internal lawyers, should put the case to the courts. This is exactly what German Chancellor Angela Merkel did recently in a somewhat similar case involving alleged defamation of Erdogan by a German citizen. Likewise, the U.S. should do everything it lawfully can to limit Gulen's foreign political activities. The situation is too dire, the stakes too big, to haggle in Washington over the issues of "precedence," bureaucratic prerogatives, and ire at Ankara, which typically hinder effective U.S. action.
The longer term U.S challenge is a Turkey that, depending on where Erdogan wants to take it, could be politically less stable, economically weaker, less anchored to Western institutions, and less committed to democratic institutions and a common NATO strategy. A weak Turkey is as problematic as an unfriendly one. But only if Washington and Ankara win success together on common regional issues will the U.S. be positioned to advise Ankara on sensitive issues such as media freedom, a ceasefire with the PKK, and its questionable economic policies. This is a critical relationship for both sides. Washington, as the senior partner, has to be patient and put up with bouts of verbal abuse. But Turks must remember there is a point at which they can truly damage this vital relationship.
