EXCLUSIVE SUBSCRIBER+EXPERT INTERVIEW – Iran’s state media said Monday that President Ebrahim Raisi had died in a helicopter crash that also took the lives of the country’s foreign minister and several other officials. The announcement came some 16 hours after initial reports that the helicopter had gone down Sunday, in heavy fog in a remote area of East Azerbaijan Province.
The country’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, announced Monday that Mohammad Mokhber, the country’s first vice president, would serve as the country’s acting president until elections are held. In an emergency meeting, Iran's Cabinet issued a statement pledging to follow Raisi’s path and said that “with the help of God and the people, there will be no problem with management of the country."
Raisi, foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and the other officials were traveling from a visit to the neighboring country of Azerbaijan, where the Iranian president met with President Ilham Aliyev to open two dams near the Iran-Azerbaijan border. Raisi was reportedly traveling to the Iranian city of Tabriz when the helicopter was reported down.
“One can’t help but wonder who decided the helicopter carrying Iran’s president and his entourage could travel in such conditions,” former National Intelligence Manager for the Director of National Intelligence Norm Roule told The Cipher Brief in an interview on Sunday.
Raisi, who became president in 2021, has led the regime with an iron fist, cracking down on dissenters and protestors who dare defy Tehran. And despite the Cabinet's statement Monday, analysts speculate that his death will have a dramatic impact on both the regime and what comes next for Iran.
THE CONTEXT
- Iranian state media confirmed the deaths of President Raisi and the other officials early Monday.
- Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced the appointment of Mohammed Mokhber, the First Vice President, as acting president. Khamenei declared 5 days of official mourning and reassured Iranians that there would be no disruption of state affairs.
- Under Iran's constitution, the interim president must hold elections for the new president within 50 days.
THE EXPERT INTERVIEW
The Cipher Brief tapped Roule to better understand what Raisi's death could mean for the country and the region. Editor’s Note: This story has been updated; the interview with Roule was conducted before the official confirmation of President Raisi's death.
The Cipher Brief: Describe the region where Iranian President Raisi’s helicopter crashed. What makes this terrain so difficult for rescuers?
Roule: The helicopter crashed in a mountainous region of the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan near the border with the country of Azerbaijan. Rescue and recovery have been hampered by rain, fog, snow, and darkness. The terrain requires rescuers to move on foot. One can’t help but wonder who decided the helicopters carrying Iran’s president and his entourage could travel in such conditions. Sanctions likely have prevented Iran from modernizing its helicopter fleet with the latest transponders. Raisi probably traveled with a communications system, likely a satellite telephone, but this could have been damaged in the crash even if there were survivors. The fact that Russia, Turkey, and other countries sent rescue teams and technical support seems to reinforce the idea that the area is so remote that recovery can only happen with technology and skills Iran doesn’t possess.
The Cipher Brief: Help us better understand why President Ebrahim Raisi has been so crucial to the Islamic Republic.
Roule: President Raisi, a seasoned hardliner and a trusted disciple of Iran’s Supreme Leader, held a pivotal position in the Islamic Republic. At 63, he had long been considered a strong contender, if not the most likely successor, to Iran’s current Supreme Leader, who is 85 years old and in frail health. Many viewed Raisi as uncharismatic but willing to defend the Islamic regime’s policies for another generation, particularly at a time when Iran’s population is growing increasingly disenchanted with the regime. The loss of Raisi would undoubtedly be a significant blow for the Supreme Leader, all the more so given the deaths of former Quds Force commander Qassim Soleimani and nuclear chief Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Khamenei has outlived many of his enemies but now seems to be outliving his most important supporters.
In many ways, Ebrahim Raisi would indeed be difficult to replace. Raisi brings decades of loyalty to the hardline leadership, including experience as a prosecutor in show trials in which he condemned thousands of perceived regime opponents to death during Iran’s revolutionary era. Raisi also managed the harsh and lethal crackdown on Iranian protestors following the death of Mahsa Amini. He shared Khamenei’s views, including his animosity toward the U.S. Raisi was also a savvy political actor. He used anti-corruption campaigns to marginalize domestic opponents during his control of Iran’s Judiciary and the wealthy and influential Imam Reza shrine based in his birthplace, Mashad. Last, he is also an influential member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting a Supreme Leader.
There will likely be a number of potential candidates who will be considered to replace him if he is confirmed killed in the crash. But it will be challenging to find a hardliner who shares Raisi’s history, experience, political networks, and relative youth. Ironically, this difficulty is partly the result of Raisi ensuring that no potential rival developed a power center or network capable of becoming a challenge to him. The ideological “purification” campaign of recent months may not strengthen but instead undermine the regime instead.
The Cipher Brief: What is the history of leadership succession in Iran? How does succession work in this case? And what does this mean for who may become Iran’s next president and Supreme Leader?
Roule: The Islamic Republic has experienced several seismic transitions, beginning with the assassination of its second president, Mohammad-Ali Rajai, in 1981. There was also the difficult experience following the death of Supreme Leader Khomenei in 1989. Iran’s constitution, section 131, requires that First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber temporarily serve as president. If Raisi’s death is officially confirmed, acting president Mokhber, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Mohseni Ejei will form a committee to organize a presidential election within fifty days.
Raisi’s death would inject deep uncertainty and perhaps even infighting into Iran’s political landscape. Insiders, analysts, and observers will be busy sifting through the names and networks of possible candidates. But it seems that Raisi’s successor would likely be a hardliner, albeit without his extensive credentials. It is doubtful that the regime would allow anyone but a trusted actor to fill Raisi’s shoes during this time of transition. It would be hard not to view the coming weeks as a preview of what will happen when Khamenei dies.
The more significant issue is how his potential death will impact the succession to the next Supreme Leader. As Iran’s ultimate decisionmaker, the position of Supreme Leader has historically been critical to regime continuity. Even when his decision-making is not required, his ability to shape the regime's DNA–especially in the selection of Revolutionary Guard commanders–means that he controls the ideological and coercive elements of the government. His successor will wield similar authority.
The Cipher Brief: Who is likely to replace Foreign Minister Abdollahian if he is reported dead in the crash?
Roule: Iran’s foreign ministers are not decision-makers but must be trusted decision implementers of Iran's strategy to project power and fracture international coalitions. Indirect discussions with Washington are part of this process. A strong candidate would be Ali Bagheri-Kani, who has strong regime credentials. Currently deputy foreign minister, Bagheri-Kani served as Deputy Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council for National Security and ran the (albeit unsuccessful) presidential campaign for regime hardliner Saeed Jalili. He has experience with U.S. diplomats and was the lead negotiator on nuclear and hostage talks. He has experience with other countries, including China. Bagheri-Kani’s potential assignment would allow Iran’s diplomacy to continue with little disruption.
The Cipher Brief: How will the Islamic Republic seek to manage the coming days?
Roule: Tehran must be a stew of rumors, developing news, and political jockeying. Raisi’s potential death has reshuffled a well-studied deck of political possibilities.
The regime will seek to promote calm organization and political stability. It knows an election is a time of potential turbulence, so the fifty days before this presidential election would likely involve considerable effort to prevent unrest by suspected regime opponents. Since the protests that followed the killing of Mahsa Amini in 2022, the regime has worked hard to identify, neutralize, and punish dissidents. This election could spark a new wave of protestors. Iran’s domestic intelligence personnel would be tasked to define and neutralize this threat. For now, the regime’s priority will be to work through the fog of this crisis and delay announcements while they build a cohesive response. We shouldn’t be surprised if they withheld news of Raisi’s death for a day or two as they do so. Prayer services for Raisi offer an initial opportunity to orchestrate a show widespread support for the regime.
Indicators of concern would include a spike in arrests of dissidents, heavy sentences for oppositionists on trial, and warnings to families of known dissidents that there will be no patience with protestors. There was a time when the regime sought to highlight election turnout as evidence of its strength—no more. Turnout during the recent parliamentary elections reached a historic low. We would likely see plenty of propaganda urging voter turnout, but for the regime, a quiet election of an ideologically sound successor to Raisi would be the Supreme Leader’s priority. Iran’s president may not be as important as the Supreme Leader, but he manages the government’s handling of domestic affairs and, thus, the foundation of regime stability. Khamenei would need to identify someone of Raisi’s generation who could be counted on to sustain the regime for another few decades, possibly eventually serving as Supreme Leader.
Last, there may be some groups, such as ISIS-K, which may seek to undertake terrorist actions to test the regime’s abilities during this sensitive period.
We should expect Tehran to seek to derive some benefits in the coming days. A state funeral for Raisi would represent an opportunity to show domestic support for the regime, much as was done at the funeral of Qasim Soleimani. A funeral would also draw many foreign leaders, allowing Iran to push back on any narrative of diplomatic isolation.
The Cipher Brief: What about the Supreme Leader’s 54-year-old son Mujtaba Khamenei?
Roule: Raisi and the Supreme Leader’s son Mujtaba were leading candidates to replace Khamenei. Raisi’s death would make Mujtaba the front-runner. He already has strong ties to the Revolutionary Guard and a firm hand on the security architecture managed by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Iran’s hardliner elites know that he will protect their interests.
But his weaknesses are significant. His ambition to replace his father is well known, and this will fuel conspiracy theorists who will recall the 1989 helicopter crash that killed Saddam’s cousin and sometimes opponent, Iraqi Defense Minister Adnan Khayr Allah.
Mujtaba’s religious credentials are questionable, and he has held no ministerial positions. The Islamic Republic has spent plenty of time criticizing monarchies, and Mujtaba’s assignment as either President or Supreme Leader would allow regime opponents to reasonably argue that the regime had become a hereditary monarchy of sorts. In the absence of another hardliner he could trust to the extent of Raisi, Khamenei could feel forced to select his son. He may believe that just as he overcame questions on his suitability when he replaced Khomenei, his son Mujtaba would be able to do the same, especially if aided by the Revolutionary Guard in a world where competitors had been neutralized.
The Cipher Brief: What would Raisi’s possible death and that of Abdollahian mean for the course of the Islamic Republic? Would you expect significant policy changes?
Roule: In the near term, there is little evidence that a new Iranian president would introduce broad change in domestic or foreign policy. He would be inherently weaker than Raisi and thus must demonstrate allegiance to hardline actors while building a relationship with the people. Not an easy task.
Looking further out and absent massive protests that could possibly lead to regime change, the regime would likely continue its trajectory towards a post-revolutionary generation of leaders drawn from and accountable to networks connected to the Revolutionary Guard.
Iran’s foreign policy would likely remain assertive while eschewing actions that it believes could ignite a regime-threatening war with the United States. Support for proxies would continue, and Iran would maintain its effort to build political, security, and commercial ties with Asia, Russia, Africa, and Latin America.
The Cipher Brief: What will Western policymakers be thinking about now? What indicators might they seek to understand the direction of a potential new regime? Could a new leader constrain Iran’s nuclear program?
Roule: Raisi’s foreign policy was marked by engagement without compromise, regional assertiveness, and periods of aggression on nuclear issues. Western policymakers will expect the first two but wonder about the last point. Also, could a weaker president mean a longer leash on the Revolutionary Guards abroad? There will also be those who wonder whether a new president could offer prospects for serious diplomatic engagement.
We should also mention that Iran’s partners abroad – from militias to Russia and China – will want to understand that any successor to Raisi would maintain past political and other support. They know the Supreme Leader is the ultimate arbiter on such matters, but having Iran’s president’s support helps avoid political and bureaucratic complications.
The Cipher Brief: What do we know about Acting President Mohammed Mokhber?
Roule: Mokhber has a long history of hardline activities. For many years, he managed the power parastatal economic organization Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), controlled by the Supreme Leader. He also has served as chairman of the U.S.-sanctioned Sina Bank. A regime loyalist, he doesn’t appear to have the stature to be president.
The Cipher Brief: Finally, a wild card question. Is it plausible that Israel or another country could have been behind the downing of the helicopter?
Roule: There is no evidence to suggest that Israel or another country played a role in this accident. There appears to be little motivation for a foreign actor to undertake such a dramatic operation. Raisi’s death will have no impact on Iran’s policies in the region. Absent robust and internationally accepted evidence that says otherwise, we should view this event as an accident caused by a poor decision to fly through dangerous terrain in harsh weather.
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