Vladimir Putin is portrayed in the West as the master manipulator in foreign policy, creating turmoil in U.S. and European elections and outfoxing his rivals in the Ukraine and Syria. In domestic politics, he is portrayed as a brutal but cunning tyrant, crushing dissent and murdering his harshest critics, yet maintaining popularity ratings that any Western leader would envy.
The Russian leader seems invincible –- or is he?
Putin has an existential fear of democracy and believes it inevitably leads to anarchy, the seeds of which are nurtured by public protest. Although his regime squashed an opposition movement in 2011 and 2012, recent massive demonstrations across the country have once again highlighted an undercurrent of unrest. While the demonstrators protested corruption and not Putin himself, the Russian leader cannot abide any tumult that could escalate to widespread opposition, and so his regime arrested hundreds of protesters.
As in the past, Kremlin intimidation may well neutralize the opposition. This time, however, the nationwide demonstrations were marked by large numbers of young participants, a disturbing sign for Putin that he may be confronting a more energized and enduring threat.
Increasing Russian discontent has already been evident for months. Smaller demonstrations have been sparked to protest individual grievances ranging from doubled tolls for truckers to Moscow parking fees. One of the most telling signs was not a demonstration but voter turnout of less than 50 percent in last September’s parliamentary elections. While Putin’s United Russia dominated, overall only 20 percent of the population voted for the party. The results had little impact on the regime, but Putin must be concerned that the apathy reflected in the abysmal turnout may be gradually mutating into widespread revolt.
Russia’s sagging economy, the root cause of this discontent, , holds few prospects for improvement. The high energy prices that boosted Russians’ standard of living a decade ago have plummeted, and the International Monetary Fund forecasts that prices will not rise sufficiently in the medium term to stabilize the economy. Relief from Western sanctions that exacerbate economic woes appears doubtful. Revelations of interference in U.S. elections have sparked a backlash against Russia in the U.S. and Europe, energized prominent hawks in the U.S., and have most likely scuttled any “grand bargain” between the Russian leader and new U.S. President Donald Trump that might have eased sanctions.
The Russian budget deficit has soared, access to foreign credit has plummeted, and reserves are dwindling at an alarming rate. Russia’s economic growth lags behind even that of the Brezhnev regime, infamously known as the “era of stagnation.” Despite Putin’s annual promises of developing the high-tech industry, technological backwardness relative to the West has reached its widest gap. No wonder –- the Kremlin reportedly spent more on the World Cup than on funding university laboratories.
Putin distracts the public from these issues by touting the restoration of Russia’s global power through its engagement in the Ukraine and Syria. One of the cornerstones of Putin’s power is the armed forces, and his modernization of the Russian military unquestionably contributed to any political gains he has achieved. But upgrading the military has been costly. The daily defense expenditures in both countries sap the already strapped treasury. The regime’s ability to sustain current defense spending is hobbled.
The strained budget precludes the regime from coping with any new military challenges. Despite the supposed “bromance” with Trump, Putin will be unable to compete if the American president implements his call for expanding America’s nuclear capability. The last time Russia engaged in an arms race against the U.S., the Soviet regime collapsed. It is no coincidence that Russia’s new military doctrine emphasizes information warfare and deployment of special forces –- both have proven effective but are also relatively inexpensive instruments of power.
Putin accomplished his buildup of the military at the expense of social services. Pensions have been cut, hospitals and clinics have closed, government pay has been in arrears, and improvements to dilapidated infrastructure have been scrapped. National pride over Russia’s successes in the Ukraine and Syria will undoubtedly wane over time and won’t quiet rumbling stomachs or cure ailing citizens.
The Russian military is also plagued by insufficient staffing in the ranks in Syria, since the number of draft-age youth is declining. The Russian Parliament approved short-term contracts for soldiers to partially fill the vacuum, and Caucasus thug Ramzan Kadyrov helped as well by dispatching 500 Chechen soldiers to Syria. The possibility exists that some of these Chechens may switch sides, join the increasing numbers of Russians aiding the ISIS cause and return home to launch terrorist attacks.
Terrorism presents a threat to Putin’s strongman image that has kept his approval ratings so high. He cultivated that image from the onset of his first presidency by his brutal repression in the Caucasus. Despite that, radicalization is rising, not only in the Caucasus but other areas of the country, bolstered by flocks of Muslim guest workers from Central Asia. According to the procurator’s office, terrorist crimes dramatically increased by 73 perceent last year.
Despite this array of problems, Putin shouldn’t be underestimated. He has played a weak hand cleverly since the onset of the economic crisis and, in fact, could become more dangerous if the situation worsens. The Russian bear, when cornered, has historically responded by lashing out with its claws.
Putin deflects the population by raising the threat of the foreign bogeyman. Serious threats to his rule could lead him into even more confrontations abroad than we face now.
