OPINION — In 2016, I sat across the table from China’s Director of Operations for the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Their visit to Kabul was tightly scripted, speaking only from prepared documents, with translators on hand, and never deviating from the line. The meeting was part of a broader intelligence dialogue between the MSS and Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), which I led at the time.
Their concern was focused and unyielding: the presence of Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan. While our engagement was primarily with the Ministry of State Security (MSS)—China’s civilian intelligence service—it’s important to note that other Chinese intelligence elements were also present and active in Afghanistan. These included PLA military intelligence officers (previously known as 2PLA), operating under diplomatic cover and conducting parallel HUMINT efforts.
That engagement was just one example of how China quietly but assertively embeds intelligence influence in developing nations. While Beijing’s actions may be framed as counterterrorism cooperation or economic engagement, the deeper pattern reveals a calculated gray zone strategy—operating below the threshold of open conflict through long-term penetration and influence—which deserves close scrutiny as U.S.-China competition escalates globally.
From Economics to Intelligence in Afghanistan
In the 2000s, China’s Afghan presence was commercially driven. The $3 billion Mes Aynak copper mine contract reflected its resource-focused strategy. Intelligence collection remained passive, primarily routed through commercial and diplomatic channels.
But after 2014, Beijing’s calculus shifted. The emergence of ISIS and the growing presence of Uyghur militants in northeastern Afghanistan—particularly Badakhshan Province, which borders China’s Xinjiang region—prompted MSS to take more direct action. China feared that ETIM fighters fleeing conflict zones, often via Turkey, were regrouping near its border.
Chinese intelligence officers, including those from the MSS and the PLA’s military intelligence, expanded its footprint inside the Chinese Embassy in Kabul and began targeting local Afghan influencers—especially Members of Parliament from affected provinces. These officials were invited to “vacations” in China, where they were offered cash, hosted with care, and asked to share intelligence about their regions. Their relatives were offered scholarships and Chinese-language education. MSS leveraged these officials to target provincial governors, police commanders, and community leaders for further influence.
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Engaging the NDS: A Partnership with Limits
Eventually, MSS sought formal engagement with the Afghan intelligence community. Initially cautious due to our close relationships with the CIA and other Western agencies, the Chinese approached both the Office of the President and senior NDS officials. High-ranking Chinese delegations, including Politburo members and MSS deputy directors, visited Kabul and opened dialogue.
Their primary interest was not in Afghanistan’s broader stability or democracy—it was in neutralizing ETIM.
In 2016, we established a joint counterterrorism unit: eight MSS officers working alongside a dozen Afghan case officers and analysts. While the collaboration was framed as mutual, Chinese officials were assertive and fixated. They would repeatedly push intelligence partners to focus on specific targets, often raising the same names in meetings with senior Afghan and even U.S. officials.
MSS offered technical support to NDS, particularly in signals intelligence (SIGINT), which comprised 80% of our raw intelligence. While this support came through MSS channels, it is likely that PLA cyber and signals units—previously known as 3PLA and now part of the PLA’s Information Support Force—were also involved behind the scenes or in an advising capacity. Our assessment found MSS prioritized learning NDS’s capabilities over improving them. We rejected offers of equipment and sensitive technical aid and kept our digital infrastructure tightly compartmentalized.
China’s intelligence architecture is multilayered. In addition to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), agencies such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department (formerly known as 2PLA), the PLA’s Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force (formerly 3PLA), and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (previously the General Political Department Liaison Office, or GPDLO) each conduct overseas intelligence, HUMINT, and influence operations—often under diplomatic, journalistic, or commercial cover. This complexity often goes unnoticed but is central to understanding China’s gray zone activities.
China’s Strategic Apathy Toward the Republic
Unlike many of Afghanistan’s partners, China demonstrated no interest in preserving the Afghan Republic. As the U.S.-Taliban peace talks advanced and President Biden’s withdrawal plan crystallized, MSS showed no concern for institutional continuity. Instead, they accelerated covert outreach to Taliban factions—replicating their northeast strategy of assistance, relationship-building, and targeted intelligence requests.
Chinese intelligence services continued to focus on ETIM. While the MSS was the primary interlocutor, other entities reportedly provided technical training and surveillance support to the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). Following the Taliban’s takeover, former Afghan SIGINT officers reported observing Chinese technicians inspecting GDI’s signals intelligence infrastructure—raising concerns about potential Chinese access to post-Republic systems. This growing alignment now extends beyond Kabul into Afghanistan’s strategic peripheries.
In Badakhshan province Chinese companies are operating mining projects in districts such as Shignan, Shahre Bozorg, Raghha, and Yaftal Payen. Presented as economic development, these projects let Chinese intelligence surveil border zones and track Uyghur militants. The mining operations likely serve dual purposes: resource extraction and the embedding of forward intelligence assets under the cover of commercial engagement.
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Beyond Afghanistan: A Global Gray Zone Pattern
Afghanistan is far from an outlier. China’s intelligence and influence playbook extends broadly across the developing world, leveraging economic presence as a key tool for long-term strategic penetration in what can best be described as gray zone competition.
Pakistan offers a critical case study. Having lived there as a refugee from 1988 to 2001, I witnessed firsthand how China evolved from an economic partner to a deep intelligence and defense collaborator. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China steadily deepened its role in Pakistani infrastructure, defense, and nuclear development—significantly strengthening Islamabad’s strategic posture against India. This relationship has since matured into a robust intelligence and military alliance.
Chinese technologies, including surveillance platforms and drones, have reportedly been deployed in recent Indo-Pakistani confrontations—marking their first use in live regional conflict. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Chinese investment through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has facilitated deeper Chinese Intelligence entrenchment, disguised as security cooperation.
This pattern extends beyond Asia. In Africa, Huawei’s surveillance systems in countries like Uganda enable Chinese intelligence access, while in Latin America, Peru’s Chancay port conceals Chinese intelligence operations, much like Afghanistan’s mining projects. Investments often conceal surveillance and intelligence. This covert encroachment threatens state sovereignty, undermines alliances, and demands a comprehensive U.S.-led response to counter China’s gray zone strategy.
Strategic Lessons for the United States
China’s engagement with developing nations is not always adversarial. In some cases, its presence has contributed to regional forums, infrastructure development, and even security coordination. But it’s also carefully calculated. Chinese intelligence agencies do not operate randomly—they target areas of strategic concern, build long-term leverage, and prioritize influence over ideology.
The United States should avoid dismissing these efforts as mere economic opportunism. When the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, it left behind a vacuum that China quickly filled—not only through commercial activity, but by embedding Chinese intelligence influence inside Taliban intelligence.
This pattern is not unique to Afghanistan. Based on firsthand experience with how China operates covertly under the banner of economic engagement, it is highly likely that similar influence operations are unfolding in other countries where Chinese investment and development projects are expanding. The U.S. must take a more proactive approach—scrutinizing Chinese activities beyond just trade and tariffs—and develop a clearer understanding of how China embeds intelligence and influence networks in fragile or strategically significant nations.
America still has leverage. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans were trained through U.S. military, educational, and governance programs. This young diaspora represents a future democratic force. Rather than cede the ground, Washington should support the formation of a credible Afghan opposition—one that reflects the will of the Afghan people and preserves their connections to the democratic world.
China’s intelligence services have mastered the art of quiet influence. What starts as economic cooperation evolves into deep-rooted intelligence presence—often without the host nation fully realizing the shift. In Afghanistan and beyond, Chinese intelligence has successfully positioned itself to secure Beijing’s interests while eroding U.S. influence.
Understanding—and countering—this strategy requires not just vigilance, but a long-term investment in allies, civil society, and the information domain in the developing world.
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