EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – “How Many Divisions has the Pope Got?” Josef Stalin’s sarcastic, contemptuous dismissal of an appeal by Pope Pius XI to a higher moral imperative in favor of the exercise of raw power during his 1935 suppression of the Catholic church in Russia came to mind with the confluence in the news cycle of two recent events: the election of Pope Leo XIV and a call by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for his counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to meet him in Istanbul to discuss an end to the war between their two countries.
And we can be sure that his antecedent in the Kremlin was not far from Putin’s mind as he presided over the May 9 parade in Moscow commemorating the 80th anniversary of victory in “The Great Patriotic War.” Parallels have often been drawn between the two, not least because both are autocrats sitting in the Kremlin with a brutality differentiated only by scale.
Indeed, Putin has been described as an “unabashed admirer of Stalin” who has worked to rehabilitate Stalin’s image in Russia, emphasizing strong leadership, national unity, and decisive action, while often glossing over or minimizing the scale of Stalin’s repression.
As Norman M. Naimark pointed out a 2023 article, the two “have many of the same characteristics,” to include “their shared role as leaders of Russia at war;” their projection of “powerful images of being in control, even when they may not be;” an image “of knowing what they are doing (even when they don’t), of leading their respective armies, and of honoring the service of their military subordinates.”
As Naimark rightly noted, “The motifs of sacrifice for the fatherland and the honor of shedding blood for the greater good of the Russian people loom large with both.” In addition, he wrote, “Both leaders relied heavily on the Russian secret police in their rise to power and in maintaining their supreme positions.”
What national security news are you missing today? Get full access to your own national security daily brief by upgrading to Subscriber+Member status.
Yet, their similarities notwithstanding, Putin’s public relationship to the feared “Koba” has long been ambiguous. As Naimark – citing the difficulty the Russian leader has had balancing Stalin’s “achievements” and crimes – has written, “In 2009, Putin called for a nuanced view of Stalin, stating: ‘If you say you are positive (about Stalin’s rule), some will be discontented. If you say you are negative, others will grumble.’ Similarly, during his 2009 visit to Poland, Putin criticized the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler, calling it a ‘collusion to solve one’s problems at others’ expense’ only to later reverse course and describe it “as a clever maneuver that delayed war with Germany.”
Stalin’s commitment to that agreement – even in the face of warnings from spies such as Richard Sorge that Nazi Germany was about to attack – set the stage for a series of Soviet military catastrophes after Operation Barbarossa was unleashed on June 22, 1941. Likewise, as Putin is well aware, the months after he launched his attack on Ukraine saw the Russian Army endure costly military reversals at the hands of their courageous Ukrainian adversaries.
Yet, as the Victory Parade will have reminded him, the Russian leader is also aware that what matters most is not how a war begins but rather how it ends.
Now that he is gaining the upper hand on the battlefield, Putin will surely be reluctant to call a halt to the fighting until he has wrought something from the human disaster he created that he can call victory.
In addition to acquiescence to his long-standing demand that Ukraine cannot become a NATO member, chief among his minimalist goals is ensuring Russian control over the four Ukrainian oblasts (regions) annexed by the Russian Duma in September 2022; Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. While we might see the Duma as a rubber stamp, Putin knows that ending the war without securing Russian control over those four regions could engender uncomfortable questions.
He might be able to sell giving up claim to the chunk of Zaporizhzhia west of the Dnieper by citing the potential military cost of executing a river crossing. But failure to secure the bulk of the annexed territory – much of which is still in Ukrainian hands – will raise uncomfortable questions for the Russian leader, chief among them ‘What was it all for if we can’t achieve our minimalist aims?” We don’t know that such an outcome would put Putin’s rule at risk, but the possibility of a repetition of an event akin to the Prigozhin mutiny will give him pause.
We are in this conflict’s concluding stage. As evidenced by a call between presidents Trump and Putin on Monday that yielded no meaningful Russian concessions, Putin is continuing to delay entering into any serious negotiations for as long as the U.S. will allow it. And if real negotiations are to take place in the future, Putin will – like Stalin at Yalta when negotiating the fate of Poland with Churchill and FDR – let events on the battlefield dictate the terms of settlement for as long as that is feasible.
The intersection of technology, defense, space and intelligence is critical to future U.S. national security. Join The Cipher Brief on June 5th and 6th in Austin, Texas for the NatSecEDGE conference. Find out how to get an invitation to this invite-only event at natsecedge.com
To be sure, the gains being achieved by the Russian Army are not on the same scale as the Red Army’s 1944 destruction of the Wehrmacht’s army center in Operation Bagration and its subsequent conquest of what was then Polish territory the next year in the crushing Vistula-Oder Offensive.
But the Russians are slowly gaining ground – albeit sometimes only a few hundred meters at a time – while grinding down their Ukrainian opponents. And they are doing so utilizing tactics that minimize casualties in comparison with the profligate waste of life that characterized their operations earlier in this conflict.
If Putin is to be deterred from this course, appeals to humanity and mercy – whether from President Trump or Pope Leo XIV are unlikely to resonate with him. As President Trump has indicated, other measures – presumably to include strengthened sanctions and some replenishment of Ukrainian weaponry – may be needed if Putin is to be forced to the negotiating table before achieving his minimalist gains.
Based on my experience observing talks between the Western nations and the Soviets regarding conventional arms and confidence building measures in Europe, any talks with Moscow over Ukraine are likely to be rife with Russian delaying tactics and squabbling over issues that, in the end, are of little import to them in order to secure concessions on those matters about which they truly care.
And, like Stalin’s promise at Yalta to allow for free and fair elections on conquered Polish territory, any promises Putin makes in the course of those talks regarding the conduct of his rule over captured territories should be seen as ephemeral.
During negotiations, we can only hope that the Russian leader does not have the benefit of reporting from a spy akin to Alger Hiss, who provided Stalin with crucial insights into the positions of the men who sat across the table from him at Yalta. Ending this brutal war will be hard enough as it is.
Mark Kelton is a founding partner in the Five Eyes Group which works to identify and deliver unique capabilities and technologies to the national security community of the U.S. and its closest allies.
Who’s Reading this? More than 500K of the most influential national security experts in the world. Need full access to what the Experts are reading?
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
