It's the kind of information that once would have been closely held, but now is being declassified and shared with reporters. It's also the latest in a string of recent sharing of intelligence that is almost unprecedented. The Biden Administration has gotten into the weeds on some of its intelligence assessments and has been uncharacteristically transparent with how it believes Russian deployments might be operationalized in the event of an invasion of Ukraine.
Bottom Line: Official explanations for the Administration’s unusual candor are that it aids alliance and public understanding and may help to dissuade Russian aggression. While many welcome this openness, some observers question whether the risks to sources and methods justifies this new level of intelligence sharing.
Background: On December 3, the The Washington Post (echoed a day later by The New York Times) cited an anonymous Administration source who laid out a stark intelligence assessment: “Russian plans call for a military offensive against Ukraine as soon as early 2022 with a scale of forces twice what we saw this past spring during Russia’s snap exercise near Ukraine’s borders.”
The intelligence disclosures coincided with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s tour of European capitals to share “evidence that Russia has made plans for significant aggressive moves against Ukraine.”
The Administration official providing the background briefing also pointed to a Russian disinformation campaign in which “Russian influence proxies and media outlets have started to increase content denigrating Ukraine and NATO, in part to pin the blame for a potential Russian military escalation on Ukraine.”
Since December, the Administration has continued to share intelligence information publicly presumably to forestall an attack and to frustrate Russian efforts to dominate the information landscape:
- On February 3, U.S. officials briefed world media on what they described as a fake Russian video that could be used as a pretext to unleash hostilities against Ukraine. The video would contain graphic images of corpses strewn at the scene of an explosion, and would include faked Ukrainian military equipment, Turkish-made drones and actors playing Russian-speaking mourners.
- On February 12, a second potential Russian fabrication was described by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who said “US intelligence points to the possibility of a false flag operation as pretext for invasion.” Sullivan reiterated the U.S. is releasing intelligence "to stop a war," not start one. "That's what we've done. That's what we'll continue to do,” Sullivan stated.
- In late January, the U.K. government said it had intelligence, some of which came from the U.S., showing that Russia intended to replace the Ukrainian President with a pro-Kremlin leader.
- According to Administration sources, the new disclosures reflect the influence of Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, and William J. Burns, the CIA director, who have shown a willingness to declassify information in an effort to disrupt Russian planning, administration officials said.
- Nevertheless, The Wall Street Journal reported on February 9 that the declassification of intelligence “has caused some consternation in U.K. and U.S. intelligence circles.” A former senior CIA officer and Cipher Brief Expert John Sipher cautioned that he and his colleagues always worry that such releases could eventually lead to disclosures that could harm intelligence gathering. “As an intelligence officer, I’d worry about the source” being exposed, he said. Still, he said, “It’s time for an unusual response.”
Cipher Brief Expertise: We asked three Cipher Brief experts to weigh in. James Clapper served as Director of National Intelligence from 2010–2017. John McLaughlin is former Acting Director and Deputy Director of CIA and Nick Fishwick is a former senior member of the British Foreign Office.
The Cipher Brief: What are your thoughts on the strategy of putting more intelligence into the public domain?
James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence
I applaud it. It is an effective use of intelligence in the information operations realm but there are two caveats: doing so more than once or twice has a diminishing return and risks 'the boy who cried wolf' response; and there is a risk of compromising sources and methods, always the hearty perennial in intelligence.
John McLaughlin, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director, CIA
During my time in government, I would occasionally be sent to relay messages to Russia based on declassified intelligence. We did this with extraordinary care to protect sources and methods. The Russians would never acknowledge the truth of what you were telling them, but I concluded over time that it was good for them to know that you knew and occasionally I believe it changed or at least slowed down something we were objecting to.
Nick Fishwick, Former Senior Member, British Foreign Office
The sharing of intelligence assessments between allies has to be a good thing. I assume that the assessments will be high level enough for there not to be a potential risk to sources. It is important in terms of the trust and unity amongst allies, and also to help establish a common understanding of the position. That understanding should not however be based purely on intelligence; most of it will come from careful analysis of non-clandestine sources, with the intelligence adding an important dimension in certain specialised areas.
The Cipher Brief: What is the likelihood that Russian tactics and strategy have been thwarted to some degree by these disclosures?
James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence
That is known only to the Russians, but I think it is disruptive and a distraction for them, and it alerts people to the “false flag” technique which is standard Soviet/Russian playbook stuff. If and when they do invade, there will probably be some sort of contrived provocation but now people will look on it with suspicion, itself a good thing.
The Cipher Brief: What are the risks posed by this kind of intelligence disclosure?
John McLaughlin, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director, CIA
Although this is an effective technique and can be carried out while protecting the underlying intelligence, it does come with a risk. Once an opposing side understands what you know, they have a basis for figuring out how you know it and systematically working through alternatives. I know of at least one instance, involving a country other than Russia, in which the passage of declassified intelligence helped them to carry out a deception on the same issue at a later date. So, this is always a matter of weighing gains versus risk. That's just a calculus policymakers have to make.
Nick Fishwick, Former Senior Member, British Foreign Office
I don't see any problem in principle with intelligence revelations so long as those doing the revealing are confident that they are true, so long as sources are not jeopardised, and the impact of the revelations, on friend and foe, has been properly anticipated. But I would counsel that friends may need some convincing that these revelations are usually such a great idea. And surprises are rarely welcome.
The Cipher Brief: Are risks mitigated by wide availability of open source information that corroborates classified intelligence, thereby masking sources and methods?
James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence
I think it is unlikely that plans to use a 'false flag' operation would be available in open source material. The more likely probability is that such foreknowledge would come from classified sources.
Research by Cipher Brief Contributing Analyst Ken Hughes
Read also Walter Pincus’ Fine Print Column, Could Ukraine end up as a War of Words, exclusively in The Cipher Brief
Read more expert-driven national security analysis, perspective and opinion in The Cipher Brief
