Ten years ago, Thailand was enjoying a prolonged and robust economic and political revival following the Asian Financial Crisis that decimated its economy and gave birth to the 1997 Constitution, a document granting strong civilian control over the government and an important place for civil society in guaranteeing human and political rights in the Kingdom.
What followed since 2006 might be called Thailand’s “lost decade”—a period of frequent military control and judicial intervention in Thailand’s government accompanied by below-average economic growth and regular political turmoil. During this period, Thailand’s regional and international role was diminished as well, as leadership focused largely on domestic politics.
While Thailand may be moving toward a return to putative civilian rule in 2017 after the passage of the constitutional referendum on August 7, the existential struggle for political-economic dominance of the Kingdom waged over the last ten years is not remotely settled.
At its core, this struggle pits the traditional Thai elite, largely centered in Bangkok and deeply accustomed to exercising the Kingdom’s levers of economic and political power, against the larger swath of Thais in the north and northeast of the country who have become increasingly empowered over the last 15 years by rising incomes, access to technology and information, and the astute political leadership of a home-grown billionaire business leader, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
To be sure, Thaksin’s own relationship with democracy was ambivalent. On the one hand, he won two free and fair elections (2001 and 2005) in landslide votes by running on platforms which spoke to the majority of Thais, including government subsidized health insurance, village investment funds, debt relief for farmers and a strongman approach to law and order.
But Thaksin also used his premiership to install political cronies in agencies that were meant to be apolitical, undermining major pillars of the post-1997 political system that were designed to be impartial and check the power of any one person. And by allowing his wife and children to retain controlling interests in his holding company, Shin Corp., while he ran the country, the former prime minister exposed himself to conflicts of interest that his detractors point to as rank corruption and tax evasion.
By 2006, a reinvigorated coalition of traditional elites had powerfully coalesced in opposition to Thaksin. The resulting bloodless coup, with at least tacit support from the Palace, made the event feel like a relatively normal part of the Thai political cycle. In fact, past military and judicial interventions that were couched in terms of pushback against poor governance enjoyed general public approval and little international condemnation.
However, in the years that followed Thaksin’s tenure, those same institutions negated repeated electoral victories for Thaksin’s allies, installed the political opposition which turned out to be equally disruptive to Thai democracy, and ultimately deposed Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck, in another military coup. As such, it became clear that the motivations of the country’s ostensibly apolitical institutions were not so altruistic.
Rather than struggling for Thailand’s democratic soul, the Thai establishment vied with the Thaksin clan in maneuvering for who will write the Kingdom’s rules and dictate its course when the revered, but infirmed, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, 88, passes away.
Indeed, the past two years of military rule saw the harshest crackdown on free speech and political rights in recent Thai history. A draconian and exceedingly broad application of Thailand’s long-standing lèse majesté law was augmented by the military junta with bans on political demonstrations, “attitude adjustment” camps for online dissidents and the drafting of a constitution (opposed by the major political parties) which entrenches the military’s role in politics, mandates direct appointment of the Thai Senate and allows for an appointed prime minister during a transitional five-year period.
Thailand may now head to the polls in 2017 under the new constitution, but there is little evidence that the self-inflicted wounds of the past decade are in the rear-view mirror.
An optimistic reading of Thailand’s current paradigm would say that the new constitution, flawed though it may be, will provide the space necessary for Thailand’s warring factions to compromise on a long-term power-sharing equilibrium for the country.
More probable is that all sides were exhausted after the last three years of fighting and realized that political stagnation would be permanent until the military eased its grip on power, if only slightly. In this scenario, the new constitution and scheduled elections are the political equivalent of a Band-Aid being applied to a gaping flesh wound. After getting a taste in the early 2000s, the Thai heartland has not given up on its dreams of full political-economic representation. And the traditional Thai elite remains determined to exert its long-standing prerogatives. None of that has changed.
Thai officials are right about one thing: Thailand is being held to a far higher standard by Washington than any of its Asian neighbors or other long-term U.S. allies.
The Obama Administration’s tough treatment of Bangkok since the coup stands in stark contrast to its muted reactions to other democratic backsliding around the world. Bearing in mind the 183-year old Thai-U.S. relationship and post-WWII treaty alliance, the centrality of Thailand to U.S. strategy in the region and the warm people-to-people bond between Americans and Thais, the public browbeating and political ostracizing of Thailand is disproportionate and counter-productive.
Anyone who understands Thai psychology knows that current American policy, while ostensibly geared at accelerating Thailand’s return to democracy, is causing the buildup of deep resentment that over the long term that has the potential to undermine bilateral relations and affect cooperation across a range of important issues including, trade, security, and good governance. A more measured approach, emphasizing the value of U.S.-Thai relations publicly while conveying concerns privately, would prove much more effective.
Regardless, Thailand’s fate always was and always will be determined by its own people. While the 2014 military takeover brought temporary stability and a “timeout” from Thailand’s cacophonous politics, it is unlikely that competing Thai interests are finished adjudicating the zero-sum struggles of the prior decade. This fundamental conflict, and the impending adjustment to a post-King Bhumibol era, continues to cast a shadow over Thailand’s long-term political-economic prospects.
BGA Research Director Kevin Cottrell contributed research to this article.
