The Cipher Brief sat down with former Acting CIA Director John McLaughlin earlier in the year to discuss the Russian security threat. McLaughlin assessed that near-term improvements in US-Russia relations are unliklely.
TCB: I would love to get your perspective on the complexity of today’s threat environment, particularly as it relates to Russia.
JM: Almost everyone says that today’s world of foreign policy is more complex than any they have seen before. Why is that? I think we are being buffeted by multiple historical forces that have been unleashed in the last 25 years. With Russia, it begins with the breakup of the Soviet Empire because the fall of the Soviet Union was no less than the breakup of an empire. And when empires dissolve, the collapse goes on for decades and the dust takes probably 100 years to settle. For example, the Ottoman Empire collapsed in World War I a century ago and much of what we’re seeing in the Middle East is a result of revision of geopolitical lines that were drawn in the aftermath in that collapse. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1990 created fault lines in Europe that were different than the previous fault lines. Then a person like Putin comes to power and yearns for a sphere of influence as great as the Soviet Union had, even though I don’t think he is trying to literally recreate the Soviet Union. Add to that everything that is happening in the rest of the world and you have collapsing empires, changing population trends, stressed governments, a rising terrorist threat, and dramatic changes in the global energy picture, which we often underestimate. My basic point is that there are many things going on that contribute to this complexity. The Cold War was a ballroom dance. This is a mosh pit.
TCB: For Russia, it seems like the Cold War never ended. Why is that?
JM: Churchill gave us the wisdom when he said, “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” It is very hard to understand Russia. We have to appreciate it as a vast, ancient culture, spanning eleven time zones with competing power centers and the fundamental problem about Russia is classic in historical terms. That is, what we are dealing with in Russia is a defeated power because the Soviet Union lost the Cold War and many Russians feel they lost their country. I think the psychology in Russia in recent years, particularly under Putin, has been: we have to regain a position of influence and respect in the world that our country lost by virtue of first having collapsed and second having gone through a period of turmoil and chaos and poverty in the first ten years of our Russian independence. Recall that when Yeltsin left office, he apologized to the Russian people for the mess he was leaving. We have to understand that these people have been through a lot.
TCB: Will the United States' relationship with Russia ever be different from what it was or what it is now? How should we respond to recent acts of Russian aggression?
JM: Will we ever have a better relationship with them? I think we will. I don’t think it’s a near term thing we can realize. We need to have a policy that combines firmness in resisting their unreasonable aggression in parts of the world with a policy that also emphasizes continuous communication with them to understand, on a government-to-government level, where are they coming from. Churchill again said, “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.” I don’t mean to suggest that we need to be appeasers or in some way tolerant but we also need to kind of understand their psychology, where they’re coming from, and then put our foot down when we think they’ve crossed a vital principle for us. Does anyone want an open war with them? No, I don’t think anyone does. And that’s, on our side, a bit of a strategic disadvantage. They kind of know that we don’t want to go gun-to-gun with them. Were they to, in their push for a sphere of influence, step a foot into a NATO country, then that problem becomes more acute in terms of what we would do, and I think NATO would have to have a pretty firm response. No one would want an outbreak of war, but there would have to be a firm response.
TCB: How are global energy trends affecting our relationship with Russia and Russia’s attempt to exert its power?
JM: In the U.S., we are becoming self-sufficient and probably will be within the next 10 years. This has not only been a factor in lowering oil prices, but raises issues for countries in the Middle East about their influence in the world. This means a U.S. that is able to be more assertive because we will be less dependent on foreign oil. For Russia, oil is now hovering around $40 a barrel, and Russia claims to need somewhere between $112 and $117 a barrel to meet their budget. This is hurting the Russian economy, but remember that while Russia is dependent upon its oil exports, so are our European allies. This is a delicate situation, especially once we consider that Russia is expanding its energy sphere to the Middle East and Asia.
TCB: Some people are saying that Russia is engaging in “hybrid warfare” and others are calling it “ambiguous warfare.” What are we seeing and will NATO be prepared to respond when the time comes?
JM: What Russia is doing is a combination of special operations, covert action, propaganda, cyber war, conventional tactics, and frankly, diplomatic dissembling. This is not a strategy that NATO has much experience with or great practice combatting. NATO was formed in response to a major conventional and nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. That was clear and the response was clear. Russia's current practice in Ukraine and earlier in Crimea is subtle, ambiguous, and slippery. NATO has to develop greater agility to deal with it and I believe alliance leaders are working on that.
TCB: The sanctions are still standing and Russia is still unhappy with the West. What happens next?
JM: No one can confidently know. I believe the sanctions will remain, and we and our allies will continue to monitor their effects. By any measurable standard, the Russian economy is hurting badly. But Putin and his policy appear to remain popular, leaving him with little incentive to change dramatically what he is doing. I don't think this can last indefinitely. If we keep the sanctions on, I think it will start to register in Russia that it's better to engage and integrate with the world rather than trying to make Russia a bastion against outside influence. But this could take a long time. In the meantime, we need to keep lines of communication open to Russian leaders, not only to convey our views and understand theirs but also because their influence is important to what we want to achieve elsewhere, such as in Iran and Syria.
