Among his first priorities, President-Elect Joe Biden is announcing a coronavirus task force and is expected to start work on an economic recovery plan this week as COVID-19 cases continue to climb in the US.
From a national security perspective, there are a number of other complicated global dynamics that the new administration with be faced with right away. Among them, a far more complicated Middle East than the one Biden faced as Vice President.
The Cipher Brief spoke with Expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule about today’s state of play in the Middle East and what it could mean for the incoming administration.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017. As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.
The Cipher Brief: What kind of Middle East will President-Elect Biden be facing in January?
Roule: The Middle East of 2021 represents the most complex political dynamic on the globe, characterized by ferment and redefinition. I struggle to recall another time in the region’s history when it faced so many dramatic challenges, so much uncertainty, but also much potential.
Seven problems top my list:
- Millions of the region’s civilians are displaced or living in terrible conditions. The international community’s refusal to make a regional humanitarian disaster on this scale a priority is unprecedented since the Second World War. The global financial burdens of COVID-19 will profoundly impact international aid programs.
- Conflicts continue to rage in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.
- Third-party involvement in Libya has created a situation that resembles Spain in the 1930s. It is especially troubling that Turkey has emulated many of Iran’s tactics in Libya.
- Yemen is fractured by several simultaneous conflicts. I believe Saudi Arabia has declared unilateral ceasefires twice in Yemen in recent months. The Houthis kept fighting.
- The Syrian conflict appears to be winding down but through exhaustion and not any political resolution that would remove Assad - by any measure a war criminal - from power. Standing by means allowing these conflicts to continue.
- Archaic and ineffective regional political structures are sustained by force. Iran’s Islamic government, Hamas-led Gaza, Hezbollah, and Lebanon’s sectarian gridlock are relics of another age.
- We have destroyed the ISIS caliphate, but its remnants remain a potent force for destruction with tentacles reaching the U.S., Europe, and Africa.
- Iran’s aggressive reach has never been broader, and it has created a new generation of Quds Force-inspired and funded militias and terrorists. The elephant in the room is that neither Iraq nor Lebanon will see stability until Quds Force involvement in their countries ends.
- Traditionally oil-rich economies are struggling with the new realities brought by low oil prices, U.S. energy production, and the world’s increasing reliance on renewable energy sources.
- Great power competition is now in full force. China and Russia openly compete with the U.S. throughout the Middle East.
There is also tremendous uncertainty:
- First, we are unlikely to see any further failed states, but Lebanon remains at risk. Iraq also remains fragile, although it is showing positive signs of reform. The economic situations of Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Oman deserve attention.
- Next, the region is adapting to new economic demands and partners. Tourism is a crucial revenue source and an engine of social reform throughout the Middle East. China’s geo-commercial role in the Middle East is growing, and this will pose a complication in terms of 5G issues.
- We are also watching the passing of a generation of leaders in a part of the world where succession management is rare. More will likely leave the scene in the coming few years. Only a decade ago, their predecessors assumed power in a familiar, stable world. Now they face urgent strategic challenges that rarely seem to have solutions.
- Finally, the region has witnessed a dramatic, if far from complete, evolution of political rights in the last few years. The good news is that women’s rights have dramatically improved in Saudi Arabia, and this has enormous implications in the region. Regional Islamic leaders are increasingly moderate. The Mecca-based Muslim World League routinely calls for interfaith dialogue. Protests occur routinely from North Africa to Iran, although it is unlikely at present that they represent a genuine threat to ruling leadership. The bad news is that authoritarianism is on the rise. Internet surveillance continues throughout the region, with routine reports of actions against dissidents. LGBTQ communities are still denied rights throughout the region.
With all the above said, not since the 1920s has the region seen so much potential for positive change and continued U.S. influence.
- Let me start with a COVID-19 related issue. The region has critical transportation and religious hubs that represent pandemic accelerants. This pandemic is an opportunity to put in place structures to improve collective health security.
- The growing emphasis on renewables in the region reflects a response to new economic and energy realities. Our collective effort to address climate change cannot succeed without more progress in this area.
- The population of the Middle East is young. The median age is just under 27. This new generation is disconnected with ideologies that shaped their parents’ worldview. Concepts such as Arab nationalism are as unfamiliar and unattractive to the youth of today’s Middle East as the Whig Party would be to young Americans. Recent Arab engagements with Israel and declining Arab funding of Palestinians dramatically illustrate the diminished hold of the Palestinian cause over regional policy.
- Many among the new generation of regional leadership recognize the need for change. Although we may reasonably criticize some of their actions, we should applaud steps regarding Israel, positive engagement in East Africa, interfaith dialogue, and women’s rights.
- Although Russia and China certainly have a broader reach throughout the region, the vast majority of the Middle East population admires Western culture.
- The need to build new economies is a great opportunity for us to exert our greatest strength: the soft power of the private sector and people-to-people engagement.
- Arab-Israeli normalization will continue, albeit perhaps more slowly. But it brings interfaith dialogue and diplomatic opportunities for the Arab states to press Israel to address Palestinian claims.
The Cipher Brief: The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is an important strategic relationship. How might a Biden Administration approach its relationship with Saudi Arabia?
Roule: The fracture in the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been extraordinary and demands immediate attention. The grotesque and cruel murder of Jamal Khashoggi, detention of female activists, and Yemen conflict transformed a relationship that has had strategic utility for both sides for decades. I expect a Biden administration will make it clear to Riyadh that we will not tolerate such behavior. Further, a Biden administration will press for a resolution to the Khashoggi murder, the release of any activists not guilty of criminal behavior and continued Saudi effort to withdraw from the Yemen conflict. A Biden administration will also be less likely to approve significant weapons sales to the Kingdom.
The Cipher Brief: What are the US’ primary interests with Saudi Arabia?
Roule: The obvious answer is coordination on energy issues. U.S. production relieves the US reliance on foreign energy sources, but we remain part of a global energy market. As we saw earlier this year, turbulence in that market directly impacts oil prices here.
Energy is not our only strategic interest. Saudi Arabia’s geographic location makes it a critical partner in ensuring the security of international trade. A tremendous amount of goods are moved through the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.
Next, we need the Kingdom’s help to combat Islamic extremism. Only Saudi Arabia – with its control of Mecca and Medina – enjoys a global reach. Success here could transform human rights and dampen extremism from the Sahel to Asia. For example, the Taliban need to hear that Saudi religious leaders expect the Taliban to protect women’s rights. We also need Saudi Arabia to lead regional and perhaps international efforts to rebuild the broken states in the Middle East. Failure to do so leaves millions in misery and creates conditions favorable to extremism. We also need social transformation in the Kingdom to succeed because doing so will impact societies and economies throughout the Middle East. Finally, any resolution of the Iran problem requires engagement with Saudi Arabia.
The Cipher Brief: What strategic opportunities exist for the U.S. to approach its departure from JCPOA under the Trump administration, and effectively constrain Iran’s activities in the region?
Roule: A return to JCPOA will be more complicated than some may expect but doing so will likely be a priority. Iran’s nuclear program must be constrained and placed under deep international surveillance. However, it is not certain Iran will seek an immediate return but its rhetoric on this issue will be a mix of defiance and hints that it is willing to change its regional behavior.
Tehran will first want to see how eager the Biden administration is for a deal. What concessions will it offer to gain Iran’s return to compliance? Tehran will likely seek guarantees that a future administration won’t abandon the deal and absent a Senate-approved treaty, that will be difficult. Iran will also push for compensation for economic losses due to US sanctions.
I expect a Biden administration will offer some early goodwill gestures likely associated with COVID-19 relief and cessation of new sanctions measures and hostile rhetoric. Unraveling the Trump administration’s sanctions regime will be complicated. Lifting the ban on Muslim travelers to the United States will be welcomed by Iran’s population. Engagement with Western culture isn’t something sought by Iran’s hardline leadership and may even be perceived as a threat to the regime during a leadership transition period.
We should be careful in thinking that the JCPOA will provide an immediate avenue for broader talks. Iran’s leadership refused to allow such discussions during the JCPOA negotiations or after. It is difficult to see why the Supreme Leader, or the Revolutionary Guard will think that such an expansion is in Iran’s near-term interest unless doing so will preserve Tehran’s regional gains, enhance regime stability, or cement regional influence
Regional states get a vote on this as well. Israel and Arab countries have borne the brunt of Iran’s violence for decades. They will see any lifting of sanctions as giving Iran, in part, resources to continue this campaign. We shouldn’t expect them to be enthusiastic about a deal that will cement Iran’s militia-based regional influence.
The Cipher Brief: What about Turkey?
Roule: Washington will continue to seek to sustain Turkey’s role in NATO and constrain its actions in Syria, Libya, and the eastern Aegean. However, the Biden administration's diplomatic and coercive options won’t differ from those available under the current administration. It will be impossible to ignore the consequences of Turkish actions to the regional and international political and economic fabric. The current administration’s diplomacy on Turkey has generally eschewed publicity. I expect this trend will continue.
The Cipher Brief: The Biden campaign repeatedly stated that it hoped to reduce U.S. involvement in the region. Is this certain?
Roule: Multiple administrations have had this goal, although China’s rise and our national fatigue with the region’s issues make this more likely than ever before. A complete withdrawal would damage our national security and thus is unlikely. As to what will dictate the course of this relationship, I am reminded that when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was asked what would determine his government's policies, he reportedly replied, "Events, dear boy, events." I suspect the same will be true here as well.
The Cipher Brief is a non-political media publishing platform dedicated to national security issues.