EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Students at dozens of universities across Iran faced tear gas and gunfire over the weekend as they continue to defy officials in protest over Mahsa Amini, the young woman who died while in the custody of Iran’s morality police last month for wearing attire they that officials deemed inappropriate.
How are these continuing protests impacting the regime and what is the likelihood that they will bring about any real change?
The Cipher Brief tapped geopolitical and energy consultant Norm Roule, who is former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, for his take on what’s happening there and what it means in Tehran and elsewhere.
The Cipher Brief: Give us some background on the ongoing unrest across Iran. Who are the protestors? How should we be thinking about this?
Roule: First, let’s talk about Iran’s people, particularly the youth of Iran who are driving the current protests. The median age of Iran’s 83 million population is 31 or 32. About 20 percent of the population was born between 1997 and 2012. Most of its citizens have no memory of the 1979 revolution, little memory of the Iran-Iraq war, but plenty of exposure to the global and regional developments of the post-2001 period. They’ve experienced none of the hardships of the war period, but all of the economic privations imposed as a result of regime behavior and policies.
This era saw endless sanctions that eroded living standards, Iran’s regional adventurism, unprecedented state-enable corruption, the explosion of the internet that brought the world to Iran’s tech-savvy Generation Z, and chronic unrest. This generation is angry about unemployment, elite exploitation of Iran’s economy, and their inability to enjoy a lifestyle available to their counterparts in other countries, particularly in the Arab Gulf states. Unsurprisingly, this generation has proven the most active on the streets. One Iranian news service reported that during the past month of unrest, more than 41 percent of those arrested during the protests were under the age of 20, and 48 percent were between 20 and 35. Women also represent a large percentage of the students at Iran’s colleges.
Looking beyond Generation Z, Iran’s overall population is also restive. The ongoing unrest is the most significant since 2009, but we shouldn’t forget the protests of the past decade or so, if only because of what they tell us about the extent of the regime’s unpopularity. Before the last six weeks, the most serious unrest in the recent past took place in 2009. Since then, we have seen smaller but still severe protests in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and even earlier this year. It is no longer uncommon for protests to erupt in such previous regime strongholds as Qom and Meshad.
The drivers of these protests represent a catalog of mismanagement by an archaic political system and a leadership disconnected from its people. The list includes regime manipulation of national elections, the treatment of opposition members, the collapse of the rial, significant inflation of basic foodstuffs, the shoot-down of a passenger plane, and unrelenting corruption that has enriched Iran’s senior-most officials. In each phase of these protests, we saw a growing willingness by protestors to publicly call for regime change and the death of regime icons, including the Supreme Leader.
Destruction of official portraits and clashes with security personnel are now routine. Unfortunately, so are fatalities. Previous protests faded away, but several episodes seemed capable of igniting a broader revolt. Indeed, the most visible difference between today’s protests and past unrest, is the role played by heroic women and girls responding to the cruel murder of Mahsa Amini over hijab rules enforced by Iran’s morality police.
The Cipher Brief: Is there any sign that the protests will result in regime change and is there any reason to believe they will end in the near term?
Roule: The unrest is likely to continue for the foreseeable future with a strong likelihood of increased intensity, particularly at funerals and anniversaries of the murder of protesters by security forces. Like the revolution of 1979, and even the Green Movement of 2009–2010, events will probably play out over months. It remains too early to predict how this will end, but it seems inevitable that some change in the system will be required if the regime is to survive.
The simultaneous strength and weakness of the unrest is that it is spontaneous, leaderless, and erupted in multiple cities simultaneously. Protestors are bravely articulating what they oppose, but it is unclear what they seek beyond an end to the regime as captured in their now famous chant “Women, Life, Freedom.”
Men and women who support wearing the hijab have participated in these protests. The world is seeing crowds successfully taking on small groups of security personnel. Student unrest is widespread and chronic. There is evidence of cross-generational support. There is evidence of labor support, but not yet so significantly that the regime needs to worry about a collapse of supply chains, oil production, and essential services. Kurdish and Baluch activists are also supporting protests, unlike anything the government has seen since 1979.
The Cipher Brief: How do you assess the regime’s response? What are Tehran’s options?
Roule: The regime’s traditional tactics to neutralize unrest have proven unsuccessful. Arrests may have hampered protest organization, but Tehran has not been able to dampen its momentum. Most of all, Iran’s population is not cowed by the threat of regime violence, despite the deaths of more than 200 people and the arrest of more than 14,000 protestors. This lack of fear could result from the regime’s need to detain protestors long enough to inject fear but not so long as to bring their parents onto the streets.
This regime has also proven unable to develop a compelling counter-narrative. Instead, Tehran has shown itself to be rigid and out-of-touch, offering stale revolutionary rhetoric and blaming foreign elements for the unrest. After six weeks of growing violence, the regime’s options are few, and it seems to lack the imagination to innovate. The pace of events has likely begun to erode security capability, and unit morale is probably under pressure. Few ordinary security forces will be comfortable attacking women. Perhaps the regime is already facing difficulties with its security forces in this regard. It is unlikely there is evidence that unrest will fade in the near term, and each successive week of unrest will embolden protesters.
Elite voices generally remain cohesive, with only a few hinting even a modicum of sympathy for the protestors. Statements by regime officials have been inconsistent or fail to reflect a coherent strategy. I think it is too early to say whether these comments represent serious divisions, but it is hard to believe that the persistence of the unrest doesn’t have some regime officials worried. I suspect the regime’s leadership has discussed whether they should attempt a compromise that could provoke further demands or initiate a violent and unprecedented crackdown that could take many lives.
In the near term, the regime’s tactics are likely to toughen, although it will try to avoid bloodshed that inevitably will involve women and girls. We have seen ominous and threatening comments from security officials and Iran’s hardline judiciary. Regime security forces in the Kurdish and Baluch areas have been violent. Protestors appear unfazed by the regime’s threats. Iran’s Generation X has, in essence, called the regime’s bluff.
The regime does possess advantages that need to be understood. Let me name four:
• Despite the thuggery displayed by some street goons, Iran’s security forces appear to be largely restrained and disciplined. Iran’s security forces also appear well-resourced, a product of Chinese oil purchases and lax sanction enforcement by the West. Iran’s parliament announced a 20% salary increase for security forces, which implies that they feel they need to curry favor with those charged with protecting the regime. This step may also suggest an imminent crackdown or concerns over the reliability of security units. Time will tell.
• The IRGC and MOIS have worked to control Iran’s communications architecture for years. The regime is exerting the full force of this power in its censorship of protestors’ access to the world.
• Iran is more than protestors. While the regime is deeply unpopular and maintains power primarily through coercion, it does have supporters. Millions of Iranians boycotted the 2021 presidential election, but — to the extent that anyone can trust official Iranian figures — around 18 million Iranians voted for Ebrahim Raisi, who is one of the bloodiest hardliners to hold power in Iran. There is little written on the views of this polity or the hardline machine that is likely working to energize them in support of the regime. Last, as crowd sizes indicate, many Iranians have yet to come to the streets. We shouldn’t forget that many Iranians rely on government or state institutions for their livelihood. This polity is likely middle class and middle-aged. They care about families, jobs and are less risk tolerant than Generation Z. Still, since many current fence-sitters angrily voiced grievances in past demonstrations, there is good reason to believe they could come out against the regime if they sense a tipping point is near.
• Last, there have been reports that Moscow has offered to help Iran put down the unrest. I am unsure what Russia offers or whether Iran can ingest these capabilities in time to respond to the unrest. Of course, much depends on how long protests last.
The Cipher Brief: Talk to us a little more about the regime. How are you thinking about its leadership, particularly the Supreme Leader and his generation?
Roule: We are watching a long-anticipated leadership transition as Iran’s revolutionary actors pass power to a generation that played little role in the events of the 1979 revolution or the Iran-Iraq war. Like Iran’s population, the worldview of the current generation of leaders was shaped by the domestic and external dynamics of the post-2001 period. Certainly, Iran’s senior-most leaders are aging. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 83 and appears increasingly frail. Ahmad Jannati, the chairman of Iran’s Assembly of Experts and the Guardian Council, is 95. Mortality is taking its toll, and assuming the Islamic Republic survives, the next few years will see many of Iran’s hardline actors pass from the scene.
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But we should be careful we don’t lose sight of this rising generation because they have their hands fully on the rudders of power. Iran’s president Ebrahim Raisi is 62. The heads of the IRGC, MOIS and the minister of Defense are about the same age. The foreign minister is just a few years younger. Many of the members of the Guardian council are in their 60s. The Assembly of Experts tends to be older but also has members in their 60s. Importantly, these individuals have been no less protective of Iran’s traditional hardline security interests domestically and abroad. However, they are more willing to engage external powers as part of their foreign policy.
The Cipher Brief: What happens if the Supreme Leader dies or is overthrown?
Roule: Like most questions involving regime transition or change, this question requires considerable humility. But it is possible to consider a couple of likely outcomes that touch on a change in personalities and known structural dynamics.
Until this unrest, President Raisi was relatively positioned to become Supreme Leader. He lacks the charisma and stature of Khomeini and Khamenei, but in fairness, I can’t think of another cleric who enjoys these attributes. His hardline views will make him deeply unpopular with Generation Z and others risking their lives on the streets of Iran.
The case for Raisi’s succession rests in his resume. He headed the largest bonyad in Iran, the Astan Quds Razavi (AQR). Based in Meshad, it commands billions of dollars in investments and key patronage positions in Iran’s politically important east. Raisi used his time in AQR to introduce IRGC officials to leadership positions to ensure that control was extended after his departure. He subsequently held key positions in Iran’s Judiciary and most recently, as President, where he similarly neutralized challengers and established a network of supporters in virtually every ministry.
Raisi has other advantages. He carries the support of Iran’s current Supreme Leader. He has sufficient religious credentials and is a senior member of the Assembly of Experts, the organization charged with selecting Iran’s Supreme Leaders. Beyond this, he assiduously curried the favor of the IRGC and MOIS. Raisi's accession would allow hardliners the prospect of a Supreme Leader who shares their views and is likely to remain in the chair for decades.
Some suggest Khamenei’s son Mojtaba could be a candidate, but he lacks Raisi’s qualifications, and his succession to the position would smack of monarchy. It is hard to imagine him as a credible Supreme Leader. This said, Mojtaba Khamenei, as well as his allies within the current Supreme Leader’s inner circle, will very likely remain potent actors in any hardline government.
I do think that Raisi will need to do something to polish his image. Perhaps he will seek scapegoats.
Some wildcards. Former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami are out there. They have little political power. I can’t help wondering if strange events may bring them to the forefront again.
It may be more useful to consider this question regarding a successor structure instead of personalities. Like a Rubik’s cube, this allows us to imagine other constructs. What if Raisi decided to remain president, albeit with greater power? In this case, a suitable candidate for Supreme Leader would be found who would not interfere with Raisi’s actions. Is it possible that instead of a Supreme Leader, a fatwa council could be formed? Former Iranian President Rafsanjani reportedly suggested this.
It is clear that whatever individual or structure replaces the current leadership, it will be tough to extract the IRGC and, to a lesser extent, the MOIS and their networks from Iran’s government and private sector. Each of these organizations used President Ahmadinejad’s privatization campaigns to burrow deep within key government and private organizations for political influence and personal profit.
The Cipher Brief: What indicators could suggest the regime is approaching collapse?
Roule: Let me run through a list of indicators that would be bad news for the regime.
• In terms of the protestors, the crowds will need to grow and involve middle-aged, middle-class citizens.
• Broad strikes, particularly involving oil, banks, transportation, public utilities, and supply chain actors, would be a bad sign for the government.
• Heightened violence is a risk both on the part of the protestors who decide to take a revolution to the next level, and the government, which would decide it had no choice but to undertake a bloodletting to survive. Violence is most likely in the southeast and northwest. It would be telling if large-scale violence spread to Tehran, Esfahan, Shiraz, or other central cities.
• In terms of the security forces, I would look for incoherent or slow performance or, in extreme cases, unit stand down or defection.
• I would also look for more profound and clearer splits among the elites, including open disagreement with the Supreme Leader, as this would indicate that officials with access to classified stability assessments might act independently.
• Confirmed reports of elite flight and capital flight would also be important.
The Cipher Brief: This can’t be good news for a potential revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Roule: I see little prospect for a revival of the JCPOA. The original JCPOA required a handful of drivers that brought Iran’s reluctant leadership to accept the agreement. All these drivers are absent today.
The missing pieces are numerous but include Great Power unity against Iran, a sense that the UN Security Council was capable of meaningful actions, impactful and unprecedented sanctions enforcement, a smaller Iranian nuclear program in Iran, and a belief that any expansion would risk U.S. or Israeli military action. Better U.S. ties with Gulf Arabs and Israel, and the confidence by some in Iran that the agreement would deliver substantial sanctions relief are important. Last, Iran’s leadership transition had not begun.
It is unlikely that Iran’s leaders genuinely believe foreign countries are behind the unrest, but if they did, they might try to revive the deal to dampen Western support for protests. I don’t see this happening, and Western support isn’t a significant factor in the ongoing unrest despite the propaganda from Tehran.
Iran’s drivers for agreeing to a nuclear deal would be a belief that it could accept nuclear limitations that would expire in a handful of years in exchange for broad sanctions relief that would sustain the regime.
However, Iran would have no reason to engage in follow-on diplomacy on other issues of concern because the current U.S. administration and Europe have done little to encourage a belief that military action could follow Iran’s malign behavior or would deter further threats against American officials in the Homeland. Tehran’s post-deal rhetoric would be defiant and bellicose, its support for proxies would likely increase, and it would use sanctions relief to build a fortress economy to sustain itself from future sanctions.
I expect there may be some in the administration who would still welcome a deal, but this would be wildly unpopular. One product of these protests has been a profound shift in the world’s view of Iran. Tens of thousands of Iranian expatriates and their Western supporters have protested Tehran worldwide. The idea that a deal could resource oppression would be seen as an outrage in a way that wasn’t possible only a couple of months ago. Indeed, even deal supporters cannot deny that had a deal been concluded, sanctions relief would now resource Iran’s crackdown against its people and the drone — and likely missile — programs that Tehran uses to support Russia’s war in Ukraine and its violent regional proxies. Any attempt to apply sanctions in response to these actions would result in Iran threatening to pull out of the deal.
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