SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE REPORTING — As Taiwan prepares for the inauguration of President-elect Lai Ching-te on May 20, it’s also preparing for fresh provocations from Beijing.
Lai was the tough-on-China candidate in Taiwan’s January election, and the Chinese government made no secret of its displeasure with the outcome. China’s Foreign Ministry said Lai’s election “will not change the basic fact that Taiwan is part of China and there is only one China in the world.”
China has expressed its displeasure in other ways. Taiwan’s defense ministry has reported a significant uptick in China’s military presence near the island – in particular in recent weeks, with more than two dozen aircraft and five naval vessels detected near its territory, and some aircraft breaching the Taiwan Strait’s median line. Officials in Taiwan have also said that Beijing’s tactics have ramped up to include night-time combat patrols, the use of landing ships and minesweepers, an unprecedented number of sweeps by the Chinese coast guard near Taiwan’s outlying Kinmen Islands, and the opening of new air routes in the Taiwan Strait, which Taipei claims are an aviation safety threat.
“Beijing will likely carry out some kind of military signaling around the inauguration, though this is not likely to rise to the level of a provocation,” Eric Gomez, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, told The Cipher Brief. “This could change depending on the inauguration itself. For example, if Lai makes a speech that is very pro-independence, or if the United States sends a high-level delegation to attend the event…then Beijing could escalate to demonstrate its displeasure.”
The White House said Wednesday that it would send an unofficial delegation to the inauguration, and in its statement called Taiwan “a model for democracy not only in the region but also globally.” But beyond the inauguration, there are profound concerns about what may unfold during President Lai’s tenure – not because of his tough line on China (his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, held similar views) but because many experts and officials say China is rapidly building the military capabilities it would need to invade the island.
“All indications point to the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) meeting President Xi Jinping’s directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027,” U.S. Adm. John Aquilino, head of the Indo-Pacific Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee in late March.
2027 would fall in year three of President Lai’s four-year term.
Retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, the former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was invited to Taiwan for a series of high-level visits in March. In an interview with The Cipher Brief, Adm. Studeman said that in his conversations with senior Taiwanese officials about a possible Chinese invasion of the island, “the question wasn’t whether. The question was when.”
Fewer carrots, more sticks
Taiwan has been a self-governing democracy for decades, but ever since the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the view from Beijing has been clear: Taiwan is a breakaway province that must at some point be “reunified” with the mainland. Whether reunification comes peacefully or by force is a matter for discussion; the status of Taiwan is not.
The difference today is that beyond the policy and rhetorical claims, China’s President Xi Jinping has added a military buildup that is aimed in part at being ready for a possible invasion.
China increased its defense budget by 7.2 percent this year, and Xi has regularly exhorted his military to prepare for conflict. In his most recent New Year’s address, Xi said that unification with Taiwan – however it comes to pass – was a “historical inevitability.”
In his Senate testimony, Adm. Aquilino cited China’s “aggressive military buildup” and added that “the PLA’s (People’s Liberation Army) actions indicate their ability to meet Xi’s preferred timeline to unify Taiwan with mainland China by force if directed.”
No surprise, then, that China deems Taiwan’s newly elected president a dangerous separatist. Lai rejects completely the Chinese claim over Taiwan, and China has repeatedly rebuffed Lai’s offers of diplomatic discussions, including one made earlier this month.
Some analysts suggest that once Lai takes office, China will gauge the new Taiwanese administration’s approach before escalating tensions even further.
“While you can never say never, all indications are that incoming President Lai will deliver a responsible speech outlining a vision close to outgoing President Tsai’s vision,” said Mark Montgomery, a Cipher Brief expert and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). “While China will likely act provocatively and raise tensions, Taiwan will remain the adult in the room, and things will calm down quickly.”
“Short-term, Beijing will want to signal its usual red lines to the incoming Lai administration,” Gomez said. “Amounts to ‘don’t do anything stupid on independence, and we will keep doing what we have been doing vis-à-vis low-level pressure, unless or until you adopt policies that we like.’”
Those are the forecasts for the early stages of the new administration in Taipei. Longer term, things get less clear and potentially much more dangerous.
“There’s no evidence that Xi Jinping is deterred from his grand strategy of returning Taiwan, unifying Taiwan and assimilating it like Hong Kong,” said Adm. Studeman. “So this is a great concern. The speeches we see the PLA getting from Xi Jinping suggest that he’s preparing them for a major test, (for) combat operations.”
As Gomez put it, “long-term, Beijing wants reunification with Taiwan, and they will keep working toward that goal using a mix of carrots and sticks, with the deck stacked more in favor of sticks.”
The view from Washington
The U.S. has long followed a policy towards Taiwan known as “strategic ambiguity.” In practice, that has meant no outright acceptance of Taiwan as an independent nation, no ironclad commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked, but rhetorical support for Taiwan’s democracy and a steady flow of military aid designed to prepare Taiwan for its self-defense. The ambiguity is part of a balancing act – allowing the U.S. to show solidarity with Taiwan while avoiding a dangerous provocation of China.
In recent years, aid for Taiwan and a general anti-Beijing approach have gained solid bipartisan support in Washington. That has meant more weapons sales for Taiwan, and regular shows of U.S. force in the region; just last week, the U.S. sent the destroyer USS Halsey to conduct a “routine Taiwan Strait transit,” through waters where “high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law.” The move drew a rebuke from Beijing; the Chinese government called the maneuver “public hype” and responded by deploying naval and aerial forces of its own to track and warn the U.S. vessel.
“The Taiwan Strait remains the most likely and most dangerous scenario for U.S. forces in the western Pacific,” Montgomery said.
Indeed, there is a rising worry among U.S. security professionals that China’s broader military buildup and increasingly forceful actions in the region, coupled with worsening relations between Taiwan and China, could eventually ignite a confrontation between the U.S. and China. Xi has said often that China would prefer a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but he has also threatened to use military force if necessary. And despite the “strategic ambiguity” policy, President Joe Biden has pledged to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack.
“I do worry about the potential of tensions slowly increasing over time if there are no concerted efforts by China, Taiwan, and the U.S. to lower the temperature,” Gomez told The Cipher Brief. “I don’t think there is any appetite for a conflict right now…but if China keeps doing low-level military activity around Taiwan, it could incentivize the United States to move toward strategic clarity and adopt a clearer commitment to Taiwan’s defense in the name of deterring a conflict. Beijing would likely respond with even more activity instead of backing down.”
On the eve of Lai’s inauguration, Olivia Enos, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, said “It is critical during this moment of uncertainty, that the U.S. underscore its continued support for the new Taiwanese administration and reiterate and underscore its commitment to defend Taiwan and provide weapons for its defense.”
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.
