On June 18, a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet shot down a Syrian Air Force Su-22 fighter bomber near the town of al-Tabqa in eastern Syria. According to coalition sources, the Syrian aircraft had bombed anti-Assad militias fighting Islamic State forces in the region and was shot down as part of “collective self defense” of the United States’ Syrian partners. The incident took place a little more than two months after the U.S. fired 59 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles at Shayrat Airbase in Syria. U.S.-led coalition forces have also shot down three Syrian government drones operating in contested areas of Syria in recent weeks.
Russia immediately condemned the shooting down of the Syrian aircraft as an act of aggression, and Russia’s Defense Ministry threatened to target “All flying objects, including planes and drones of the international coalition, detected west of the Euphrates...” Russia also announced the suspension of the deconfliction “hot line” used to avoid collisions of aircraft operating in the air space over Syria. Following the April 7 cruise missile attack, Russia vowed to strengthen Syria’s air defenses, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev said the act of aggression had put the U.S. on the “cusp of war with Russia.” An important question to consider now is whether and how Russia will respond to the latest military incident involving ally Syrian President Basher al-Assad.
As witnessed by Putin’s comments in his recent interview with Oliver Stone, Putin views Russia as a law abiding but aggrieved state surrounded by a hostile U.S./NATO dominated world. He considers Russia to be militarily threatened by the eastward expansion of NATO, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, victimized by sanctions after the annexation of Crimea, which followed—in his view—an illegal Western-sponsored coup d’état that ousted the legitimate President of the Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich.
In Putin’s view, Russia’s military intervention in Syria is the result of the invitation by the Syrian government following the expansion of the instability of the U.S.-encouraged Arab Spring to Syria nearly six years ago. Putin points out there is no legal basis for any other military forces to operate in Syria, including the international coalition. However, the Russian intervention in Syria is more than just an effort to help a long time surrogate; it is an important part of Putin’s narrative to the Russian public. In that narrative, Russia is under constant threat from a U.S.-led unipolar world order that is quick to use its military to punish those who try to exert independence. He cites U.S. regime change efforts in Serbia, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria to support his case to the Russian public that his government is also a target. Moreover, Putin argues it is Russian (and allies, Iranian and Syrian) forces that are carrying the fight to the Islamic State in Syria as the U.S.-led coalition concentrates on the regime change effort to oust Assad.
It seems unlikely Putin will let this latest incident go without a response, especially as he seeks to divert attention from the recent series of anti-corruption protests in Russia inspired by the work of Alexei Navalny. Putin certainly wants to re-ignite the us-versus-them narrative that has worked so well for him in recent years. A response to the shooting down of the Su-22 would seem to fit the requirement nicely.
Despite the threat to target coalition aircraft flying west of the Euphrates, we consider it unlikely Putin would authorize Russian warcraft or anti-aircraft installations to fire at a U.S. warcraft. Similarly, we believe it unlikely Putin would authorize or encourage Syrian military forces to attack U.S. or coalition aircraft, because the consequences of a likely U.S./coalition response against Syrian air defenses, the Syrian air force, government leadership and communications, among other potential targets would likely be devastating. Russia has deployed S-300 and S-400 air defense systems to Syria, and despite the sophistication of those systems, they are likely no match against a concerted U.S./coalition strike. Putin could not be enthusiastic about the embarrassment of his sophisticated air defenses being unable to do the job. Moreover, firing at a U.S. warcraft risks escalation that could lead to a broader conflict in the region.
There is also another sanctions bill awaiting consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives. Despite his occasional belligerent rhetoric and ego, Putin must understand a broader conflict cannot end favorably for Russia, Syria, and Iran. Additional sanctions will certainly not help the Russian economy. Unlike his confident assessment of former President Barack Obama’s reluctance to use U.S. military force, Putin cannot now have the same assessment of President Donald Trump’s willingness to exert U.S. military power.
So how does Putin respond? The possibility Putin responds asymmetrically should be considered. Putin has options outside the Middle East to create problems for the United States and Europe. The first option to be considered could be an escalation of the level of violence in the Ukraine or another referendum, this time to build a land bridge from Crimea to the Russian Federation, or perhaps activity further east against Odessa whose governor until recently was former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili. An effort to bring Odessa into the Russian Federation would also satisfy a long-time ambition of Putin to reunite ethnic Russians in the frozen conflict zone of Transdniestria with the Russian Federation and perhaps forestall the movement of Moldova to closer economic relations with the European Union.
Perhaps a more likely option is further Russian agitation in the Balkans, an area of historic Russian influence, and one largely ignored by the West in recent years. Only a few months ago, there was a Russian-sponsored coup attempt in Montenegro clearly designed to cut short that country’s membership in NATO. Similarly, Russian intelligence and cyber operations have dramatically increased in Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and elsewhere in the Balkans in the past couple of years. The goal of each seems to be to halt any gravitation in those states toward the EU or NATO.
Another potential area for asymmetric response to U.S./coalition action in Syria would be enhanced agitation in the Baltic States, whose NATO membership is particularly galling to Putin and the hardline clique that surround him in Moscow. Estonian and Lithuanian leaders in recent months have pointed out increased Russian cyber and influence operations designed to stir up pro-Moscow sentiments in the ethnic Russian population in those countries.
The events of June 18 could prove to be an important escalation point in the Syrian conflict and perhaps for the region. In addition to the shooting down of the Su-22, also on June 18, for the first time Iran fired several medium range ballistic missiles from Iran at Islamic State targets in Syria. On June 19, a U.S. F-15E fighter shot down another Syrian government drone. It seems unlikely the governments of Russia, Syria, or Iran can be enthusiastic about the reassertion of U.S. military power in Syria.
We believe Putin will not put in jeopardy the effort he has undertaken to bolster the Assad regime by direct military confrontation with the U.S.-led coalition. Putin considers himself a strategic thinker and views the conflict with the West in the long term, thus we believe a more probable response from Putin will be to put pressure on Western interests elsewhere.
