Most would agree that Kim Jong-Un’s 2018 decision to change tack and seek rapprochement with the U.S. and South Korea was due to enhanced U.N. sanctions, intimidating joint U.S.-ROK military exercises and Kim’s determination to focus on economic development, after successes in 2017 with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Fortunately, all countries, especially China, implemented sanctions that restricted North Korea’s ability to export coal, fisheries and textiles and import petroleum products and crude oil. The joint military exercises, with the introduction of strategic assets, no doubt got the attention of Pyongyang. Also, important, was Kim’s strategic decision to focus on economic development in a North Korea unable to feed its own people.
It was a combination of these three factors that apparently convinced Kim that relief from sanctions and the threat of military action - combined with the prospect of an end to isolation and normal relations with the U.S. - was worth complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons and programs.
Joseph DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea
"However, for North Korea, the ideal scenario would be a normal relationship with the U.S., with the lifting of sanctions and an end to joint military exercises, while being permitted to retain a nuclear weapons capability."
Since 2003, with the establishment of the Six Party (U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and North Korea) Talks process, North Korea has argued for being accepted as a nuclear weapons state. In formal and private negotiations and discussions, North Korea’s negotiators said North Korea would be a responsible nuclear weapons state, committed to a close and friendly relationship with the U.S. The U.S. relationship with Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state with normal relations with the U.S., was cited as a model for dealing with North Korea.
Repeatedly, North Korea’s negotiators were told that the U.S. would never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, arguing that North Korea with nuclear weapons would encourage other countries in the region, especially South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, to pursue nuclear weapons, regardless of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Also noted, was the possibility that a nuclear weapon or fissile material would find its way to a terrorist organization, with devastating consequences.
Ultimate success with North Korea depends on Kim Jung-Un understanding that the end to sanctions and joint military exercises comes with complete and verifiable dismantlement. Anything short of this would lead to a continued regime of intrusive sanctions and intimidating joint military exercises. If, however, North Korea was convinced that relief from sanctions and joint military exercises was possible, while retaining a nuclear weapons capability, then this clearly would be Kim Jung-Un’s ultimate goal. Thus it’s imperative that the U.S. has the support of China, South Korea, Russia and Japan in regard to sanctions implementation, with the option of reconstituting joint military exercises with South Korea.
Joseph DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea
"If especially, China and South Korea, falter in their support of sanctions and military exercises, then it’s likely that Kim Jung-Un would renege on his commitment to complete denuclearization, knowing that the U.S. no longer has the levers to punish North Korea for its nuclear program."
In short, the U.S. needs China and South Korea to be in sync with its strategy for dealing with a nuclear North Korea.
Kim Jung Un’s 2018 charm offensive has been spectacularly successful. Three summits with South Korea’s Moon Jae-in; a successful summit with President Donald Trump, with the prospect of a second summit in the near future; three meetings with China’s Xi Jinping and improved bilateral relations with China and Russia, North Korea’s two allies. North Korea has invited international inspectors to visit the Punggye-Ri nuclear test site, to confirm its dismantlement. They also offered to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear research center, with its five megawatt nuclear reactor, in return for reciprocal deliverables from the U.S., which probably means a declaration that ends the Korean War and the lifting of one or more sanctions. North Korea maintains, and South Korea and China apparently agree, that these would be confidence building moves to engender greater trust.
Ideally, based on Kim Jung-Un’s successful meetings with Presidents Trump, Moon and Xi, North Korea would be prepared to provide the U.S. with a declaration of its nuclear weapons and facilities, and a willingness to sign a verification protocol that would authorize nuclear monitors to inspect non-declared suspect nuclear sites. In return, the U.S. would present North Korea with a declaration ending hostilities with North Korea and possibly also proposing that liaison offices be established in the respective capitals.
This was the approach undertaken in 2005, when North Korea signed the Six Party Talks Joint Statement that, inter alia, committed North Korea to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and affirmed that the U.S. has no intention of attacking or invading North Korea using nuclear or conventional weapons.
Joseph DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea
"We’re at an important inflection point with North Korea. It appears that Kim Jung-Un made the strategic decision to verifiably abandon the North’s nuclear weapons and facilities in return for robust security assurances and economic development assistance, definitely to include a normal relationship with the U.S."
However, If Kim believes he can gain these security assurances and receive economic development with the establishment of a normal relationship with the U.S. without having to give up all of the North’s nuclear weapons and facilities, this then will be Kim’s priority objective. Our challenge, therefore, is to ensure that Kim understands that security assurances and a normal relationship with the U.S. are possible only with complete and verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons and facilities. Also important, would be assurances from South Korea and China that the U.S. would be supported in its approach to resolving the nuclear and missile issues with North Korea.
The views are the author’s and not those of any government agency or department.
