North Korea launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile this weekend, marking Pyongyang’s first provocation since President Donald Trump took office.
The test coincided with Trump hosting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at his Palm Beach estate and club Mar-a-Lago. The pair turned their dinner into an open-air strategy session, and then delivered brief statements on the launch. Abe called it “absolutely intolerable,” while Trump said, “I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100 percent.”
Trump’s comments were muted given some of his rhetoric on North Korea before entering the White House. After Kim Jong-un said in a New Year’s Day speech that North Korea was close to testing its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), then President-elect Trump tweeted, “North Korea just stated that it is in the final stages of developing a nuclear weapon capable of reaching parts of the U.S. It won't happen!”
The Cipher Brief’s Mackenzie Weinger spoke separately with former Ambassadors Joseph DeTrani and Christopher Hill to get their respective views on this latest provocation, how Trump has handled the security challenge so far, and what the U.S. should be watching for concerning Pyongyang.
DeTrani, the President of the Daniel Morgan Graduate School on National Security, previously served as the Mission Manager for North Korea for the ODNI and as the Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea. Hill, the Dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs when he was also the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party Talks. He also served as the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.
The Cipher Brief: What is significant about this missile test?
Joseph DeTrani: The launch on Sunday of the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is significant. In 2016, North Korea launched eight intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the last one in August was a success and showed that the North Koreans were pursuing the perfection of the intermediate-range ballistic missile. It has a range of up to 4,000km, which means it could reach as far as Guam, a major development.
Launching this IRBM during the visit of Shinzo Abe is also significant. It was a message, certainly to Japan and the United States that North Korea has not halted its nuclear or missile programs, and they’re working on perfecting their missile technology. I think what’s very significant about the intermediate-range ballistic missile, based on what the North Koreans have said and some of the preliminary analysis, is that apparently this test was of a solid-fuel missile. So we’re talking about a mobile, solid-fuel missile that’s capable of being launched anywhere, literally at any time if it’s solid fuel. A liquid-fuel missile requires that period of time to be fueled, thus the greater opportunity of locating it. With a solid-fuel rocket that’s mobile, it makes it that much more difficult to discern. They’re advancing their capabilities on the missile technology side.
So, two things — one, they’re persisting with the intermediate-range ballistic missile, which, I might add, if you look at some of the components, could be fungible in regards to an intercontinental ballistic missile. So if you’re working on your capabilities, and if there is something that can be transferred to an ICBM, and in this case all indications are, you could be talking about a significant event. So, one, a message to Japan and the United States that North Korea is persisting with their missile program, and two, basically an upgrade by all indications of their missile capabilities and know-how.
Christopher Hill: First of all, I don’t think in and of itself the missile test is significant. Obviously, it’s part of a broader pattern and an extremely worrisome pattern, and that is a North Korea that is trying to develop deliverable nuclear weapons. With respect to this particular missile, it is worrisome that it appears to be a solid-fuel rocket. Solid fuel is more sophisticated than liquid fuel and can mean that it will be difficult to detect when it is being prepared for launch. That is, solid fuel tends to reduce the preparation time. So there is much to be concerned about in this missile launch, but I would emphasize it’s the broader pattern of conducting tests toward a deliverable nuclear weapon that we all need to be very concerned.
TCB: President Trump delivered very brief remarks following Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s statement condemning the launch. What did you make of President Trump’s muted response to the missile test? How would you assess the President’s handling so far of the first provocation from North Korea since he entered office?
JD: This was not an ICBM. Thank goodness it wasn’t an ICBM. If it were, it would be extremely significant because this touches the United States in a profound way. This is an intermediate-range ballistic missile, still very significant. The comment from the President, or the lack of a very substantive comment from the President, is indicative of the fact the President needs more information. He needs more information on what’s going on, what’s in the calculus of Kim Jong-un, why is he persisting? Kim has an opportunity now with the new administration of showing good will by restraining himself and not launching missiles the way his father did, Kim Jong-il, when President Obama took over in 2009. In this case, the President is probably saying, what’s going on? Give me a sense of what’s driving this Kim Jong-un. Why is he doing this now, and what does he expect from us?
And there’s another piece to this, too. Where is China in this equation? The President just had a good telephone conversation with President Xi Jinping. Hopefully Xi Jinping is telling North Korea, do not be provocative, certainly not provocative with a new administration. And here he goes and launches an IRBM and Shinzo Abe is having dinner with the President. This doesn’t make much sense. Was China not aware of it? Are they not listening to China? Apparently China was not happy with this missile event, but the fact is, what are they doing about it? How are they using their leverage to try to get North Korea and Kim Jong-un to refrain from continuing to be provocative?
CH: I don’t think they anticipated the missile launch during the Abe-Trump summit, but I think it was significant that they agreed on the way forward. President Trump’s comments were extremely disciplined, perhaps even airing on the side of being too disciplined in that he did not mention South Korea. That said, I think we’ve come a long way from the campaign rhetoric in which he criticized South Korea and Japan for allegedly not paying their share of the burden and for apparently suggesting that perhaps a solution for all this is to give them nuclear weapons. I think we’re a long way from that rather unhelpful rhetoric.
Secondly, I think it was important that in the days just previous to the Abe meeting, the President spoke with the President of China and essentially agreed to the “One China Policy.” You recall a few months ago it appeared that the Trump administration wanted to somehow bring this long-standing tenant of our relationship with China onto the table as a kind of bargaining chip. That was an approach that was not going to work, and I’m pleased the President actually pulled back from that.
And finally, of course, two weeks ago the President sent Secretary of Defense James Mattis to the region and I think gave some very reassuring words, not only to the two allies there, South Korea and Japan, but also more broadly. I think it was well received by other allies in other parts of the world.
TCB: The U.N. imposed new sanctions against North Korea late last year. What more do you anticipate, and what can really be added at this point? What can be done by other international actors?
JD: There is still room for additional sanctions. I think we will be seeing additional sanctions from the U.N. Security Council, and indeed, the consequences of those sanctions that will be imposed on those entities that are dealing with the sanctioned North Korean entities; ergo, if you have Chinese banks dealing with sanctioned North Korean entities, those Chinese banks and entities would also be sanctioned and not be able to deal in the U.S. financial system. The sanction issue is still available to the U.N. and the United States, certainly. The consequences would be that much more severe for North Korea, and potentially for China, if they are not implementing those sanctions in a meaningful way.
CH: First of all, the U.S. really needs to stay close to its allies. And with respect to South Korea, that means the fielding of this very sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system. I think that’s important as a sign the United States will do all it can consistent with its obligations as an ally to field its best forces and its best technology. Of course China has made very clear it’s not happy with this at all, and I think that’s something the Chinese are simply going to have to understand that the United States is committed to its alliance with the ROK and the alliance with Japan. That’s number one, I think.
Number two, with respect to the sanctions, there is undoubtedly more that China can do. They have done more than they did in the past, but there is still more they can do in terms of energy shipments and financial flows. It behooves the United States to have some in-depth talks with the Chinese to see what more they can do. No one wants North Korea to have a deliverable nuclear weapon, and that includes China. But I think we need to try to find some patterns of communication and cooperation.
TCB: Is there any credible way for considering negotiations with North Korea on this?
JD: There needs to be some attempt at determining whether North Korea is capable of sitting down and negotiating a halt to their missile and nuclear programs. We haven’t had a substantive dialogue with North Korea since 2008. The new administration has an opportunity now of sitting down and saying, listen, if you keep escalating, we are going to use the tools available to us on you, North Korea, and also on China, that has the leverage on North Korea. Are you prepared to sit down?
And North Korea has a menu of issues they’re interested in — security assurances, they’re looking at relief from the sanctions and the joint military exercises. This is an opportunity now, sitting down and determining, is North Korea capable of halting what they’re doing? Could they stop these provocations?
Now, if it doesn’t go anywhere, and most people say it won’t go anywhere — I’m not of that school, I believe you have to give it a try — if it doesn’t go anywhere then you go back to your other options. But possibly North Korea, hopefully to build some confidence in the relationship, may be willing to halt what they’re doing in exchange for some relief. They’re talking about peace treaties, they’re talking about sanctions relief and so forth, and that’s what negotiations are all about. Give negotiations another chance. If it doesn’t work, then move down the road.
CH: I am not in favor of just opening negotiations with North Korea, in so far as they have essentially repudiated their previous agreements, which were an outgrowth of negotiations which yours truly conducted. I don’t think it makes much sense to have negotiations with a partner who does not acknowledge the past undertakings. It’s kind of starting from scratch again. I think it is important, however, to step up discussions with the Chinese to allay concerns that they might have about the U.S. somehow taking advantage of North Korea’s behavior to introduce new weapons or otherwise to put additional pressure on China.
We need to commence some serious discussions with China, but I think we also need some serious discussions among ourselves to set what our priorities are, what our agenda is with China. I would respectfully suggest that if somebody wants to have a trade war with China, one should not expect at the same time to pursue robust measures against North Korea. The Chinese link all these things together.
TCB: Looking ahead, what are some of the key challenges facing the U.S. and the Trump administration on North Korea?
JD: With North Korea launching an IRBM at this time — with a new administration, certainly when the President is meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan — and the IRBM’s capabilities, which the North Koreans have published, are rather significant. Solid fuel, it’s a mobile system, apparently it was a successful launch, there’s an element of fungibility where some of their rocket capabilities could be transferred to an ICBM which could give the ICBM greater reach—go beyond 9,000km maybe up to 10 or 12,000km. An ICBM that can touch the whole of the United States rather than the West Coast. There are a lot of issues there.
The response is going to have to be somewhat significant. Sanctions are available, but also THAAD, the enhanced missile defense which goes not only into South Korea but into the region, intensifying the joint military exercises with the ROK, maybe a greater coordination between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan on not only intelligence but maybe eventually down the road, on military exercises. There is a menu of options available.
CH: They need to make sure the sanctions program can really put pressure on the regime and not just on the beleaguered North Korean people, because I’m not really sure their needs are necessarily filled by the regime. Secondly, I think it’s very important, and it’s related to the first point, it’s very important that we find a way to work with the Chinese on this problem and kind of clear the decks and have a better understanding of the Chinese. That’s problematic because of the rough start the Trump administration, in terms of the “One China Policy” but also the trade relations. And, finally, South Korea right now, they have a president who has been impeached and may well get convicted, that means a new election, that could mean electing new candidates who may not share completely our way of thinking on North Korea. So we need to watch that political situation very closely.
