Jim Schoff is a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Asia Program. Schoff spoke with The Cipher Brief about Japan’s new national security law and its implications within East Asia. He says that with the expansion of the Japanese Self Defense Forces, military planning and cooperation in East Asia is likely to improve.
The Cipher Brief: Can you put Japan’s new national security law into context for our readers? What does this mean for Japan both domestically and internationally? How do you expect nations within East Asia to respond?
Jim Schoff: I like to describe this package of laws (mostly amendments to previous laws) as historically incremental change. Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution prohibits "war potential" and the use of force to settle international disputes. Over the years, Japan has stretched its interpretation of what this means to allow for the means to provide for its self-defense, and to contribute to international peacekeeping or disaster relief operations, but always with strict limitations.
The new security legislation is historic because it crosses a line many thought unconstitutional before—that is, exercising its right of collective self-defense that all other nations share, which means it can come to the aid of an ally under attack, even if Japan itself is not directly attacked. But it is incremental because the exercise of this right is still rooted in self-defense. Japan can only do this if the conflict that involves its ally somehow directly threatens the lives and livelihood of the Japanese people.
Previously, Japan was prepared to help the United States in a North Korean contingency, for example, with so-called rear area support (medical, search and rescue, non-lethal logistical, etc.), while U.S. forces fought in the forward area. The new laws break down the concept of forward and rear area, and allow for a more integrated response with U.S. forces. But this is still within pretty strict legal and political limits, so although it means Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can plan and train more realistically with U.S. forces, it is still unlikely to become involved in skirmishes overseas.
Although South Korea is a bit wary of a more active SDF, for historical reasons defense officials recognize that this should help U.S. and Korean forces fight more effectively against the North in the modern day, if ever necessary. So there are benefits if good communication is maintained.
China is concerned that Japan could become more involved in regional security confrontations, which could complicate its calculations vis-a-vis the U.S. or other Southeast Asian nations, but for this reason many of those nations welcome Japan's changes (in places that are in danger of being bullied by China such as the Philippines, Vietnam, or Taiwan).
The biggest risks are overly high expectations in the U.S. or internationally about what Japan can do and then disappointment if Japan does not directly support the U.S., and the weak political support in Japan for getting more internationally active, leading to major backlash if SDF personnel are hurt in an expanded mission someplace like South Sudan during a peace keeping operation (PKO) mission that people do not think is vital for Japan's security. Japan's military capability and budget size are not changing significantly, so we should not expect drastic change.
TCB: What were Abe’s motivations in strengthening the Self Defense Forces? Should the U.S. be concerned or hopeful by this reform?
JS: The Abe administration and the Japanese government overall believe that the regional security environment has become more severe, primarily due to China's military expansion and coercive diplomacy, along with North Korean nuclear and missile development.
Japan also recognizes that the nature of warfare has changed such that waiting around to be attacked—by, say, a North Korean nuclear missile—doesn’t make sense. And if there is a very severe security crisis in the region that threatens Japan’s people in a direct and tangible way, then Japan ought to be able to work with the U.S. (and maybe others) more proactively to address the situation.
To me, the most important and relevant scenario is a North Korean contingency. After all, what does “forward area” and “rear area” mean when North Korea has nuclear missiles, or more and more submarines, or cyber attack capabilities?
The Abe administration is also trying to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance via this reform, and in this way strengthen the deterrence power of the alliance vis-a-vis China in particular. If there is more reciprocity in the alliance in terms of how each can help the other, then the alliance commitment is stronger. And if the commitment is stronger, then China has less opportunity to try to split the alliance with subtle pressure surrounding disputed territory and water in the East China Sea, for example.
The U.S. is hopeful by this reform, even if the Japanese people are less convinced that it is necessary. The Abe administration is convinced that this is necessary for the long-term security and independence of the nation, and it is willing to spend political capital to get it done. Abe believes the people will eventually become comfortable with this legislation and support it (as what happened with the PKO law in 1992).
TCB: Would you expect the expansion of the Self Defense Forces to have any economic impact in Japan? Would you expect any impact on Western weapons manufacturers, or any other Western industries?
JS: This will have very little impact on Japan's economy, because the defense budget and the SDF overall are not changing. Japan is increasing what weapons it is buying directly from the United States in order to obtain the most capable equipment at the best price, which will reduce the amount of licensed production of weapons that Japan conducts. Smaller defense manufacturers in Japan might suffer as a result, but the new laws are accompanied by a new policy that allows Japan's defense industry to sell overseas for the first time (albeit with many restrictions). Some Japanese firms (the largest, like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries or others) might find new opportunities to partner with Western firms or pursue new markets, but the overall impact on Japanese industry will be minor because defense industry is so small in Japan.
TCB: How do you see the expansion of the Self Defense Forces impacting the U.S.-Japan alliance in the future?
JS: From the U.S. perspective, these are probably the most significant bills since the SIASJ bill in 1999. They could significantly change the way that the allies cooperate in the security sphere. It should open up more meaningful and integrated, planning and cooperation. A more equal relationship will develop, on this front.
The alliance will not be defined by these new laws, because the alliance is much bigger than that and involves economic, foreign policy, and technology cooperation. But slightly expanding the limits of what the SDF can do should strengthen the relationship in the security sphere. The alliance should become more durable as a result of this, if it leads to more frequent collaboration in security coalitions in the future, but it also raises the stakes. If there is a conflict of some kind that we disagree about or goes badly, then it could put strain on the alliance. The political relationship between Japan and the U.S. will need to grow closer in order to make decisions that have strong political and operational accountability.
