President Donald Trump and his cabinet are now responsible for U.S. policy on one of Asia’s most contentious regions: The South China Sea. While China’s intentions to militarize the islands it claims have grown clearer—recent satellite imagery shows emplacements for anti-aircraft weaponry on the Spratly Islands— U.S. policy after the transition of power remains murky.
The secretary of state nominee, Rex Tillerson, said during his confirmation hearing that the United States is “…going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” Many thought the Secretary of State nominee misspoke, given the provocative implications.
However, when White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer was asked about the same issue, he replied, “I think the U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there. So it’s a question of, if those islands are in fact in international waters and are not part of China proper, then yeah, we’re going to make sure we defend international territories from being taken over by one country.” This has left many observers wondering whether this does in fact signal a more assertive U.S. policy in the South China Sea.
China may be most concerned of all, though its response has been muted. In reaction to Spicer’s comments, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, “I don’t think he is in a position to say that that’s international territory,” and a separate Foreign Ministry statement declared Beijing would "remain firm to defend its rights in the region."
For his part, Chinese President Xi Jinping has steered clear of the debate—a trend that may continue. At a CSIS event last week, Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, suggested that Xi would seek to avoid controversy with the U.S. ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress this fall. This important meeting is an opportunity for Xi to solidify power and elect new members to the politburo. While China may avoid confrontation in the short term, the United States’ recent statements may be an attempt to communicate a new take on an old policy.
The stance put forward by Tillerson and reiterated by Spicer could reflect a more assertive approach on an Obama administration policy. Bill Hayton, author of The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, highlights the unstated policy of the Obama administration that China should not begin land reclamation activities at Scarborough Shoal. The recent statements could be the Trump Administration telling China that if it begins island building on Scarborough Shoal, as it has done elsewhere in the South China Sea, the action would run afoul of the United States.
Scarborough Shoal is strategically important to the U.S. because it is also claimed by the Philippines, a U.S. ally, and its proximity to Subic Bay, a Filipino military base that is also used by the United States. For China, a military installation on Scarborough Shoal, in combination with its current facilities in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, would give it complete air defense and surveillance coverage over the South China Sea.
So far, the Trump administration’s approach to the South China Sea lacks what many experts see as essential: unambiguous language and action that demonstrates U.S. intentions. Historically, the United States has committed itself to the freedom of navigation by all vessels through international waters and demonstrated this through the use of routine Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS). However, this message was muddled during the Obama administration with the use of FONOPS to respond to China’s “excessive maritime claims,” even though China has not disrupted navigation through this critical trade route.
Retired Admiral Jonathan Greenert told The Cipher Brief “FONOPS is less effective when executed inconsistently, managed from D.C., and used as a singular messaging tool. Recent management of FONOPS’ episodes in the South China Sea interrupted the consistency of the program, confused some in the region with regard to intent, and instigated a perception that the program’s principles (freedom of navigation), are negotiable.” Greenert believes there should be a separate policy response to address China’s actions.
The risks and ramifications of miscommunication are dire. The large number of countries with territorial claims in the South China Sea, the variety of resources (oil, fishing, etc.), and the presence of two great powers produces a long list of potential flash points, such as harassing fisherman, building on Scarborough Shoal, or further militarization of the Spratlys, for instance. Zack Cooper, a fellow at CSIS, told The Cipher Brief, “one of the administration’s most urgent tasks should be to determine beforehand which of these actions it will attempt to deter.”
The South China Sea is where the United States and China both have vital interests that are at times at odds with one another. The ability for the two powers to coexist falls within a relatively small margin, and there is little room for error in signaling policy. Greenert believes the U.S. can avoid misunderstanding by providing “a clear and coherent strategy with a campaign plan defining [U.S.] ends, ways and means. Publish it. Regional allies, friends, and adversaries should all understand [U.S.] ends, and therefore [U.S.] intentions.” Absent this, the margin for error could get even smaller.
Will Edwards is an international producer at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @_wedwards.
