Over the past decade, Japan has had to deal with external threats, from Chinese assertiveness in the seas surrounding the island nation to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been making moves to give his country greater capabilities and flexibility to defend itself. The Cipher Brief’s Kaitlin Lavinder spoke with Sheila Smith, a senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, about Japan’s current defensive posture.
The Cipher Brief: Japan seems to be remilitarizing, after decades of emphasis on using non-military means to resolve international disputes. Is this an accurate assessment? If so, when did it start? Why?
Sheila Smith: Japan has not been remilitarizing. Rather it has continued its consistent effort to build defenses at or around the budgetary target of one percent of GDP. Compared to others in Asia, this is a small share of national wealth dedicated to military power, and it reflects the continued Japanese commitment to limiting its military power.
Perhaps it is useful to separate out two parts of your question. The first is the acquisition of military capabilities – and as I noted, this effort has been limited in Japan by a desire to provide solely for self defense. Nonetheless, Japan's military is one of Asia's most capable and is equipped with technologically sophisticated weaponry. Japan restricts itself to conventional weapons and continues to reject the nuclear option.
The second part of your question, however, has to do with the way in which Japanese think about using their military forces. This is changing. Since the end of the Cold War, military coalitions have become the norm for responding to global conflicts. Whether organized under UN peacekeeping missions or led by the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Japanese leaders have gradually accepted the idea that Japan ought to contribute to these multinational efforts to provide for collective security. Nonetheless, the Self Defense Force (SDF) is not deployed for combat abroad nor can it use its weapons freely once deployed into a coalition. Constraints on the use of force still hold, even though the Japanese largely see their military as a positive contribution to global security coalitions.
TCB: Japan recently reinterpreted Article 9 of its constitution to allow for collective self defense, which seems to mean that Japan could engage in offensive operations in the future. What does this mean in practice? What does it signal to the international community?
SS: This reinterpretation of Article 9 does not mean that Japan's military can engage in offensive operations. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet reinterpreted the constitution in 2014 to allow for collective self defense. This means that the SDF can be deployed alongside other militaries, most importantly the U.S. military, if Japan's security is threatened. The new security laws designed to implement this new interpretation were passed in 2015 and drew considerable domestic protest. The first mission under this new interpretation was to send the SDF to South Sudan. The SDF had very strict instructions as to how to use its weapons. It was allowed for the first time to protect civilians and to rescue others in the UN mission should they be subjected to attack, but it was not given permission to use its weapons against another army or military unit. In other words, it is still not allowed to enter into combat.
In theory, however, the Japanese military would be allowed to use force with the U.S. forces in and around Japan in the case of a conflict in Asia, should it threaten Japanese security.
TCB: Some people say that recent Japanese deployment with UN peacekeepers in an armed capacity is a huge shift in policy. Do you agree? Where are the Japanese UN peacekeepers deployed? And what does this signal?
SS: It is a considerable shift in policy. The South Sudan mission allowed, for the first time, the SDF to use force to protect itself and those under its protection. This came after many deployments with UN missions in which the SDF was not permitted even the most basic mission of using its weapons, should those around it be threatened. This is how carefully Japanese leaders are imposing constraints on their military abroad.
TCB: Are there other areas of tactical/operational military buildup on which Japan is working? Reuters reports that Japan will send its largest warship on a three-month tour through the South China Sea, beginning in May, in its “biggest show of naval force in the region since World War Two.”
SS: Japan's navy is the best in Asia. Since the early 1980s, it has taken on patrols along the sea lanes to its south, in an effort to share the mission of maritime security with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. More recently, in the wake of the Cold War, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force has taken on missions in the Persian Gulf, helping the U.S. and its coalition partners refuel in the Indian Ocean during the Iraq War and joining the international coalition of navies that patrol the Gulf of Aden in an anti-piracy mission. Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan has expanded its cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as with India, to improve regional maritime defenses.
The Izumo – the warship to which you referred – is indeed Japan's largest destroyer. It is helicopter-capable. It will visit ports across the region, including the Philippines and Singapore, and will exercise with the U.S. and India. This reflects Japan's growing concern about regional maritime security and its sense of responsibility for ensuring that international waters remain open and free. The U.S. has encouraged Asia's maritime powers to work collectively to demonstrate their interests in maritime stability as China's maritime presence has grown and as Chinese forces have challenged the maritime boundaries of many regional powers.
TCB: What is the public perception of Japan’s evolving military stance? Is the public engaged in defense/security conversations? Does it view recent events – like the constitution reinterpretation – as remilitarization?
SS: The Japanese public is highly sensitive to any policy initiative related to the use of force by the SDF, especially abroad. But it is important to recognize that many in Japan are concerned about nuclear and missile proliferation by North Korea and about the growing presence and pressures by China in and around Japanese waters. Of course, the territorial clash between Beijing and Tokyo over small islands in the East China Sea has intensified popular sensitivity, since China seems to be increasingly interested in changing the status quo through coercive means.
The Abe Cabinet has met with considerable criticism for its position on the constitution, and so the Japanese government will need to move slowly and cautiously if it seeks to increase its cooperation with other militaries. For direct threats, however, the Japanese people today are far more supportive of the SDF's efforts to defend their country. I would expect support for increased defensive capabilities but continued scrutiny of any effort to expand the SDF's role abroad.
TCB: What is the most important aspect of this question for the United States?
SS: It is important to remember that Japan is a non-nuclear power and a nation that for 70 years has moved slowly to adapt to external changes in its security environment. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the most widely supported instrument for handling any external threats to Japan. But as North Korea fires missiles closer and closer to Japanese waters, and as China continues its military expansion across Asia-Pacific waters, Japan will seek to enhance its own ability to defend itself in case of an attack. The U.S. and Japan will need to ensure that the alliance is capable of meeting these new challenges, and alliance policymakers will need to improve the U.S.-Japan deterrent so that these Japanese neighbors do not miscalculate Tokyo's military self-restraint.
