But Tehran is continuing to build up a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles in Iraq, a move that is being called out by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
As Iran continues to strategize regionally, Tehran is also dealing with thousands of protesters on its streets demanding lower fuel prices and economic reforms in a series of protests that have turned violent.
The Cipher Brief spoke with expert and former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule about recent events and whether any of it indicates that the U.S.’ maximum pressure campaign is working.
The Cipher Brief: How should we interpret Iran’s release of Princeton scholar Xiyue Wang? Is this an effort by Iran to show some flexibility in terms of its willingness to come to the table with the U.S.?
Roule: The release of the U.S. hostage Xiyue Wang is important for several reasons. First and foremost, an American citizen has been brought home to his family after three years of unjust detention. This is a cause for celebration and hope for the families of other U.S. hostages in Iran. Second, the Trump administration successfully managed what was no doubt a complex diplomatic process.
Several drivers likely lay behind Iran’s decision to approve this release. First, the deal involved an exchange, albeit not on the scale seen in the previous administration. Iran obtained the return of an academic convicted by the U.S. of sanctions violations. Tehran places some importance on being able to bring home those Iranians jailed for sanctions violations. Although we may have no choice but to accept the concept of such exchanges, some may say that doing so could encourage Iran’s security forces to detain more innocent Americans whenever they seek to obtain the release of an Iranian from the U.S.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI
It may be useful to recall that Iran’s President and Foreign Minister have little influence over judicial issues. Iran’s judiciary has long been managed by its most hardline officials and decisions on hostages require their approval as well as that of the Supreme Leader. This U.S. release of an Iranian detainee allows Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to demonstrate his effectiveness to hardliners who are among Iran’s most aggressive sanctions violators but often his most severe critics.
At the same time as the release of Mr. Xiyue Wang, Tehran released several other prisoners. I think it is likely Iran did so to soften its image at a time when its brutal response to demonstrators has turned world opinion against it.
The Cipher Brief: Does this mean that the U.S.’ ‘maximum pressure’ campaign is working? Do you believe this pressure is the main driver behind Iran’s protests?
Roule: Tehran likely authorized these releases at least in partial response to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign. When people think of how Iran will respond to U.S. sanctions pressure, they generally focus on acts of violence and expansion of its nuclear program. But Tehran also has a history of using softer tactics. We should remember that Iran hopes to reinforce fissures between U.S. and European decision makers. Tehran may well hope that the release of hostages will cause some in the U.S. and Europe to argue that sanctions relief might spur further gestures by Iran.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI
Tehran’s revolution has aged badly, and the ideology looks increasingly archaic in a region where populations in many countries are standing up against the sort of corruption, sectarianism, and ossified leadership so prevalent in Iran. Across the Persian Gulf, the Arab states are aggressively trying to overhaul their economies and base their success on technologies and markets currently denied to Iran. Their success stands in stark contrast to the economic and social stagnation felt by Iranians.
But we need to be careful not to overstate the extent of political entropy within Iran or underestimate the levels of coercion that Iran’s leaders will use to sustain power. The unprecedented violence and shut down of Iran’s national internet provide a glimpse of how far Iran’s hardliners will go to sustain their hold on power. There has been no sign of disloyalty by Iran’s security forces. The regime is likely to ensure resources continue to flow to the IRGC, military, and other security forces although Iran’s rampant inflation will gnaw at their budgets.
The Cipher Brief: What does this mean for Iran regionally?
Roule: Regionally, Iran’s gains are under severe and growing pressure on all fronts. Protests in Iraq against Iran – which include repeated attacks against Iran’s Najaf consulate must be particularly galling to Iran’s leadership given the deep Qods Force investment in the country, the proximity of the violence to Iran, and the similarity of protestor complaints to those voiced by Iran’s own restive population. A combination of Arab coalition military pressure and Saudi use of its hitherto unsuccessful back channels with the Houthis offer hope that the terrible Yemen conflict may end. It seems that the Houthis - who have never been a monolith of decision making – may be considering a political settlement. Riyadh will likely offer a generous settlement to end the conflict, but only if it can obtain guarantees that peace won’t bring an Iranian threat in Yemen similar to that faced by Israel in Syria. I believe that Tehran will discourage a political settlement. The Yemen conflict is not only relatively inexpensive for Iran, but a hold on the Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea is not something the Qods Force will easily relinquish. Some say that Yemen represents “low-hanging fruit” in a settlement with Iran, but I never see a footnote to justify this claim. Looking north, the unrest in Iraq and Lebanon has been provoked by broad political failures which are, at least in part, exacerbated by Iran’s persistent interference.
Looking forward, I would make two points. First, Iran’s inability to solve its problems at home mean that it has nothing to offer abroad beyond weapons and cash. Tehran will need to hope that this will be enough to sustain partners until the current wave of protests ends. The recent reports of Iran’s transfer of missiles to Iraq and the seizure of yet another arms shipment to Yemen remind us that Iran has plenty of weapons to deliver. At the same time, sanctions have cut deeply into Iran’s available funding for its proxies and partners. However, the bottom line remains that unrest in Syria and Lebanon has yet to reach the point where deep structural political change is obvious-particularly that which would threaten Iran’s influence. No one yet believes that Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah will be extinct anytime soon. As protests continue, the Qods Force will encourage the same sort of harsh crackdown the world witnessed recently in Iran.
The Cipher Brief: What does success against Iran look like without ‘maximum pressure’?
Roule: Well, first, this depends entirely on what you call “success.” Do you define success solely in terms of restricting Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon? Those who do so are the loudest voices calling for the U.S. return to the Iran nuclear deal.
Should we try to roll back Iran in the region to its pre-2011 (or in the case of Iraq, 2003) status? How aggressive should we be in responding to Iran’s efforts to establish new versions of Hezbollah in the region and its actions which exacerbate conflicts that impact the lives of millions, to include thousands of Americans in the region? To what extent do you believe we should respond to Iran’s vast stable of missiles? No other regional state has a missile stable close to that of Iran which sees missiles both as defense and as power projection, so simply calling for a regional missile deal won’t work.
We sometimes hear calls for a regional de-escalation which sounds attractive until you try to come up with specifics as to exactly what Israel and other countries are supposed to stop doing in return for Iranian concessions.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI
Certainly, Iran should play an important role in regional actions responding to environmental, refugee, drug, and seismic problems. But Iran’s hardliners are likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future. Meaningful social and political change in Iran may require decades. Until positive change occurs, how will we deal with malign adventurism which impacts our regional partners and the Americans living in these countries? Is it reasonable to ask our regional partners to share the region with Iran if doing so really means sharing it with the Qods Force? What does it say about American values if we are perceived as endorsing Iran’s hold on the region?
Our resources are not limited, and the American people are weary of Middle East conflicts and dealing with intractable regional political disputes. We also need to shift resources to deal with a rising China, an increasingly aggressive Russia, as well as such issues as climate change. It is easy to argue for a rightsizing or reduction of America’s role in the region.
Those who argue for a withdrawal from the region offer few specifics on what we will do to insulate ourselves from developments in a region where events often touch U.S. strategic equities. There are no easy or inexpensive answers here, but we should be honest about the likely consequences of our actions – or non-actions.
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