EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Chinese President Xi Jinping opened the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on Sunday with a speech that makes clear where his party stands on its future ambitions, to include the reunification of the self-governing island of Taiwan.
Xi, who is expected to seek an unprecedented third term as leader of the party, said “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the upmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary. The wheels of history are tolling on towards China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without a doubt, de realized.”
Xi’s position on Taiwan, along with US President Joe Biden’s comments that he would use the US military to defend Taiwan against invasion, seem to be setting the stage for a face-off.
BACKGROUND
- House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August, the highest-level U.S. visit in the past 25 years, provoked condemnation from China, which called the visit a threat to peace and stability.
- Beijing responded by launching war exercises in the Taiwan Strait that included missiles landing in waters surrounding the island as well as Chinese planes crossing the line that divides the island from mainland China.
- President Joe Biden recently told CBS’ 60 Minutes that the U.S. military would defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion saying, “We agree with what we signed onto a long time ago. And that there’s one China policy, and Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. We are not moving – we’re not encouraging their being independent. We’re not – that – that’s their decision.”
- Multiple observers, and Beijing, have interpreted the comments as a clear shift in U.S. policy. Exactly how much has changed from the U.S.’ long-held “strategic ambiguity” posture is still unclear.
- What's at stake beyond the ability for Taiwan to choose its own path forward? "Taiwan is the U.S.’ ninth largest trading partner with $90.6 billion in two-way trade," says former senior representative for the Australian High Commission Liesl Jordan. "The disruption to supply chains during COVID-19 for critical technology components manufactured in Taiwan, e.g. semiconductors, went to the heart of the U.S. economy and had a direct impact on its ongoing health."
With tensions clearly rising over Taiwan’s future, The Cipher Brief turned to a range of deeply experienced experts for their perspectives on the scope and significance of where the U.S. and China stand on Taiwan today.
THE EXPERTS
Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University
Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he has taught for five decades. He is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. Allison was the “Founding Dean” of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and is the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?
Ambassador Joe DeTrani, Former Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.
Liesl Jordan, Former Senior Security Representative for the Australian High Commission
Liesl Jordan served as the Australian Government's senior security representative for the Australian High Commission in London from 2012 - 2016. Ms. Jordan is now CEO of Connect2Effect, a consulting firm assisting international companies in navigating and positioning technologies in Australia, Southeast Asia, and the Indo-Pacific region.
Dennis Wilder, Research Fellow, Georgetown University's Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues
Dennis Wilder is a Research Fellow at Georgetown University's Initiative for U.S-China Dialogue on Global Issues. Wilder served as National Security Council's (NSC) director for China (2004-2005) and then as the NSC special assistant to the president and senior director for East Asian affairs from 2005 to 2009. From 2015 to 2016 Wilder served as the CIA’s deputy assistant director for East Asia and the Pacific.
THE PERSPECTIVE
The Cipher Brief: Although the Administration has denied a change in China-Taiwan policy, what would be the implications of jettisoning “strategic ambiguity,” and how is China likely to respond?
Allison: Big picture is, we should realize that up against the canvas of history, the likelihood is that this rivalry between the U.S. and China ends in war, a really catastrophic war. Now that's an unpleasant thought for people today, seven decades after no great world war. Many people think great wars are obsolete so that couldn't happen again. I don't believe that for a second. I believe that this is a remarkable achievement these past seven decades that cannot be taken for granted, cannot be complacent about. And that if we think about the U.S./China rivalry, the most natural outcome will be a catastrophic war.
Secondly, the fastest track to that war is Taiwan. And as one watches the dynamics both in China and in the U.S., domestic political furies in the U.S., in which each party is competing to show that it's not softer on China than the opposition. And in China, nationalism that is becoming ever more assertive saying, "Well, why should we not be ruling our own territory? Why should it be acting the way Hong Kong was acting before? It shouldn't. We should resolve this issue."
So, that combination of factors I think is making it exceedingly more dangerous.
DeTrani: President Biden's third declarative statement that U.S. forces would defend Taiwan has displaced a policy of "strategic ambiguity." China has criticized Mr. Biden's statements, citing previous commitments from the United States — the Shanghai Communique of 1972 — that the issue of reunification would be managed solely by China and Taiwan. No doubt China is using senior diplomatic channels to gain greater clarity on the president's comments and if, indeed, U.S. policy has changed, and the U.S. is in fact committed to using men and women for the defense of Taiwan.
Concurrently, China will intensify efforts to ensure that their military - naval, missile, air and ground forces - will prevail if there is conflict with the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait — a fourth Taiwan strait incident. Neighboring countries, like Japan and Australia, will be supportive of Mr. Biden's unambiguous support to Taiwan, to include using its military to defend Taiwan. Other countries in the region will be concerned that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait could spread and affect their economic and political relations with China and the U.S. And more broadly, all countries will be concerned with the potential use of nuclear weapons, either intentionally or accidentally.
Wilder: Jettisoning “strategic ambiguity” has large implications as it has been part of a carefully nuanced U.S. policy on the Taiwan question that has served the United States, Taiwan, and the East Asian region well for decades. Strategic ambiguity is part of an American deterrence and assurance strategy that has kept China from taking coercive action toward Taiwan ever since the normalization of US-China relations. Beijing is likely to see a shift away from strategic ambiguity as part of a larger set of moves in the past few years to step away from a one China policy to a one China, one Taiwan policy. These moves increase the chances that Beijing will conclude that peaceful reunification is not possible, that time is not on Beijing’s side and that it must act with military force to stop independence.
Jordan: President Biden’s statement on 23 May in Tokyo brought into question America’s adherence to a policy of strategic ambiguity on China and Taiwan but fell far short of transforming it into a policy of strategic clarity. Biden’s advisers were quick to point out that despite Biden’s comments that the U.S. would defend Taiwan against an attack from China, these were off-the-cuff comments. It’s unlikely that Biden – a foreign policy incrementalist – would be looking now to make a shift in the U.S.’ pragmatic approach to a four-decade long policy.
U.S. hawkishness on this issue would leave countries like Japan and Australia in a difficult position, especially if Taiwan were to feel emboldened enough to declare independence. That said, like the U.S., Australia under the most recent former Liberal government and now under the recently elected Labor Government, has seen a whittling away of our own policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of clearer statements of intent, which support a global rules-based order, whether that be over China’s approach to Taiwan or Russia's in Ukraine.
The Cipher Brief: What are the U.S. motivations for a guarantee of U.S. military involvement in defending Taiwan against an “unprecedented attack” by China?
Allison: I don't think that if you ask Americans, would they be prepared to fight a war with China for Taiwan…I think you might find 15 percent of people who would say they're prepared to fight for Taiwan, not more, if they understood the consequences. So, what this is about is not having a war with China for Taiwan, it's trying to persuade China through a strategy of deterrence that it's better to let the game play out longer than trying to move to change the situation in the short run.
And I think as long as we don't present Xi Jinping with a binary choice between humiliation and attack, he'll continue letting the game play out because he's got a big agenda. He's got 10 things to do, this one doesn't have to be done today. So maybe how about 2049? Or 2039, or longer. So, I think our objective should be to play the game out over a longer period of time, because we'll all change, we'll be smarter, circumstances will be different.
If we want to have a war with China, there's hardly an area in the world in which the advantages to China are greater and the disadvantages to us larger.
DeTrani: Hopefully, a clear declaratory statement that the U.S. will defend Taiwan if China invades Taiwan will serve as a strong "deterrent", thus motivating China to seek a "peaceful" resolution of issues with Taiwan.
Wilder: Those who are for guaranteeing U.S. involvement have concluded that China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan means that the chances that China will take the risky step of invading Taiwan have increased. By guaranteeing U.S. intervention they believe they can make President Xi think twice about any aggressive military actions.
Jordan: The dangers of facing off against China over Taiwan have never been higher; however, inaction by the U.S. in the face of an increasingly aggressive China also carries great risk. First and foremost, the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan has wider implications for continued credibility of U.S. strategic commitments in the Asia Pacific region. The U.S. is still seen as the guarantor of peace and stability on the region and a failure to step in over Taiwan may cause other countries to reconsider their own strategic relationships if they saw a real or perceived shift in the global order.
Cipher Brief Senior Editor Ken Hughes contributed to this report.
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