OPINION — Spain's recent decision to award Huawei a contract worth €12.3 million to manage and store legally authorized wiretaps raises significant concerns about the country's commitment to digital sovereignty. This move jeopardizes Spain’s national security and undermines the trust that is essential for the intelligence-sharing frameworks of the European Union and NATO.
While Huawei has made considerable efforts to demonstrate technical compliance with European standards, the political reality is more complicated: any sensitive system it builds is, by default, subject to exploitation by Beijing. Huawei is subject to China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law and cannot credibly claim complete independence from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) security and intelligence apparatus. Despite this, Madrid’s procurement process proceeded as if the controversy around Huawei had no bearing on the domain of sensitive state surveillance networks.
This episode highlights the lack of clear institutional safeguards in Europe and among transatlantic allies for assessing foreign vendors in critical intelligence systems. While the EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox has guided member states regarding telecommunications infrastructure, there is no similar framework for the technologies that support law enforcement and intelligence operations. The result is fragmentation: some countries exclude Huawei on national security grounds, while others invite it to manage their surveillance backbones.
This divergence is not sustainable in an environment that requires intelligence sharing to stay ahead of adversaries.
Spain’s SITEL Contract is Effectively A Security Breach
Spain’s wiretap system, SITEL, functions as the core for Spanish law enforcement and intelligence wiretap activities, storing sensitive data about targets involved in terrorism, organized crime, and even foreign espionage.
Huawei is technically capable of managing such a system, but under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, the company is compelled to cooperate with Chinese intelligence services. This creates a constant vulnerability in any critical infrastructure that Huawei or any PRC company operates abroad. However, Spain's procurement process treated Huawei's bid as if it were a neutral supplier.
Political factors have also shaped Madrid's decision. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's government has aimed to strengthen economic ties with China, seeking investment and technological collaboration. This approach has caused Spain to clash with several EU states that have taken a more cautious stance toward Huawei in telecom infrastructure. There is also unease within Spain; reports indicate that officials from the national police and Guardia Civil have expressed concerns about depending on a Chinese vendor for such a sensitive role.
Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.
Bribery, Backdoors, and Alarm in Belgium
Belgium’s State Security Service (VSSE) added Huawei to a watchlist in 2023 due to concerns about potential espionage. The country’s cybersecurity agency later banned Huawei from 5G networks used in critical sectors after detecting unusual data traffic patterns at a Brussels telecom hub.
The “Generation” bribery scandal worsened these concerns. Members of the European Parliament accepted lavish perks from lobbyists linked to Huawei, raising fears that influence operations had penetrated EU regulatory bodies. This incident eroded public trust and showed how corruption scandals can weaken vendor neutrality.
Belgium’s swift and decisive response demonstrates a security-first approach, which should be adopted across the EU and transatlantic alliance. In contrast, Spain’s SITEL contract indicates either a gap in awareness or a willingness to take risks that could affect Europe’s shared security framework.
Diverging National Paths Across Alliances
The approach to Huawei varies further across Europe. Greece demonstrates how economic dependence can override security concerns — the country chose Huawei as a key provider for its telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei has even offered discounted equipment and “training centers” for Greek engineers to strengthen this relationship further. However, leaked documents in 2024 revealed that Huawei provided perks to Greek officials to secure these contracts.
Elsewhere in Europe, Huawei maintains a significant market share in Germany’s 5G infrastructure despite pressure from the U.S. and the EU to choose a different path. Berlin adopted a pragmatic integration strategy and argued that excluding Huawei would incur prohibitive costs and delay 5G deployment. Germany has imposed limited restrictions on Huawei in specific networks, but the company nonetheless remains central to its telecom infrastructure.
These divergent national approaches illustrate Europe’s fractured response. Greece and Germany focused on cost and speed, while Belgium emphasized national security, leaving the EU without a unified strategy.
Conflict-Zone Dynamics
Recent patterns emerging from conflict zones further emphasize the urgent need for a unified security policy. In Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, local populations and military operations are increasingly served by unauthorized mobile operators using Russian and potentially Chinese-supplied infrastructure. These networks—established in Crimea, Donbas, and southern Ukraine—are not only illegal under international law but also structurally opaque, enabling surveillance, population control, and disinformation on a large scale. Evidence indicates that Chinese vendors have been involved in providing equipment to these unauthorized operators, either directly or through intermediaries. In Crimea, for example, existing infrastructure was reportedly transformed using Russian intercept technology (SORM), raising concerns that Chinese equipment may have aided these transitions.
This reality exposes a significant blind spot in current EU and NATO frameworks. If hostile actors can take over infrastructure built with Chinese components during war, it is naive to think the same systems would stay secure during peacetime or under foreign pressure. The lesson is clear: infrastructure is deeply tied to geopolitical goals. Allowing vendors linked to authoritarian regimes to operate within the backbone of democratic intelligence or law enforcement systems not only compromises sovereignty but also offers adversarial regimes chances to exploit legal ambiguities and technical backdoors in moments of crisis.
The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.
NATO’s Oversight Gap with Intelligence Systems
NATO started assessing Huawei’s risks to telecommunications networks as early as 2019 and has issued warnings about supply chain vulnerabilities. However, the alliance’s guidance remains focused on telecommunications rather than surveillance and intelligence systems. This gap in oversight is significant. Intelligence-sharing within NATO depends on the secure handling of sensitive data. If one member state allows a high-risk vendor to operate its interception system, it creates a weakest-link problem that undermines trust. With adversaries mainly relying on hybrid threats, which exploit economic and technological channels to weaken the alliance, Huawei’s presence in SITEL is a glaring vulnerability.
Why Binding Guardrails Matter
Intelligence sharing fundamentally depends on mutual assurances. The EU and NATO operate on the assumption that member states follow similar security standards. When one state diverges, it jeopardizes the effectiveness of the entire group. This creates a real risk, as adversaries can exploit these gaps to breach shared systems and compromise allied operations.
The debate over Huawei is not just about technology; it is about the integrity of Europe’s intelligence infrastructure. Without enforceable standards, Europe’s goals for strategic autonomy will be undermined by compromises and strategic divisions.
Policy Prescriptions: Binding EU & NATO Mechanisms
- Codify Vendor Exclusion Policies: The European Commission should formalize its 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox from a voluntary framework into a binding directive, at least concerning intelligence infrastructure. This regulation must require the exclusion of vendors subject to foreign intelligence laws from operating within critical national security systems.
- Align NATO procurement standards: NATO must implement a collective security standard that requires member States to vet vendors for potential State influence and espionage risks.
- Support Member-State Transitions: For countries already relying on high-risk vendors, the EU and NATO should provide transition assistance to subsidize migration to trusted suppliers. This approach balances security needs with economic realities.
- Enhance Transparency in Intelligence Procurement: Member States should share sanitized risk assessments for major intelligence infrastructure contracts with other member State services whose security relies on them. Transparency enables allied oversight and strengthens democratic accountability.
Conclusion
Spain’s Huawei contract highlights a deeper problem: the lack of binding standards to safeguard Europe’s intelligence infrastructure. Procurement policy is a matter of national security. As hybrid threats grow and alliances face unprecedented pressure, EU and NATO leaders must act to address this critical gap. Without enforceable guidelines, the trust that underpins Europe’s security framework is in jeopardy.
Europe’s credibility hinges on its ability to align its intelligence infrastructure with alliance standards; otherwise, it risks increasing strategic division.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
