Five months have passed since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar on June 5 over allegations that Doha is supporting terrorism and that it embraces Iran and its regional agenda.
The dispute is not only the most significant of its kind since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, but threatens President Donald Trump’s principal foreign policy success: his historic address to the U.S.-Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh, where he called for Arab unity against Iran’s regional agenda and joint efforts to defeat extremism.
Seeking to personally resolve the crisis, Trump met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in New York during the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September, where he emphasized that that the crisis “would be solved pretty quickly” but did not provide additional details. Just before that, and immediately after hosting the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, at the White House, Trump brokered a phone call between Tamim and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as part of an effort to resolve the standoff.
The détente generated by the Trump-initiated phone call between Qatar and Saudi Arabia lasted for about an hour before it collapsed over the interpretation of a Qatari statement over who had initiated the Saudi-Qatar call and how to proceed with a reconciliation process.
Washington’s efforts to resolve the crisis have been spearheaded by the U.S. secretaries of state and defense who have sought to advance a diplomatic process that would bring the crisis to an end while ensuring that U.S. military operations in the region faced minimal disruption over the standoff.
Trump’s personal involvement suggests that the standoff between Washington’s key Gulf partners is disrupting the U.S. regional agenda, which explains his decision to intervene.
Qatar is home to the al-Udeid Air Base, the forward headquarters of Central Command, which oversees the U.S.-led coalition’s bombing campaign of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and maintains a direct line to Russia to manage Syria’s crowded skies. Bahrain is the home of the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and crucial bases for its campaign against ISIS, as well as the war in Afghanistan.
From a U.S. perspective, the GCC is not only a strategic partner, but as a bloc it has significant potential when it comes to strengthening both economic and security cooperation. Together, the six nations can also strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation and help to raise funds for the strategic effort to stabilize Iraq in the post-ISIS environment.
A Suspended GCC
Since the crisis first erupted, the GCC has for all practical purposes been suspended as no meetings have taken place since June. Not a single statement been issued on the crisis by the GCC Secretary General, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani, which not only suggests that no organizational mechanism has been established to solve the matter – or any future conflict – but that the dispute is between Qatar versus Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain.
Kuwait’s decision to actively mediate between the parties could also be considered its own insurance policy against being forced to pick sides. Oman, meanwhile, remains an outlier within the GCC and remains supportive of the Kuwaiti role.
While the annually scheduled GCC foreign ministers meeting during the sidelines of the UNGA summit was canceled, there are nevertheless unconfirmed reports that suggest that Kuwait is moving ahead with issuing invitations for the next GCC summit in December. It is well-understood that no summit would take place unless all GCC leaders commit to attending.
But the split within the GCC had become evident during the lead up the Riyadh Summit in May.
Following Trump’s address to the U.S.-Arab-Islamic Summit, he inaugurated a counter terrorism center – which all GCC members signed onto, even though Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman had not been informed about the center prior to the Riyadh summit. It is also unclear whether Bahrain was informed about the matter, but it is assumed that the UAE was, as its ambassador in Washington is believed to have lobbied for Trump to pay Saudi Arabia his first visit as president.
It is, of course, also possible that the information about the center was not shared with the remaining GCC members in question due to the U.S. Administration’s inexperience with diplomatic processes and lack of familiarity with internal Gulf dynamics in particular.
Needless to say, how a solution to the crisis can found is bound to impact Gulf dynamics for decades to come: Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, 32, Emir Tamim, 37, and UAE’s Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, 56, and de-facto ruler, are all young – but with competing visions for the region – and are expected to rule well into the future, maybe for decades to come.
Unless the core issues of this crisis are dealt with accordingly – which center on the role of political Islam, political participation, and competing visions for a regional security – tensions between Abu Dhabi and Doha in particular could once again trigger hostilities.
Ali Shihabi, the Washington-based executive director of the Arabia Foundation and a Saudi scholar familiar with the thinking of the Saudi leadership, provided his own assessment of how the standoff could be resolved, saying, “The crisis will end when Qatar reaffirms its commitment to abide by the agreements it signed with the quartet in 2013/2014 and this is ‘witnessed’ by the United States so Qatari compliance is supervised by a third party (with influence over Qatar).”
This narrative alleges that Doha has through its foreign policy contributed to exacerbating regional instability, especially during the post-Arab Spring environment, by supporting regional Islamist groups.
Also commenting on the 2013/2014 agreement, Kuwaiti scholar Hamad Althunayyan suggested in an analysis published by Al Jazeera that Saudi grievances pertaining to Doha’s alleged failure to live up to the last GCC agreement centered on three principal demands.
“Ejecting Muslim Brotherhood leadership as well as other prominent figures from Doha, neutralizing the Qatari media, especially Al Jazeera, towards the Gulf states and Egypt and molding Qatar's regional policies so they do not collide with Saudi/Emirati interests,” Althunayyan wrote.
From a Qatari perspective, the crisis was never about terrorism financing allegations but about its independent foreign policy. Doha also feared that the initial 13 demands presented by the Quartet were not a negotiation gambit but an imposition meant to curtail its sovereignty. Qatar has maintained that it is open to negotiations but the parties remain deadlocked over how to proceed.
In Search of a Solution
Signaling support for Qatar, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis made an unannounced visit to Doha on September 28 where he met with Tamim and his Qatari counterpart at the Al-Udaid airbase. Following his visit, The Associated Press reported on October 6 that the U.S. military has halted some exercises with its Gulf partners over the ongoing diplomatic crisis which specifically targeted the ongoing U.S.-UAE exercise entitled “Iron Union 5.” It is also expected that the cutback will impact the annual Eagle Resolve exercise in which the U.S. and its GCC partners work together as a multinational force in a simulated battle.
Washington’s decision to cancel the joint exercises comes as the parties to the conflict have failed to respond to Tillerson’s diplomatic initiatives and to Trump’s respective statements in particular to negotiate an end to the crisis.
By scaling back on the military exercises with its Gulf partners, Washington is signaling that it can – and is willing – to deliver tangible pressure on the various parties to bring an end to the standoff. If the opposing parties fail to engage in de-escalatory measures, it is conceivable that U.S. intelligence and military cooperation on Yemen – with Saudi Arabia and UAE – could be reduced next, which would be considered an incremental escalation by Washington and could run in parallel with the suspension of future exercises.
“There are other actions the U.S. could take, such as suspending staff talks and country visits, but these are likely to damage American interests as much as the targeted countries... A superpower always finds it has the least leverage with its own partners, sadly,” said former Pentagon official and Associate Professor at the National Defense University David Des Roches said,
Should these measures fail to deliver a diplomatic breakthrough, Trump could suspend high-level bilateral meetings, including those for heads of states, but it is unlikely that this would be his preferred choice as he has publicly touted his friendship with King Salman (who is scheduled to visit the White House in January 2018), Emir Tamim, and Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait.
On whether the Pentagon would consider withholding U.S. defense sales to the Gulf as part of an effort to pressure the parties, Des Roches referred to King Salman’s recent visit to Moscow, and observed, “The last few days show that the ability of the U.S. to force a GCC settlement is extremely limited. The strongest potential tool Washington had was the ability to hold up weapons sales. When Saudi Arabia indicated it would buy a Russian air defense system, however, the hold [placed by Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bob Corker (R-Tennessee)] on the sale of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) was lifted.”
In light of the 80-year old U.S.-Saudi strategic alliance, which has not only survived the tumultuous aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, but even thrived over the ensuing decade as Washington and Riyadh drew closer over shared security concerns, it would be a mistake to assume that Salman’s visit to Moscow was a gesture meant to balance Washington off Moscow. But rather, the visit was tied to Riyadh’s long-term objective to strengthen its bilateral relationship with Moscow.
But an even better way to forge GCC reconciliation is to host a joint U.S.-GCC counter-ISIS strategy conference at Al Udaid, which draws the wayward partners into a recognition of the value of cooperation and that the failure of a unified GCC would only benefit the spread of extremist groups in the region. This would have the added benefit of maintaining pressure on the parties themselves to resolve the GCC crisis.
Rather than using sticks to resolve the crisis, unconfirmed reports suggest that the U.S. Administration – in cooperation with Kuwait – is pushing for a GCC summit at Camp David in December. It is unclear, however, whether this would take place instead of the GCC summit in Kuwait or whether a Camp David meeting would officially be tied to the Kuwait summit.
During his visit to the Gulf, Tillerson in July, he presented a set of principles that unite the GCC, which include non-interference, protection of sovereignty, and state-funded media not attacking other countries.
By presenting his “six principles” that all parties could agree to, which also built on a separate set of principles that Trump had laid out at the Riyadh summit, Tillerson sought to break up the initial list of the 13 demands the Quartet had issued to Qatar to end the crisis. Similarly, by extending the initial deadline with another 14 days, Tillerson once again sought to reduce the demand list.”
Regardless, by pushing a solution to the crisis, a U.S.-GCC summit at Camp David would also provide an opportunity to settle the long-standing Gulf dispute as Washington could establish a subcommittee dealing with each of Tillerson’s six principles.
Each subcommittee could be chaired by either a Kuwait or Omani envoy and provide a forum for the opposing parties to negotiate directly.
Once a compromise to all of the outstanding issues has been found, Washington would have to provide assurances that any unilateral action by a GCC member against another would not be tolerated. Towards that end, Trump, along with the GCC monarchs, could hammer out a framework for how to address future disputes.
Finally, by hammering out the outstanding issues between Qatar and the Quartet, Washington could upgrade the 2013/2014 GCC agreement by including the changes, which would provide a face saving mechanism for all of the disputing parties.
