China’s militarization of the South China Sea includes beefing up its military facilities on Woody Island in the Paracel chain – occupied by China but also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam – where the Chinese reportedly just deployed eight batteries of its advanced, long-range HQ-9 air defense system. This is the latest step by Beijing to deploy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to complicate or disrupt U.S. power projection in the Western Pacific.
Seen against this backdrop, the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands seems like an open and shut case from a U.S. national security perspective: Japan is a U.S. treaty ally, the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan, and Article 5 of the treaty stipulates in part that, “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”
In a parallel case, the U.S. approach to Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories (several islands north of Hokkaido which Russia seized in the final days of WWII) has long been clear and straightforward: “The United States supports Japan on the Northern Territories issue and recognizes Japanese sovereignty over the islands (from a public State Department background note on Japan).” In the case of the Northern Territories, the U.S. actually encouraged Japan to pursue a territorial dispute, as a means of bolstering Japanese motivation to participate in the Cold War coalition against the Soviet Union.
In contrast, after things flared up again between Japan and China in the Senkaku Island dispute in 2012, the U.S. under the Obama Administration was initially reluctant to come down decisively on the side of Japan – and when it did, only with disclaimers about the ultimate disposition of the islands. This inconsistency in U.S. policy has been all too obvious to Japanese policymakers and reflects in part the Obama Administration’s concerns about alienating Beijing, as well as its political coolness towards the conservative Abe Administration.
In a September 3, 2012 email just released by the State Department from Hillary Clinton’s private email server, as forwarded to Secretary Clinton by a third party, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell reported that Japan would purchase the Senkaku Islands from a private owner, nationalizing them. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae (now ambassador to the U.S.) assured Campbell that “China actually understands the necessity of these actions and will accept them.” However, Campbell reported, “I’m not so sure.”
In fact, tensions immediately arose between China and Japan over this move; the initial U.S. response was generally tepid. U.S. officials were careful to emphasize that the U.S. does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands, using such terms as “neutral,” while acknowledging in muted tones that Article 5 would come into force if China used its military to seize them. The U.S. also called upon the “claimants to resolve the issue through peaceful means among themselves,” morally equating a regional rival with a treaty ally.
Given the Obama Administration’s foot-dragging, in November 2012 the U.S. Senate unanimously approved an amendment to the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act stating the Senkaku Islands fall under the scope of the defense treaty with Japan, and the U.S. would defend Japan in the event of armed attacks.
Amidst continuing military tensions, in January 2013, Secretary Clinton finally stated that “we oppose any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the islands (during remarks to the press with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida).
By November 2013, China ratcheted up the pressure by announcing the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone" – including the Senkaku Islands – and stated it would require aircraft entering the zone to file a flight plan and submit radio frequency or transponder information.
Yet, it was only in April 2014, a year and a half after tension escalated between China and Japan over the islands, that President Barack Obama, in advance of his Japan trip, finally told the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper unambiguously, “The policy of the United States is clear—the Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. And we oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.”
It could be argued that the U.S. had helped preserve its relationship with Beijing through its nuanced approach. However, relative U.S. passivity may well have encouraged China to take a more aggressive approach to the territorial dispute than it would have in the face of a more determined, clear, and unambiguous U.S. indication of support for its treaty ally, Japan. Far from serving as an effective deterrent to Chinese aggression, the net effect may well have been destabilizing. Moreover, U.S. failure to strongly back up an ally may have had a deleterious demonstration effect on other U.S. allies in the region facing similar territorial disputes with China, and indirectly encouraged China to continue on its present path of militarization and confrontation in the South China Sea.
Going forward, the U.S. Government would be well served by recognizing that support for its treaty allies in the South China Sea strengthens deterrence, while ambivalence in the face of aggression will make not only Japan, but all U.S. treaty allies, question whether the U.S. is a reluctant ally upon which they cannot fully rely.
