Cipher Brief Expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey is Visiting Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London and is a former senior member of the British Foreign Office.
OPINION — It was hardly a surprise, but it was shocking nonetheless. President Trump tweeted late last week; “We should have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!”
The 109-character message undermined the work of U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and his negotiations in Qatar with the Taliban. The State Department has been quick to reassure allies that the original timelines still apply but the seeds of doubt have been sown. The theory that the United States could use its withdrawal date as leverage never made much sense. Both the Taliban and Pakistan, (both of which will have read John Bolton’s memoir, The Room Where it Happened) know full well that Trump and the State Department cannot wait to get out of Afghanistan. By contrast, the Pentagon and the US military have found it hard to argue the case for staying against a popular weariness in the US for the 19 year-old war.
There are few things more humiliating than pursuing a ‘conditions-based’ process when your opponent repeatedly flouts the conditions, as the Taliban have done with lethal attacks, which included one on the Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh on 9th September which killed 10 people. But even that was not enough for Khalilzad to cancel the talks and in recent days, the Taliban have increased their operations in Helmand Province. They are acting with almost complete impunity except that they are avoiding US targets.
Apologists have been suggesting that the Taliban operate a highly decentralised model and that some units may be unaware of the commitment made on 29th February in Qatar. This is misleading. The Taliban may have some mediaeval features but these do not extend to their communications. Over the past two decades, they have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to respond promptly and effectively to new orders from Quetta.
Another explanation is that Pakistan has lost its grip on the Afghan Taliban. One example is Abdul Basit’s piece on 25th September in The Interpreter titled, ‘Intra Afghan talks and future of Pakistan-Taliban relations’. Although many of the Taliban resent the Pakistan Army, which they regard as a Punjabi institution, they know that they need Pakistan to sanction the use of territory in Balochistan for leadership presence and for fighters to rest, rehabilitate, rearm and train. This arrangement has been crucial ever since NATO deployed to the South of Afghanistan in 2006.
Furthermore, the Haqqani network, which is part of the wider Taliban, is a highly-disciplined and effective organisation which regards itself as distinct and even affects a mild disdain for its Taliban brothers (much as Special Forces worldwide exhibit similar condescension towards regular infantry). Its loyalty to Pakistan dates back to the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s and was rewarded by being spared any serious harm when the Pakistan Army launched its ‘sweep’ of North Waziristan in 2014.
So, what will now happen? Much depends on who wins the US election on 3rd November. If President Trump wins, he might wish to stick to the 31st December deadline to show that he honours his commitments, or he might be persuaded that the risk is no longer worth taking. If Biden wins, he might prefer to keep to the original May 2021 deadline, but Trump could presumably deny him that option before he leaves office on 20th January. And, if the election is so close that it leads to a lengthy judicial process and constitutional crisis, then it is anybody’s guess.
In any event, the US will be leaving Afghanistan shortly. It is instructive to read the accounts of the Soviet withdrawal on 15th February 1989. The received wisdom was that the mujahideen would take Kabul before the end of March. In fact, the so-called ‘puppet’ government of President Mohammad Najibullah survived until April 1992. Key to its survival was that the Soviet Union continued to pay the Afghan Army and to provide key supplies including ammunition and fuel. The Afghan Army was sufficiently capable to inflict a major defeat on the mujahideen at the Battle of Jalalabad in 1989. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted the provision of pay and supplies which ended altogether in January 1992. Meanwhile, the government continued to lose control of outlying provinces and barely controlled 10% of the country by the time Najibullah finally resigned.
A similar trajectory is possible over the next few years. The Afghan National Army has performed adequately since the allies ended their direct combat role in 2013. So long as they are paid and equipped, there is no reason to believe that they could not hold Kabul and some of the central, eastern and northern provinces. If the US commitment were to wane over time, that control would gradually erode.
A much better outcome would be a negotiated settlement between the government of President Ashraf Ghani and the Taliban, probably brokered by Khalilzad or by another third party. For as long as Mullah Baradar was the key player on the Taliban side, this looked like a possibility. It was he who wanted a negotiated settlement as far back as 2008, but he was detained by the Pakistanis. Baradar’s relatively moderate sentiments, though, are not widely shared amongst the Taliban leadership.
There are other options too. One could be an informal partition agreement with the Taliban controlling southern and western provinces like Helmand from its capital in Kandahar and regime loyalists governing the centre and north from Kabul. This would have similarities to the situation in the mid 1990s and it is hard to see how such a construct could remain peaceful for long. Too many provinces would be contested.
The key factor to remember is Pakistan’s central role. Whilst other participants have had imprecise and flexible objectives, Pakistan has retained its singular focus; to deny India a material presence in Afghanistan. For as long as there is a pro-India lobby in Kabul (such as Abdullah Abdullah and Amrullah Saleh) Pakistan will be uncomfortable about any power-sharing arrangement.
However, if Pakistan wishes to retain a strategic relationship with Washington, when most analysts predict an ever- closer Washington-New Delhi axis against China, then Khalilzad could develop genuine traction to deliver a lasting settlement in Afghanistan.
Read more expert-driven national security analysis, insight and perspective in The Cipher Brief
