On 23 May, John Walker Lindh was released after spending 17 years in a U.S. prison. The notorious “American Taliban”, convicted of providing support to a terrorist organization, will be kept under observation for years. That close supervision, however, cannot guarantee that he would be incapable (some would say “or unwilling”) to commit terrorism in the United States, particularly following a future U.S. attack on a Taliban target. His case will be watched closely, as it is the first post-9/11 example of a convicted American terrorist being released back into society.
Overseas, there are numerous similar cases, mostly unresolved. The thousands of prisoners picked up on the ISIS battlefield are the most recent and most pressing instance of an unresolved dilemma: what to do with hardened terrorists, including women and children, who are in custody?
Since the fall of Bagouz to the anti-ISIS coalition in April 2019, hastily built camps have been established to handle the wave of new prisoners from the once-expanding ISIS caliphate. In these camps are former fighters from Iraq, Syria, Europe, the Caucasus and even America. Sadly, one also finds women and children, some innocent but others still spellbound by the vision of a return to life under the caliphate.
Journalists like NPR’s Jane Arraf and Ben Hubbard of The New York Times have waded into these camps and been struck by the plight and the fury of the fighters – and that of their wives, widows and children. They have also been struck by the fact that these camps are fertile breeding grounds for another cadre of well-trained terrorists. Of note, 65 percent of the residents in the largest detention facility are children. The children may be among the most dangerous. “In some camps, the (boys) were forced to watch instruction videos on beheading, from how to lift the prisoner’s head by his scalp to where to cut the throat,” a recent Time magazine article noted. “Yezidi boy returnees described learning how to remove hands, arms or legs …some boys were also taught how to crucify those found guilty of disobeying ISIS’s dictates” according to the article.
So, what to do with these fanatics dressed in black chador and tiny sweatshirts? Despite the urgency of the problem, there is no international consensus. Iraq is separating its citizens from the general population and will likely bring them to trial in Iraq, but few other countries have decided what to do with their citizens. The overwhelming response to date has been to do nothing, with few international organizations stepping up to the challenge. The reason is simple; there are no easy solutions, and most options have been tried before. All have been criticized and few have been effective. The current options are Faustian bargains, and all require the political will found absent from most countries, especially when those countries have been forceful critics of the U.S. in the past.
What is abundantly clear is that simply looking away while waiting for the problem to solve itself is not an option. Yet, it may well be that the other options are equally unpalatable.
Option 1: Repatriate and instigate judicial action (The “SuperMax Option”)
At first glance, this option appears a reasonable and humane solution. Use the court system to try one’s citizens and imprison those convicted of criminal activity. Incarcerate in a high security facility with prisoners kept separate, and throw away the key. Yet, the strength of Western judicial systems is a “reasonable doubt” standard, and reasonable doubt will prevail in many (if not most) of the cases.
Indeed, most will claim they didn’t fight, didn’t provide material support or were merely cooks or logisticians. Others will claim they fought, but merely took up arms to avoided being killed. Without strong evidence to convict, many (if not most) will earn their freedom in their country especially those originating from liberal democracies in Western Europe. Yet, the consequences of released but unrepentant fighters returning to the general population, often to communities where they have not assimilated, should raise grave concerns. Gilles Kepel, a noted expert on militant Islam and the author of Terror in France: The rise of Jihad in the West and Al Qaeda in its Own Words, argues the danger that “…if you have lack of proof and you sentence the guy (to prison)…. he proselytizes like crazy then comes out and is perceived as a hero in his community.”
And that is merely the fighters. The specter of hundreds of radicalized ISIS brides, revenge-seeking widows and former ISIS “cubs” who may not have participated in the fighting but have been fully radicalized should raise concerns as well. Each a possible Manchurian Candidate potentially recruiting more fighters, more ISIS brides and their children should cause even the most forgiving to shudder.
As for those locals who wish to return to their homes in Syria or Iraq, there are no simple solutions. According to a journalist who recently visited the al Hol camp, “The main reason I heard from families not wanting to return were tribal problems - tribes not accepting them back - and fear of the Hashd (Shia militias). Some told me their villages were taken over by the Hashd and one little boy told me the Hashd would kill them if they returned.”
Option 2: Find a third country or location to harbor the prisoners (The “Australia Option”)
An historical solution to this challenge has been to establish facilities far away from one’s home country. Australia, “Devil’s Island”, St. Helena and, for that matter, Guantanamo Bay have all been used in the past to banish the worst criminals to imprisonment abroad. While an option to convict and export prisoners may be attractive on its surface, there are few remaining territories or colonies willing to construct detention facilities and even fewer willing to accept another’s convicts. The United States faced massive, in many cases insurmountable problems in resettling small numbers of former Guantanamo detainees and for those who were resettled, it took significant diplomacy, persuasion and incentives. It is unlikely Palau, Ghana and El Salvador can be relied upon in the future.
The political challenges are another reason this option may appear attractive on the surface but fail in practice. Inevitably, there will be a public outcry from segments of the population who will cite the inhumanity of banishment, the illegality of stripping a person of their birthright citizenship or condemn “another Guantanamo”. Despite the convictions passed down, many will call for the State to adhere to their “national values” and let these citizens remain. Not near them, of course.
In either of the first two options, the potential for violence, extremism and danger in free and open societies is grave, which explains why few (if any) politicians – or even humanitarian organizations – are clamoring for the return of their citizens or the resettlement of the stateless.
Option 3: Shelter in place and build long-term detention facilities (The “Bucca Option”)
In 2005, when the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq found its ad hoc detention facilities overflowing, a large complex was built in the southern part of the country. While under the titular supervision and responsibility of the Iraqi government, the Camp Bucca facility was constructed, operated and patrolled by U.S. troops. Despite its well-managed operations, the crowded conditions and critical mass of security threats and terrorists allowed it to become a fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization. Among the camp’s most notorious inmates was Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and little doubt his core element of fighters and terrorists were recruited inside of the tents of Bucca. Despite the drawbacks, many still argue for the international community to detain these threats indefinitely. According to Kepel, “Most European countries, even though (none) say that explicitly, want them to stay where they are.”
Some would argue that detention is not the answer, but a combination of de-radicalization programs and judgment according to Sharia law would provide better outcomes. Some regional officials have suggested that by making recourse to Sharia Law, Western countries would nullify potential accusations from rights groups later that justice was not properly served for these individuals. A Sharia Law approach could also prevent the trials in Western countries from later being construed as “persecution” by a resurgent ISIS.
Neither of these programs are precluded in any of the options listed above, although few countries are likely to bend national laws to Sharia judgments.
The solution to the situation on the ground may be one, or a combination, of the options noted above. Perhaps further novel options could emerge to compliment or replace elements of repatriation, local detention, national judicial action or extraterritorial banishment. There is no best option as, candidly, few formal options are being considered outside of narrow circles.
For Syrian detainees, there may be no option at all as handing them over to the Assad regime would mean extrajudicial killing or, at best, a lifetime in the living hell of a Syrian concentration camp, which is an equally likely outcome for those fighters from less-liberal countries east of Europe.
In all of these options, de-radicalization programs should be and probably will be included. While resource intensive and reasonably effective, they are not a panacea. Like all rehabilitation programs, there is much recidivism and irretention. That should not dissuade the sponsors of these options from embracing de-radicalization programs, but as the assassination attempt on Crown Prince Muhammad bin-Nayif in 2009 showed, (masterminded by a graduate of the Saudi de-radicalization program) the programs are not failsafe.
Among the greatest impediments to any solution is public opinion. Kepel notes, “Politically… (keeping) them in Syria is the only way”. As for the belief of a sympathetic majority in France, he writes, “Public opinion does not want those guys to come back. They are seen to be responsible for the terror wave in Europe between 2015 and 2017. No one wants to think the taxes one pays is going to feed those guys. If you have hundreds of them come back (to France), Marie Pen would already be at 30% in the polls.”
As the surviving ISIS fighters, wives, widows and children bake in the Syrian sun, the next generation of ISIS fighters, or worse, are being once again evangelized and recruited for future operations. They watch as their caliphate is destroyed, their friends and loved ones die, and they are seeking revenge and comeback. Individual countries and international organizations have a responsibility to deal with their citizens, and they have a responsibility for deep introspection into their societies and cultures which created these precision-guided ideologues.
Holding these people in detention facilities not dissimilar to those which held and radicalized Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri will achieve the same result, and the consequence of inaction is predictable. We’ve read this book before and dealing with the problem is long overdue. The do-nothing option, merely whistling past the graveyard, may prove to be the worst option of all.
Read more from Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt (USA, ret.) in The Cipher Brief
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