Rob Dannenberg is a 24-year veteran of the CIA, where he served in several senior leadership positions, including chief of operations for the Counterterrorism Center, chief of the Central Eurasia Division and chief of the CIA’s Information Operations Center. Dannenberg is now an independent consultant and speaker on geopolitical and security risk, after serving as the managing director and head of the Office of Global Security for Goldman Sachs, and director of International Security Affairs at BP.
On January 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin fired his entire government, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (technically, Medvedev resigned at Putin’s request), and initiated a series of amendments to the Constitution meant to enable him to continue steering Russia after his fourth and current term expires in 2024. Putin then appointed Mikhail Mishustin as the new prime minister, while Medvedev has been appointed the deputy chairman of the presidential Security Council, even though the legislation to create such a position has not yet been approved by the Duma. The expectation in Moscow is that the “referendum” on the constitutional changes will take place May 1st—passage of the proposed changes is not in doubt.
Although the timing of the announcement took many by surprise - Putin had only discussed the move with Medvedev - there has been active discussion in Moscow about what is referred to as Operation 2024, the plan to preserve Putin’s control of Russia and the power structure he has created when his term ends in 2024. Other options under consideration (and the January 15 announcement may not be the final iteration of Operation 2024) include a merger with Belorussia which would require amendment of the Constitution and thus an opportunity for Putin to run for another term, a replay of the Putin steps down to be Prime Minister and Medvedev serves one term again as President, or as the January 15 announcement suggests—and once the changes are approved—Putin will have options to become, for example, Chairman of the Duma, Chairman of the Federation Council, or Chairman of the State Council or Gossovet, which will be codified in the Constitution. All powerful positions under the new proposed legislation. But, as many observers have noted, in Putin’s Russia how power is apportioned under law or in official structures is quite different from how power is actually exercised.
There are some other aspects of what Putin has proposed that may be of interest, in addition to some power being formally re-distributed away from the presidency, the post of prime minister has also been weakened in that the role would become beholden to both the President and the Duma. In addition to watering down the power of the presidency, Putin is seeking to introduce other constraints on his successor. No longer will it be possible to serve more than two terms as President (whether consecutive or not) but the next President must have lived for a minimum of 25 years permanently and uninterrupted in Russia and must never have had any kind of foreign passport, residency permit or similar document (Putin himself could not have become President had such a requirement previously existed). Many Russian government officials and siloviki currently have two passports. Further, among the constitutional changes to the power/political system, Putin proposed to remove any reference to the supremacy of international law in the constitution. Once these changes take place, Russian
laws will take precedence over international laws, as well as precedence over any international agreement or treaty Russia has entered. Such laws, agreements, and treaties will only be valid in Russia to the extent they are not deemed to be “contradicting the Russian constitution.”
On January 16, Putin’s new prime minister Mikhail Mishustin was approved by the Duma. Perhaps symbolically, Putin did not personally accompany Mishustin to the Duma to present him as he has always done with Medvedev. Instead, he let the Presidential Representative to the Duma, a relatively junior official, do so.
Mishustin, 55 years old, is a relatively unknown figure and has been head of the
Federal Tax Service for the past ten years. He spent a couple of years previously in the private sector as President and a Managing Director at UFG Capital Partners. He is considered a quintessential state technocrat but has a real interest and some skill in digital and data technology matters. Perhaps significantly, regime critic Alexis Navalny already seems to have done some research on Mishustin and Navalny alleges that in the nine years when Mishustin was head of the tax service, his wife earned about 800 million rubles (roughly $100 million) despite having no occupation. Mishustin is not really a political figure or a heavyweight in the system. He is not a “successor” to Putin or a threat to other insider groups. Many already consider him to be in a caretaker status until Putin decides his next step. Putin needs to have confidence that whatever figure or figures emerge from Operation 2024 in either real or nominal positions of power, that they will do for Putin and his structure what Putin did for Yeltsin, protect the security of the structure Putin has built.
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